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Abstract 
Introduction:  Theories of moral reasoning, empathy and information processing 
have long been used to explain offending behaviour in people with intellectual 
disabilities (ID), and the way in which attention is allocated to stimuli is thought to be 
integral to developmental models of offending that incorporate these ideas (Garrigan & 
Langdon, In Press).  The present study sought to examine empathy and attentional bias 
in ID offenders (IDO) and ID non-offenders (IDNO).  Methods: Men with mild ID 
(IDO n = 34; IDNO n = 32) completed a self-report empathy measure, and an affective 
dot-probe task containing negative, positive, and neutral images.  Reaction times (RT) to 
computerised trials were recorded.  Results: (1) The IDO group had significantly lower 
empathy scores than the IDNO group; (2) within group comparisons showed that RT in 
the IDO group were similar across trial types, whilst the IDNO group had significantly 
slower RT the affective trials than neutral trials; (3) between group analysis revealed a 
significant group difference in attentional bias for negative-affective and global-affective 
stimuli (positive and negative images collapsed together); and (4) across all participants, 
attentional bias could not explain a significant percentage of the variance in empathy.  
Discussion: The findings suggest that IDO attentional allocation is unaffected by the 
stimuli content, whilst attention in the IDNO group is significantly biased away from 
negative- and global-affective information in comparison to IDO.  However, attentional 
bias could not explain any variance in empathic abilities.  The findings provide some 
support for the application of attentional theories of information processing to this 
population.  Further research in people with ID could lead to the use of attentional bias 
paradigms as unbiased pre- and post-intervention measures, and may even have 
application in an intervention context, in the form of cognitive bias modification.  
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Chapter Overview 
A minority of people with intellectual disabilities (ID) are known to engage in 
antisocial or offending behaviours, and the impact of their offending has far reaching 
implications for society.  ID offenders (IDO) are also a particularly vulnerable 
population; they are susceptible to exploitation in the community, risks to their health 
and wellbeing are enhanced in the criminal justice service, and the effects of long term 
detention can have a considerable negative impact.  Consequently, innovative theories 
and interventions are being sought to ameliorate these risks, to improve outcomes for all. 
Psychological models are receiving increasing attention in this endeavour, and this 
study aims to generate new evidence that can contribute to our understanding of people 
with ID who offend.  This chapter opens with a historical backdrop to ID and offending.  
It then goes on to discuss psychological theories of offending – moral reasoning, 
empathy, and information processing, and considers how these form part of more 
comprehensive developmental models of offending in people with ID.  A single aspect 
of these models, attentional bias, will then be considered in detail, and a systematic 
literature review of attentional bias investigations in non-ID offenders is discussed.  The 
chapter closes with a rationale for the present study, and the research questions and 
hypotheses. 
1.2 Intellectual Disabilities and Offending 
1.2.1 Section Overview 
Section 1.2 begins by providing the context of the clinical population examined 
in this thesis.  It will consider the historical background of people with ID, the 
prevalence rates and characteristics of this group, and the relationship between ID and 
13 
 
offending.  Methodological issues pertinent to research in this population will also be 
discussed. 
1.2.2 Intellectual Disabilities 
1.2.2.1 Historical and Recent Context 
Defining and understanding ID has historically been complex, and consequently, 
it has been socially constructed and reconstructed over time (Hatton, 1998).  In the late 
19
th
 and early 20
th
 century, one approach to conceptualising ID was to categorise people 
according to whether the aetiology of their disability could be established (Carr, 
O'Reilly, Noonan Walsh, & McEvoy, 2007; Scheerenberger, 1983).  The literature 
distinguished individuals with ‘pathological conditions caused by organic insult’, from 
‘subcultural mental defectives’, who had no identifiable cause of their impairments 
(Down, 1887; Lewis, 1933; Tredgold, 1908).  Another approach was to consider deficits 
in intellectual capability and defects of congenital aetiology as being integrally linked to 
moral insanity, or immorality (Maudsley, 1872).  For many years, the terms ‘moral idiot’ 
and ‘moral imbecile’ were associated with people with ID (Trent, 1994).  It was argued 
that the majority of people who engaged in immoral behaviour did not have normal 
levels of intelligence, and as such, were ‘morons’ (Goddard, 1919).  Research at that 
time suggested that half of people who were in prisons were ‘mentally defective’ 
(Goddard, 1914).  
During the eugenics movement of the 20
th
 Century, it became an established idea 
that people with ID were a threat to society (Taylor & Lindsay, 2010), and when the 
Mental Deficiency Act was established in 1913, courts were given the power to issue 
committal orders for any person deemed to be ‘mentally defective’ (Walker & McCabe, 
1973).  The impact of these academic, clinical, social and political ideas affected many 
14 
 
people with ID – both those who had and had not committed crimes – with sterilisation, 
and institutionalisation becoming commonplace.  It was not until much later that the 
introduction of the National Assistance and Mental Health Acts (1948, 1959) brought 
about revisions of the terms used in legislation, that distinguished those with a ‘mental 
impairment’ from those who engaged in irresponsible or antisocial behaviour (Cope, 
1995). 
More recently, there have been regional differences in the terminology used to 
describe this population, with ‘mental retardation’ used in the USA, and ‘learning 
disabilities’ used in the UK, and increasingly, ‘intellectual disability’ is the preferred 
term.  This current use of this label denotes a group of people with different, potentially 
multiple aetiologies, such as genetic abnormalities or chromosomal dysfunction, who 
have atypical intellectual development that results in a variety of lifelong conditions and 
behavioural phenotypes (Carr et al., 2007; Harris, 1995).  With the advent of 
neuropsychological testing, formalised diagnosis of ID has been possible since the 
beginning of the 20
th
 century.  Based on the concept of intellectual quotient (IQ; 
Detterman, Gabriel, & Ruthsatz, 2000), the main premise of assessing IQ in this group 
of people was that impairments in cognitive skills were a ‘symptom’.  However, it has 
since been acknowledged that this is insufficient criteria for determining ID, and that 
adaptive functioning or behaviour (i.e. age appropriate behaviours which individuals 
require in order to live independently and safely) must also be assessed.  For some time, 
diagnostic systems utilised concepts of both IQ and adaptive functioning, but most 
recent definitions have moved away from the use of IQ (see Table 1).  
15 
 
Table 1. Classification Systems Describing Intellectual Disabilities 
ICD-10 / WHO (1992) DSM-IV-TR (2000) DSM-5 (2013) 
For a diagnosis, there should be a: 
A. Reduced level of intellectual 
functioning’ resulting in: 
B. Diminished ability to adapt to the 
daily demands of the normal social 
environment. 
Diagnostic criteria: 
A. Significantly sub-average 
intellectual functioning - an IQ of 70 
or below, 
B. Concurrent deficits or impairments 
in present adaptive functioning, 
C. Onset before 18 years. 
Diagnostic criteria: 
A. Deficits in general mental abilities, 
B. Impairment in adaptive functioning for the 
individual’s age and sociocultural 
background, 
C. Onset during the developmental period. 
Four classifications: 
1. Mild: Ability to use speech in 
everyday situations; usually full 
independence in self-care; IQ 
between 50-69. 
2. Moderate: Slow in comprehension; 
supervision of self-care, retarded 
motor skills; IQ between 35-49  
3. Severe: Marked impairment of 
motor skills; clinically significant 
damage to CNS; IQ between 20-3.  
4. Profound: severely limited 
understanding, immobility or 
restricted mobility, incontinence, 
constant supervision; IQ <20, 
usually organic aetiology. 
Degree of severity reflects level of 
intellectual impairment:  
1. Mild: IQ level 50-55 to 
approximately 70  
2. Moderate: IQ level 35-40 to 50-55  
3. Severe: IQ level 20-25 to 35-40  
4. Profound: IQ level below 20 or 25  
5. Mental Retardation, Severity 
Unspecified - when there is strong 
presumption of Mental Retardation 
but the person’s intelligence is 
untestable by standard tests. 
Four severity levels: Mild, Moderate, Severe and 
Profound, based on the three domains of 
adaptive behaviour (IQ criteria no longer 
central to the diagnosis): 
1. Conceptual: e.g. language, reading, 
writing, maths, reasoning, knowledge, 
memory.  
2. Social: e.g. awareness of others’ 
experiences, interpersonal skills, friendship 
abilities, self-regulation.  
3. Practical: personal care, job 
responsibilities, money management, 
recreation, managing one’s behaviour, and 
organizing tasks. 
 
Note: ICD-10 / WHO - International Statistical Classification of Diseases and Related Health Problems / World Health Organisation; DSM-IV-TR - Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 4th 
Edition – Text Revision; DSM-5 - Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 5th Edition.
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The World Health Organisation (WHO; 2001) estimates the global prevalence of 
ID is 1% - 3% (Gillberg & Soderstrom, 2003), and a recent estimate using data from 24 
local authorities suggests 985,000 people in England have an ID (Emerson & Hatton, 
2008).  Within this, approximately 25% of people with ID are believed to have a 
disorder of known (prenatal, perinatal, or postnatal) aetiology, 25% have a suspected, 
but unconfirmed aetiology, and 50% have disorders of unknown aetiology (Cans et al., 
1999).  Some specific types of ID are investigated within modern literature due to their 
established cause or shared behavioural phenotype, but many studies examine the 
population as a whole, assuming a certain degree of heterogeneity based on intelligence 
and overall functioning.  In the present study, the literature examining ID of all 
aetiologies will be considered. 
1.2.2.2 Population Characteristics 
People with ID are a heterogeneous population, with a wide variety of cognitive, 
social, physical and behavioural skills and needs.  They may have difficulties with 
interpersonal skills, receptive or expressive communication needs, or problems with fine 
and/or gross motor functions (Carr et al., 2007).  They can have impairments in 
executive functions, such as planning, problem solving, or organisation, or deficits in 
processes such as response inhibition, attention shifting, or working memory 
(Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996).  They have an elevated incidence of mental health 
problems; rates of anxiety, depression, and psychosis are significantly higher than in the 
general population (O’Brien, 2002), and when making appropriate adaptations to 
diagnostic criteria, prevalence rates of mental health problems in people with ID vary 
between 30% and 50% (Cooper, 1997; Lund, 1985).  They also have a greater incidence 
of physical health problems, which frequently go undetected and untreated (Lennox & 
Kerr, 1997).  
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In addition to these difficulties, people with ID and their families are at increased 
risk of adverse socio-economic circumstances (Emerson & Hatton, 2008).  It is 
estimated that only 10% of people with an ID are in employment Department of Health, 
2001) and this is associated with poorer quality of life (Beyer, Brown, Akandi, & 
Rapley, 2010).  People with ID also have difficulties accessing housing, and as this often 
enables people to access social and community networks, they are also at risk of social 
exclusion (Bryan & Bryan, 1978; Department of Health, 2001).  Societal attitudes 
towards people with ID also contribute to them being a marginalised group.  
Quantitative research suggests that people hold both overt and covert negative attitudes 
towards people with ID (Akrami, Ekehammar, Claesson, & Sonnander, 2006), and 90% 
of people in this population have reported experiencing harassment and abuse (Sin, 
Mguni, Cook, Comber, & Hedges, 2010). 
1.2.3 Intellectual Disabilities and Offending 
As early as the turn of the last century, assessment results from adults in prison 
populations were argued to indicate link between offending behaviour and impaired 
intelligence (Goddard, 1914).  More recently, the idea that offenders have lower IQs on 
average, in comparison to the general population, has been supported (Goodman, 
Simonoff, & Stevenson, 1995; Hernstein & Murray, 1994).  For example, Hirschi & 
Hindelang (1977) found that IQ was a good predictor of criminal behaviour within 
different racial or social groupings, and Hodgins (1992) found that men and women with 
ID were three and four times more likely, respectively, to offend than people without an 
ID.  Assessment of a cross-sectional prison sample using the Wechsler Adult 
Intelligence Scale and the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scales found that 7-10% of the 
population had an ID (defined as an IQ under 70), whilst 23-33% had an IQ in the 
borderline range (Hayes, Shackell, Mottram, & Lancaster, 2007). 
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Although there appears to be an association between criminal activity and 
intelligence, this relationship is not necessarily linear.  Some authors suggested that the 
majority of offenders fall “in the low normal or borderline subnormal range…their 
relative frequencies decline on either side of this range” (p. 155, Wilson & Herrnstein, 
1985), suggesting the relationship between IQ and offending may instead be curvilinear.  
A recent large scale study of national self-reported offending data using a variety of 
assessment tools supports this idea.  Mears and Cochrane (2013) found that people with 
lowest and highest IQs had lower rates of offending than those in the middle of the 
continuum.  Thus, whilst IQ may be associated with offending, until recently, the nature 
of this relationship may have been misunderstood.  
In part, this may be due to a number of methodological problems in investigating 
this relationship, particularly with regards to difficulties in obtaining “true” offending 
statistics in people with ID.  For example, people with an ID have an increased 
likelihood of diversion from the criminal justice process before they enter it (Cullen, 
Gendreau, Jarjoura, & Wright, 1997).  Furthermore, for an act to be deemed criminal in 
British law, intent or a guilty “state of mind” must be present (Holland, Clare, & 
Mukhopadhyay, 2002).  This can be problematic to ascertain in people with ID, and so 
many people with an ID are not charged.  Conversely, if people with a lower IQ give an 
insufficient or incomplete account of their activities, they may be more likely to receive 
a less severe sentence than people without an ID (Williams, 2008).   
However, there is little explanation of the causal relationship between 
intelligence and offending, and many studies have often inadequately controlled for 
potentially confounding factors.  Interestingly, a leading longitudinal investigation gave 
some attention to the role of such factors.  In the Cambridge Delinquency Study, it was 
reported that almost double the number of boys who engaged in criminal activity were in 
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a low, rather than high, IQ group, and almost a third of these went on to be convicted of 
criminal offences (Lynam, Moffitt, & Stonthame-Loeber, 1993; West, 1982).  However, 
they also found that low non-verbal ability was related to low socioeconomic status, 
poor school attainment, high truancy, and early school leaving, raising an important 
issue regarding how the relationship between these two variables is commonly studied.  
Most frequently, studies have examined offenders who, as a consequence of social 
disadvantage, disruptive behavioural disorders, and poor education histories, have lower 
IQs, rather than specifically examining people with an ID. Therefore, it is possible that 
studies are not truly measuring intelligence, but perhaps are examining educational 
attainment and background. 
1.2.3.1 Population Characteristics 
The prevalence of people with ID in the criminal justice system ranges between 
0.6% and 39.6% (Holland, 1991; MacEachron, 1979), and there are data to suggest that 
in comparison to the general population, almost double the expected number of people 
with an ID are sectioned under the Mental Health Act and detained in secure NHS 
facilities (Taylor & Lindsay, 2010).  In part, this may be due to some of the 
methodological issues previously discussed, and it is interesting to note that when using 
standardised diagnostic criteria (APA, 1994) with the application of an appropriate 
confidence interval (+/- 5 points from an IQ of 70), prevalence rates of offenders with 
ID triples from 2.9% to 9.4% (Hayes et al., 2007). 
Several studies have sought to identify the topography of IDO.  People with ID 
who have offended are likely to be male, from a low socioeconomic background, have a 
history of behavioural problems (Simpson & Hogg, 2001), and have an IQ in the “mild” 
range (Salekin, Olley, & Hedge, 2010).  They are also reported to often be from abusive, 
neglectful or disruptive families, in need of supported accommodation, and typically 
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have chaotic lifestyles (Glaser & Florio, 2004).  Comorbid mental health problems are 
also high in this group.  Smith, Quinn and Lindsay (2000) reported a 22% prevalence 
rate, mainly comprising mood disorders and schizophrenia, and when considering both 
mental health problems and substance abuse, a recent report suggested prevalence in this 
population is as high as 90%, with approximately 68% substance and alcohol abuse and 
36% personality disorders (Mannynsalo, Putkonen, Lindberg, & Kotilainen, 2009). 
Women are thought to comprise a small (less than 10%) percentage of the 
population, yet they are overrepresented in the criminal justice system (Lindsay, Smith, 
et al., 2004).  In comparison to male ID offenders, they have higher rates of mental 
health problems, and lower levels of reoffending (Lindsay, Smith, et al., 2004), and due 
to social, political and cultural reasons, comprise a particularly marginalised and 
oppressed population (Kendall, 2004).  It should be noted that comparatively very few 
studies consider females with ID, and as such, they are often misrepresented within large 
scale reports, research, and treatment considerations.   
Patterns of offending in people with ID vary across samples.  Murphy, Harnett 
and Holland (1995) indicate assault, burglary and drug offences are common, while 
Klimecki, Jenkinson and Wilson (1994) found highest offence rates for theft/robbery, 
assault and sexual related offences, and Mabile (1982) reported burglary/breaking and 
entering, and sex offences were most common.  The prevalence of vehicle-related 
offences and white collar crime is very small, as people with ID are unlikely to drive or 
to have the abilities or motivations to commit offences such as fraud (Simpson & Hogg, 
2001).  There is also very limited evidence of offending in people with an IQ of less than 
50, as they are unlikely to be deemed to have “mens rea” (guilty mind) according to 
criminal law (Simpson & Hogg, 2001).  
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There are a number of other features of IDO that are relevant to their engagement 
in criminal proceedings.  They are vulnerable to acquiescence and coercion when being 
questioned (Hayes, 1996), have an elevated misunderstanding of criminal justice 
procedures and personal rights in comparison to non-ID offenders (Johnston & Halstead, 
2000), and impaired competency with regards to standing trial and pleading guilty 
(Baroff, 1996).  Furthermore, offenders with ID are at risk of being rejected by 
mainstream services due to high prevalence of mental health problems and perceptions 
that they are difficult to treat or present a greater risk to others (Lindsay, Taylor, & 
Sturmey, 2004).  Consequently, offenders with ID are amongst those detained for the 
longest in secure facilities, and have complex and difficult discharges (Johnston & 
Halstead, 2000; Murphy, 2000). 
1.2.3.2 Interventions 
In comparison to non-ID offenders, it is thought that IDO may require specific 
interventions that both target and accommodate their difficulties (Holland, 1991).  For 
certain types of offenders, there are some offence specific issues which have been 
identified as beneficial to target (Clare and Murphy, 1998), however, a number of 
general areas of intervention are thought to be important for this population, such as 
addressing self-control and promoting personal responsibility (Day, 1993).  The majority 
of recent studies support the use cognitive and behavioural therapies and social skills 
training in IDO (Barron, Hassiotis, & Banes, 2002).  Although there have been long held 
assumptions that the cognitive difficulties experienced by people with ID render them 
unfit for such interventions, a growing body of literature in this field suggests this is 
starting to change, and a recent meta-analyses suggest that treatment is efficacious with 
a moderate effect size (Vereenooghe & Langdon, 2013).  There is also a small body of 
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evidence for other therapies, such as dialectical behaviour therapy (e.g. Morrissey & 
Ingamells, 2011). 
Consideration of offence specific treatments does not offer clear advice for 
clinicians and services.  For example, Hamelin, Treavis and Sturmey (2013) reviewed 
anger management interventions, and although they acknowledged they are important in 
people with ID who have high rates of aggression and impulsivity, many of the studies 
considered could not demonstrate clear behavioural change.  A review of the sex 
offender literature revealed similar problems.  There is a reasonable research base in this 
field, where studies typically make use of cognitive and behaviour management and skill 
acquisition, however Ashman and Duggan (2002) note that there is no ‘gold standard’ 
evidence from randomised controlled trials to guide this field, and many studies have 
used small samples or uncontrolled designs.  Recently, the Sex Offender Treatment 
Services Collaborative for people with ID offered encouraging evidence for cognitive 
and behavioural interventions, demonstrating that a manualised treatment approach led 
to significant reductions in victim empathy and distorted sexual cognitions, maintained 
at a six month follow up (Sex Offender Treatment Services Collaborative – Intellectual 
Disabilities, 2010). 
Overall, many of the studies that do exist are case studies or case series, and 
whilst these may offer the possibility of identifying the key components and processes at 
work (Clare and Murphy, 1998), this stands in contrast to the dominant use of 
randomised control trials in the general population.  Furthermore, many studies indicate 
that treatment outcomes for offenders are mixed: Baron, Hassiotis and Banes (2004) 
reported that that recidivism rates following treatment are between 0% and 85%, whilst 
Lindsay (2002) suggests that up to 69% of people who have not received treatment 
reoffend.  Thus whilst psychological interventions offer a great deal of potential for 
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change in offending populations, significantly more research is needed if outcomes are 
to be improved, and the key mechanisms for change are to be more precisely defined. 
1.2.4 Section Summary 
People with ID make up at least one percent of the general population.  By 
definition, their IQ is below average, and they can experience a wide range of 
impairments across cognitive, adaptive, and communicative domains, often compounded 
by an increased incidence of mental and physical illness and social exclusion.  A 
substantial research body has shown that a relationship exists between IQ and offending, 
and offenders with ID are also a vulnerable and heterogeneous population.  Despite a 
clear need to understand the needs of IDO and understand how offending behaviour 
arises, the research in this area is lacking in quantity and quality, and is fraught with 
methodological problems.  Such issues impact upon the development of evidence based 
treatments that are needed to improve outcomes in this population.  An increasing body 
of evidence has examined treatment programmes in different types of offender with ID, 
and although many are promising, they cannot offer reliable conclusions regarding 
which treatments, or aspects of treatments, best meet individual needs.  Effective 
treatment programmes for IDO should be based on robust, well researched theories of 
offending.  The following section will therefore explore models and theories of 
offending, and consider how they can be applied to people with ID. 
1.3 Theories and Models of Offending 
1.3.1 Section Overview 
Theoretical explanations of offending are intrinsically linked to clinical practice, 
and are used to guide the format of assessments, formulation, treatment and evaluation 
of individuals and their difficulties (Ward, Polaschek, & Beech, 2005).  This section will 
review some of the relevant theories and models of offending.  Many contemporary 
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theorists focus on a single dimension of mind or behaviour and its associated 
explanatory processes, and this section will begin by briefly reviewing three key 
theories: moral reasoning, empathy, and information processing.  This will be followed 
by a discussion of developmental models of offending behaviour that incorporate these 
ideas, which have application to IDO populations.   
1.3.2 Theoretical Explanations  
1.3.2.1 Moral Reasoning  
Moral reasoning theories refer to the processes a person engages in when making 
decisions about whether an object or action is “right” or “wrong” (Langdon, Clare, & 
Murphy, 2010).  It offers a developmental framework for understanding how people 
make moral judgments, based on the idea that such decisions change and typically 
mature over time.  Piaget (1932) viewed the development of morality as process of 
constructing ideas and ideals around justice and equality that develop in line with logical 
reasoning.  He broadly suggested that moral reasoning could be developed through 
emphasis on cooperative decision making and opportunities for problem solving, and 
that children’s reasoning developed from being governed by laws or standards, to 
reliance on individual and societal principles. 
However, these ideas were only developed to account for development between 
infancy and adolescence.  Kohlberg (1969) expanded upon this, viewing justice to be the 
essential characteristic of moral reasoning.  He suggested moral development progressed 
from an egocentric view where rules are viewed as being outside of the individual, 
through to a complex understanding of laws, circumstances in which they can be 
challenged, and ethical principles.  Both theoretical perspectives considered that 
individuals increasingly aim to make sense and create structure within their world, and 
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so higher order levels of reasoning can only be attained through a successful, upwardly 
linear progression through lower levels.   
 Despite its development of the field, this model attracted a number of criticisms 
(Gilligan, 1982; Snarey, 1985; Sullivan, 1977), in particular, its over reliance on a 
cognitive-developmental perspective of morality, and minimisation of the possible role 
of emotion in moral judgement (Palmer, 2003).  Accounting for these limitations, Gibb’s 
(Gibbs, 1979, 2013) developed a sociomoral model that emphasised the role of social 
interaction.  Gibb’s contested that reasoning could be concrete and superficial, or based 
on a more mature understanding of interpersonal relationships and consideration of 
societal needs.  Eisenberg (1989) also went on to highlight more empathic, prosocial 
components of moral behaviour that rely on a person’s ability to perspective take and 
understand how others may feel.  In particular, she argued that concepts of sympathy (an 
affective response of sorrow or concern for another) and personal distress (a feeling of 
discomfort in response to someone else’s situation) are implicated in prosocial 
development and action.  The progression of these ideas are summarised in Table 2. 
1.3.2.1.1 Moral Reasoning and Offending 
Together, the application of these ideas to offending behaviour acknowledges 
that people commit offences for different reasons, and in different ways, depending on 
their stage of moral development.  For example, a person operating at an early stage of 
moral reasoning may be likely to offend if they believe punishment can be avoided, 
whereas a person at a later stage may commit a criminal act as a result of a conflict of 
multiple moral principles.  A wealth of empirical evidence supports the significant role 
moral reasoning plays in offending, and a recent large scale meta-analysis (n = 15,992 
offenders) has shown that there is a significant inverse relationship between moral 
development and criminal acts (Van Vugt et al., 2011).  Despite small to moderate effect  
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Table 2. Key Developments in Moral Reasoning Theories 
Piaget (1932) Kohlberg (1969) Gibbs (1979) Eisenberg (1989) 
Heteronomous moral reasoning 
A view of people as either right or 
wrong; rules are perceived to be 
inflexible and imposed by authority 
figures, and children appeal to the 
consequences, rather than the 
intentions, of an act.  This phase is 
characterised by egocentric thinking 
- where children are unable to 
simultaneously hold theirs and 
others perspectives.  Their relative 
social relationship and power 
imbalance with adults is also key. 
Autonomous moral reasoning 
Individuals learn that rules are 
developed by society, for the benefit 
of society, and are governed by 
principles of fairness and justice. 
Level 1: Pre-conventional 
Stage 1: Heteronomous Morality 
Decisions are based on obedience of 
authority and avoiding punishment. 
Stage 2: Individualism and 
Instrumental Purpose 
Own needs are viewed as highest 
priority.  Decisions based on personal 
views of reward and punishment. 
Level 2: Conventional  
Stage 3: Mutual Interpersonal 
Expectations and Relationships  
Decisions taken in relation to other 
people’s needs, where the relationship 
is perceived to be important. 
Stage 4: Social System and 
Conscience 
Decisions are made in the context of 
societal laws and rules, with an aim of 
ensuring order is maintained. 
Level 3: Postconventional  
Stage 5: Social Contract and 
Individual Rights  
Decisions made within the framework 
of overarching values, taking into 
consideration that different views will 
be held by different groups. 
Stage 6: Universal Ethical Principles 
Well-developed ethical arguments 
underpin decisions, taking into 
consideration justice, dignity etc. 
Level 1: Immature 
Stage 1: Unilateral and 
Physicalistic 
Moral decisions are based on 
obedience of authority figures and 
avoiding punishment. 
Stage 2: Exchanging and 
Instrumental 
Moral decisions are based on 
superficial understandings 
developed from social 
interactions.  Reasoning is 
concerned with the needs of the 
self, or others. 
Level 2: Mature  
Stage 3: Mutual and Prosocial 
Decisions are based on a prosocial 
understanding of emotional states, 
care, and appropriate conduct.  
Emphasis is placed on the 
consequence of behaviour for 
others.   
Stage 4: Systemic and Standard 
Decisions are based on complex 
understandings of rights, values, 
social structures, justice, 
responsibility and conscience.   
Self-centred reasoning 
Priority of perceived consequences 
to self, consideration personal costs 
and benefit, expectations of 
reciprocity. 
Needs-oriented reasoning 
Express concern for other’s needs 
even though there may be a conflict 
with one's own needs. No role-
taking or empathy. 
Stereotyped and/or approval-
oriented reasoning  
A desire to win approval, and 
stereotyped ideas of good/bad 
people and good/bad behaviour. 
Empathic reasoning 
An awareness of the emotional 
consequences of giving or 
withholding help.  Some use of role-
taking, empathy, and perspective 
taking. 
Partly internalized principles 
Justifications for actions involve 
some personal values, such as 
concern for others' rights. 
Strongly internalized principles 
Justifications for actions are based 
on strongly-held internalized values, 
such as belief in equality of all, with 
the emotional consequences of self-
respect. 
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sizes, this was found across men and women, adults and adolescents, and self-reports 
and official reports, using different types of assessment tools, suggesting this 
relationship is relatively robust.  
It is also interesting to note that, similar to the curvilinear relationship between 
IQ and offending (Mears & Cochran, 2013), there may be a similar pattern between 
moral reasoning and offending.  Richards, Cooper, Coder, Masnaz and Anderson (1992) 
suggest that at early moral stages, antisocial or disruptive behaviour is minimised as 
emphasis is placed on obeying rules; this behaviour increases at the mid stages, where an 
individuals’ own needs take priority; and at latter stages it decreases again, as there is 
greater emphasis on the development and maintenance of relationships.  In support of 
this, a review of adolescent studies (Gibbs, 2013) noted a prevalence of early level 
(stage 2) reasoning has been noted in adolescents who offend, whilst age matched non-
offenders gave higher level (stage 3) reasoning in their understanding and obeying of the 
law.      
1.3.2.2 Empathy 
Empathy is “the ability to understand and share in another’s emotional state or 
context” (p988, Cohen & Strayer, 1996), or “an affective response more appropriate to 
someone else's situation than to one's own" (p48, Hoffman, 1987).  Some of the earliest 
and most influential studies in this area suggest that empathy can be divided into two 
elements: emotional or affective empathy, and cognitive empathy (Davis, 1980).  
Affective empathy describes the sharing of the emotional state or context of another  
(Eisenberg & Strayer, 1987), namely, the felt experience of an emotion.  It motivates 
people to engage in altruistic behaviours, and in so doing, facilitates familial bonds and 
promotes group cohesion (Plutchik, 1987).  Cognitive empathy refers to a more 
intellectual understanding and identification of the experience of another person, their 
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perspective, or their internal states (Cronbach, 1955; Ickes, 1997).  It facilitates social 
expertise, and enables people to understand and predict the behaviour of others, based on 
their attributed mental states. 
Early research investigated empathy as a dichotomous construct (Davis, 1980), 
but many theorists also acknowledge these ideas may be interdependent.  Consequently, 
theories of empathy can either be heavily reliant on either cognitive, or affective 
components, or can assimilate these ideas (Hoffman, 1977).  For example, theories of 
perspective taking explain how a person may take an alternative perspective in order to 
form ideas about what another person other knows, feels, thinks, and believes (Kraus & 
Fussell, 1996), whilst social mindfulness theory places emphasis on will and motivation 
for empathic concern and prosocial orientation (Van Doesum, Van Lange, & Van Lange, 
2013).   
Emotional states are associated with highly motivated behaviours, and the 
relationship between empathy and moral behaviour can be most easily seen in prosocial 
actions.  Hoffman (2000) posits that empathic distress functions as a prosocial moral 
motivation to act, and that this is automatically and without conscious awareness.  He 
identified five key modes that are necessarily part of this process, which develop from 
birth through to adulthood (Table 3).  He suggests that the ‘primitive’ modes comprise 
the more basic components of an empathic response; mimicry, conditioning and direct 
association enable a person to demonstrate an affective or emotional response.  As 
language and cognition develop, more ‘mature’ modes of verbally mediated association 
and social perspective taking come into play, and behavioural responses become 
increasingly reliant on cognitively advanced processes. 
As empathic responses that occur through the higher order modes are more 
cognitively complex, they permit a deeper connection to others than does empathy from 
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only the basic modes.  Furthermore, although they are more subject to effort and 
voluntary control, they can be triggered immediately and have the potential to be fast 
acting and involuntary.  Thus, those engaging in higher modes have the ability to 
consider others who are not physically present, and consequently, to consider moral 
dilemmas such as whether they might feel guilt if they were to harm another person, or 
to consider another person’s needs when deciding upon their own actions. 
 
 
Table 3. Hoffman's Developmental Model of Empathy 
Mode Description 
Primitive/Basic Modes  
Motor Mimicry Involuntary imitation of another’s facial or motor 
movements.  Feedback enables the individual to feel 
what another feels. 
Classical Conditioning Pairing of the other’s distress, with one’s own distress, 
thereby developing an association between distress cues 
and affective responses 
Direct Association The observed external cues of affect in the other acts as 
a reminder of previous experience of one’s own 
distress, causing an emotional response. 
Higher Order Cognitive/Mature Modes 
Verbally Mediated 
Association 
The experience of emotion via communication of the 
other’s distress through written or spoken language.  
Emotional response occurs independently of direct 
observation. 
Social Perspective Taking Imagining the self in the other’s place. 
 
In support of the idea that actions are contingent on both empathy and moral 
reasoning, Seara-Cardoso, Neumann, Roiser, McCrory and Viding (2011) examined a 
community sample of non-offenders.  They found that affect and interpersonal features 
psychopathic traits, such as reduced guilt and attachment to significant others, were 
significantly related to reduced affective responses and propensity to feel empathic 
30 
 
concern – a moral emotion that influences behaviour (Eisenberg, 1989).  They also 
found these affective and interpersonal features were associated with less difficulty in 
making decisions on moral dilemmas, and argued this may be suggestive of a heightened 
emotional disengagement. 
As there are a number of ways that empathy can be conceptualised, it is perhaps 
not surprising that there are a number of different assessment tools.  Many measures 
typically rely on self-report through a questionnaire format, asking people to rate 
statements that tap into particular aspects of empathy and then summing the responses 
into a single empathy score (e.g. Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).  However, as 
questions asked can often elicit both cognitive and affective processes, this does mean 
that outcomes on these measures often conflate multiple constructs (e.g. Mehrabian & 
Epstein, 1972), and in addition, these sorts of measures are open to social desirability 
bias.  Alternative measures that are not questionnaire based can overcome some of these 
problems, for example, through directly observing and measuring participants effortful 
response or decisions to another person’s perspective (e.g. Van Doesum et al., 2013).  
However, at present no “gold standard” form of measurement exists (Preston & de Waal, 
2002).  
1.3.2.2.1 Empathy and Offending  
Recognition of affective information is a key regulator of behaviour (Frijda, 
1986), and consequently, the relationship between empathy and offending has been 
explored in some detail.  An individual who can comprehend or share the emotional 
reaction another person holds towards socially unacceptable behaviour is less inclined to 
act, or continue to act, in this way themselves (Feshbach, 1975; Zahn-Waxler & 
Robinson, 1995).  It is therefore postulated that deficits or dysfunctions in empathy are 
associated with criminal behaviour (Hogan, 1969), and offenders are thought to have 
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reduced sensitivity to the thoughts and feelings of others, poor perspective taking, and 
poor awareness of the effects of their actions on others (Farrington, 1998). 
Reduced or impaired empathy has long been found to be associated with 
behaviour such as aggression (Miller & Eisenberg, 1988), conduct disorder (Cohen & 
Strayer, 1996), and psychopathy (Soderstrom, 2003), and some of the early studies of 
empathy and offending suggested people who engaged in antisocial behaviour had lower 
cognitive empathy (Hogan, 1969) and lower affective empathy (e.g. Kendall, Deardorff, 
& Finch, 1977).  However, a number of methodological problems existed in this early 
work, particularly with regards to the samples investigated, and since more robust 
methods have been applied it has transpired that the relationship between empathy and 
offending is not necessarily straightforward.  Reviews have shown that the correlation 
coefficient between empathy and offending is in the low to moderate range (Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2004; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988), and examination of these findings suggests 
that intelligence is a significant mediating variable in this relationship.  Furthermore, 
when additionally controlling for socio-economic status, the relationship can be 
explained away altogether, suggesting that empathy may be a function of other factors 
known to be related to offending, rather than having a direct, causal relationship.   
Models of empathy in offenders are broadly similar to general theories of 
empathy.  For example, Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and Fernandez (1995) suggest the 
empathic process comprises: (1) the accurate recognition of an emotional state in 
another person, (2) perspective taking, (3) evocation of a fitting emotional response, and 
(4) a response decision.  Models such as this have particular utility in this context, as 
they can help to localise idiosyncratic empathy impairments in offenders.  For example, 
sex offenders have been shown to have impaired recognition and misinterpretation of 
others emotions in comparison to controls and non-sex offenders (stage 1; Gery, 
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Miljkovitch, Bethoz, & Soussignan, 2009), whilst violent sex offenders had impaired 
perspective-taking skills (stage 2; Hanson & Scott, 1995).  This may be evidence to 
suggest that offenders do not have global deficits in empathy, but rather, have specific 
deficits, and that these are amenable to examination. 
Another model of empathy that can be applied to offending is that by Proctor and 
Beail (2007) which draws together previous theoretical ideas (Davis, 1983; Geer, 
Estupinan, & Manguno-Mire, 2000; Goldstein & Higgins D’Alessandro, 2001; Keenan 
& Ward, 2000; Marshall et al., 1995; McFall, 1990; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). 
They outline five distinct cognitive-affective processes that lead a person to empathic, or 
un-empathic action: (1) perception/emotion recognition, (2) cognitive comprehension – 
acknowledging and understanding the existence of alternative perspectives, (3) emotion 
replication – the experience of the other person’s emotion, (4) cognitive evaluation of 
these processes in order to guide decision making, and (5) the actions taken.  
Interestingly though, when examining this model in IDO, contrary to their hypotheses, 
they found that IDO performed better at stages 1, 3, 4 and 5, than ID non-offenders.  
Similar results were also observed in a sample of sex offenders with ID (Ralfs & Beail, 
2012). 
In spite of the mixed evidence for the role of empathy in offending, many 
treatment programmes have been designed to improve empathy (e.g. Serin & Kuriychuk, 
1994), based on the assumption that developing this skill will help to reduce recidivism 
rates.  In recent years, such programmes have often taken a cognitive-behavioural 
approach, with the goal of targeting the cognitive associations and behavioural 
consequences of empathy that are key to offence behaviour (Wastell, Cairns, & 
Haywood, 2009).  
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1.3.2.3 Social Information Processing  
Information processing describes a sequence of operations that occur between two 
defined points, akin to a set of computational processes, that underpin human thinking 
(Juola, 1986).  It considers how information comes from the external environment and is 
processed and manipulated through a set of internal cognitive structures, how this 
knowledge base is stored, integrated, and accessed, and how these cognitive processes 
underlie and mediate affect and behaviour.  In current psychological discourse, biased or 
inaccurate information processing is believed to be one of the key ways in which 
problematic thoughts and behaviours arise, and theorists have attempted to delineate the 
different aspects of information processing in order to understand how such problems 
arise. 
Ingram and Kendall (1986) suggest that there are four conceptually distinct, but 
inter-related cognitive variables that explain information processing, and biases at any of 
these levels are often term “cognitive distortions”.  The first, structures, are akin to a 
hardware system; they comprise storage and organisations of information.  The second, 
propositions are the cognitive content of stored information, used in order to make sense 
of the world in such a way that is idiosyncratic, but consistent with previous beliefs, 
experiences and expectations.  The third, operations, are the processes that manage and 
encode incoming information, through attention to some stimuli, and not others (and can 
be guided by heuristics or affected by current emotional state, circumstances or 
motivations).  Finally, products are the consciously accessible images and thoughts that 
result from all of these processes. 
Theories of information processing have been developed to take account of the 
fact that a large percentage of the information that human’s process is social in content.  
One of the more comprehensive and well developed ideas is the recursive social 
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information processing model developed by Crick and Dodge (1994), which suggests 
that individuals receive information about social experience in the form of a set of cues, 
and that observable behaviours are a consequence of the processing of this contextual 
information.  The authors propose six key steps to information processing (outlined in 
Table 4, and represented in Figure 1).  These are suggested to occur rapidly, in parallel, 
and are dynamic in their content; that is, stored information will change with experience 
and development in cognitive functioning.   
 
Table 4. Crick and Dodge’s (1994) Social Information Processing Model 
Step Description 
1. Encoding of cues Selective attention to particular internal and external cues. 
2. Interpretation of cues The cues are interpreted or mentally represented through a 
number of processes, such as personalised mental 
representation of the cue, a causal analysis of the situation, 
inferences about the perspectives of others, or inferences 
about the meaning of this exchange for themselves. 
3. Clarification of goals Selection of a goal or outcome for this situation. 
4. Response access or 
construction 
Possible responses to the situation are accessed from 
scripts held in memory, and are selected based on the 
current situation and/or goals.  New behaviours are 
constructed if the situation is novel. 
5. Response decision The evaluation of previously accessed or constructed 
response, in order to choose one to perform.  Criteria used 
to make this response include: outcome expectation, self-
efficacy, response evaluation. 
6. Behavioural enactment Performance of response generated at step 5. 
 
The relationship between the input of information and output of behaviour is 
influenced by a “database” of stored information (such as social schema, scripts, and 
social knowledge), together with a set of idiosyncratic, pre-existing capabilities.  
Schema and scripts are deep level cognitions that offer ways of storing information 
acquired through experience, and that organise new incoming information according to 
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the nature of existing knowledge.  They function as unconscious, causal theories, that 
develop from one’s own experiences and interactions with others, particularly at an early 
age (Ward, 2000).   
 
 
 
Figure 1. Crick and Dodge’s (1994) Social Information Processing Model. 
(Reprinted with permission, see Appendix 1) 
 
This model was proposed to explain antisocial behaviour in children.  For 
example, evidence suggests problematic encoding and interpretation of information 
exists in aggressive children.  They have been found to have selective attention to certain 
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cues from social interactions, were more likely than their peers to rely on internal 
schemata to interpret social situations than non-aggressive children (Dodge & Tomlin, 
1987), and were more likely to be hypervigilant to threat information (Ribordy, Camras, 
Stefani, & Spaccarelli, 1988).  Aggressive children and adolescents have also been 
shown to have an attribution of hostile intent in their perception of others, which can 
mean ambiguous cues are incorrectly interpreted as threats (Nasby, Hayden, & DePaulo, 
1980). 
These encoding and interpretation problems may be understood in context of 
negative early experiences, which are formative in the nature of scripts and schema.  In 
this model, this top-down style of processing can result in vital cues from a social 
situation being missed; by comparison, non-aggressive children’s reliance on a bottom-
up information processing style meant greater emphasis is placed on social cues, which 
are later incorporated into existing schemata.  There is some evidence to suggest that 
interventions specifically designed to improve socio-cognitive processes may be helpful; 
for example, the recent “Fast track” programme of social-cognitive process training for 
children found that working on these various processes throughout the school years can 
lead to the development of benign rather than hostile attributions and can increase social 
competence (Dodge, Godwin, & Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group, 2013). 
Social information processing also has clear theoretical and observable links to 
empathy.  In their perception-action model of empathy, Preston and deWaal (2002) 
argue that when a person attends to the emotional state of another, the observation or 
imagining of the person experiencing a particular emotional state will automatically 
activate a mental representation of that state in the observer (perception), and that the 
resulting empathy is the shared emotional experience (action).  This model emphasises 
that the process of allocating attention to the state of the person/object is a key factor in 
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this sequence of events, and predicts the sort of stimuli an individual is drawn to, and 
consequently, feels an empathic reaction towards (Preston, 2007).  
1.3.2.3.1 Social Information Processing and Offending 
In the offending literature, the most researched aspect of this model to date has 
been cognitive products (Segal & Stermac, 1990), and in particular, it is thought that 
cognitive distortions play a key role in the development and maintenance of offending 
behaviour (Polaschek & Ward, 2002; Ward, Gannon, & Keown, 2006).  It has been 
proposed that atypical development can lead an individual to develop ‘offence 
permissive beliefs’ (Marshall & Barbaree, 1990), and it is suggested that offenders 
typically have cognitive distortions that support offence behaviour (Broxholme & 
Lindsay, 2003).  Cognitive distortions can be measured using questionnaires, however 
they usually are open to transparency effects which can bias responding (Langton & 
Marshall, 2001).  As a consequence of problems with such measures, and in order to 
better understand the aspects of information processing that are upstream of cognitive 
distortions (that is, the initial bias in the cognitive process), more automatic measures 
encoding of information are recommended (Langton & Marshall, 2001), yet this has 
been surprisingly under-researched to date.   
Distortions and biases in information processing also link to problems in moral 
development.  Gibbs and colleagues (Gibbs, 2013; Gibbs, Potter, Barriga, & Liau, 1996) 
suggest that offending behaviour can be explained by impaired or superficial moral 
reasoning, which is tied to a prolonged egocentric bias (a desire for one’s own needs to 
be met, irrespective of the impact this has on others), self-serving cognitive distortions 
(inaccurate schemas used in the perception of events that favour and protect the self 
when harm is done towards others), and poor social skills (based on deficient schemas 
that are used to regulate behavioural responses in interpersonal conflict).  This is 
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supported by evidence that shows violent and aggressive behaviours correlate with self-
serving cognitive distortions (Paciello, Fida, Tramontano, Lupinetti, & Caprara, 2008) 
and an inverse relationship between social skills and antisocial behaviour (Freedman, 
Rosenthal, Donahoe, Schlundt, & McFall, 1978; Simonian, Tarnowski, & Gibbs, 1991). 
1.3.2.4 Summary  
Moral reasoning, empathy and social information processing theories offer 
different explanations of how and why a behavioural response is taken, and so can be 
used to understand engagement in both pro- and antisocial behaviours.  However, 
multiple factors are argued to better predict and conceptualise offending than theories in 
isolation (Deater-Deckard, Dodge, Bates, & Pettit, 1998), and so these ideas will be 
considered together in models of offending.   
1.3.3 Models of Offending 
1.3.3.1 Palmer’s Model 
Palmer (2003) offers a multifactorial, developmental explanation of offending.  It 
considers how a constellation of six factors come together in a dynamic model in which 
the outcome is criminal offending and/or antisocial behaviour. At the heart of this model 
is the relationship between information processing and moral reasoning.  The model 
suggests that lower stages of moral reasoning reflect cognitive biases and errors that 
occur during social information processing, and these are typically seen in offenders.  
The model expands on the previously discussed core theories by arguing that 
information processing and moral reasoning are also developmentally affected by peer 
interaction, parenting and child rearing practices, and social and environmental risk 
factors.  These components are detailed in Table 5, and are diagrammatically 
represented in Figure 2. 
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Table 5. Palmer’s Developmental Model of Offending 
 
Key Components Description 
Peer interactions In childhood, active and spontaneous developments in 
reasoning are achieved with peer interactions, and passive 
reasoning is achieved with child-adult interactions.  In 
young adults, moral reasoning develops through 
interactions with a person who is already operating at a 
more mature level. 
Parenting and child 
rearing 
An inductive approach towards discipline (parents give 
explanations as to why certain behaviours are wrong and 
are connected to punishment) is associated with higher 
levels of moral reasoning.  Strong attachment between 
parents and their offspring is related to lower levels of 
antisocial behaviour in adolescents. 
Social and environmental 
factors 
Low income, high parental stress, single parenthood, an 
ethnic minority background, and lack of social support 
correlate with behavioural problems. 
Moral reasoning An individual’s moral reasoning will operate at one of a 
number of stages, depending on the framework used, and 
individuals will break the law for different reasons, and in 
different ways, depending on their stage of moral 
development.  Moral reasoning develops over time, and the 
way in which people reason about their behaviours will 
vary with their circumstances. 
Social information 
processing 
Individuals filter their social experiences through a 
complex set of social perceptions and experiences and 
emotions, motivations and goals.   
Cognitive distortions These are non-veridical beliefs about oneself and one’s 
behaviour in social situations.  An egocentric bias is a 
primary distortion that is present even in young children, 
and common feature among offenders, particularly when 
justifying their crimes.  It also underlies lower level moral 
reasoning abilities. 
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Figure 2. Palmer’s Developmental Model of Offending 
(Reprinted with permission, see Appendix 2) 
 
A single study has explored these factors using a large, age matched sample of 
adolescent offenders and non-offenders.  Participants completed measures of moral 
reasoning, perceptions of parenting, and attribution of intentions of their behaviours 
(Palmer & Hollin, 2000).  The offending group were found to have more immature 
sociomoral reasoning, greater perceived parental rejection, and a greater hostile 
attribution bias than the non-offenders, and significant relationships were noted between 
high perceived parental rejection, perceived parental warmth, immature sociomoral 
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reasoning and hostile attribution bias.  Across both groups, these factors were also 
associated with reports of greater self-reported delinquency. 
A key strength to this model is that attention is given to multiple different factors 
in explaining offending behaviour, and its developmental approach means it has 
application across the lifespan, from children with antisocial or problematic behaviours 
to adults engaging in criminal activity.  However, the framework can be criticised.  
Perhaps most problematically, the model offers no theoretical rationale to link these 
ideas, considering them to be relatively distinct developmental processes or components. 
Secondly, despite offering a developmental perspective, the model does not consider the 
role of general intellectual functioning, which is a significant factor in explaining 
offending (Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004; Mears & Cochran, 2013), or consider the 
application to IDO, who make up a significant percentage of the offending population. 
1.3.3.2 Aresenio and Lemerise’s Model  
Lemerise and Arsenio (Arsenio & Lemerise, 2004; Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000) 
have developed some of the ideas in Palmer’s (2003) work, providing support for the 
idea that social information processing perspectives and moral reasoning are integrally 
linked.  In essence, they suggest that the way social behaviours or motivations are 
understood and interpreted has a fundamental role in the enactment of an individual’s 
behaviour.  Using the social information processing model (Crick & Dodge, 1994) 
which asserts that real time processing of information and decision making is made in 
the context of social situations, Arsenio and Lemerise note that affective information, 
such as that of the facial expression of another person, is a vital source of information to 
be encoded and interpreted.   
They suggest that this is filtered through latent mental structures (knowledge, 
schemas, and social rules), which form the core of a framework that organise 
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information about oneself, together with access to social and moral conventions that are 
used to inform their social interactions.  Behaviour therefore stems from attempts to 
understand social information using moral (e.g. involve issues of fairness and justice) 
and non-moral (e.g. rules information typically governs emotional interactions) 
knowledge bases.  The selection of a goal or information that is attended to will then 
vary according the information and knowledge set, and so can exert different influences 
on response generation, evaluation, and decision. 
1.3.3.3 Garrigan and Langdon’s Model 
Recently, this work has been developed further by Garrigan and Langdon (In 
Press), specifically in relation to people with ID.  From the perspective that cognitive 
and socio-moral ideas develop and mature over time, the authors integrate theories of 
empathy and affect in order to consider the how role of perspective taking, emotional 
regulation and empathic arousal, relates to moral decision making and social information 
processing, and thereby influences behaviour.  They also incorporate developmental 
neuroscience theories to consider how factors such as attention, working memory and 
abstract thinking contribute to this process.  A diagrammatic summary of the model is 
shown in Figure 3.   
Their model contains the six non-sequential steps drawn from Crick and Dodge’s 
(1994) model.  Core developmental changes are depicted within the four components of 
the inner circle (brain development, emotion processes, database and social factors), and 
together, they mature with development (see Table 6).  The brain development aspect of 
this model is intrinsic to development of all cognitive and emotional skills.  The 
maturation of the connections and regions influences the nature and speed at which
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Figure 3. Garrigan and Langdon’s (In Press) Developmental Model of Offending. 
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Table 6. Garrigan and Langdon’s (In Press) Developmental Model of Offending 
 
Step Description 
1. Encoding of cues Selective attention e.g. to a moral dilemma, which develops 
with age.  Only cues that are attended to can be interpreted. 
2. Interpretation of cues Interpretation involves making inferences about the 
perspectives and intentions of others, which changes as the 
brain develops, and its capacity for perspective taking, 
develops.  Interpretation of cues also relies on evaluations 
of the self, other and the past, which requires working 
memory capacity. 
3. Clarification of goals Moral goals are long term structures which individuals 
endeavour to live by, and are developed though 
communication and interaction with others.  Orientation 
and desire to achieve such outcomes that may not have 
previously been experienced or achieved relies on abstract 
thinking. In addition, appropriate emotional arousal, and 
the ability to regulate this, is needed in order to achieve a 
proportionate response to stimuli. 
4. Response access or 
construction 
Emotional, in addition to cognitive processes, are used to 
assess the incentive value of available choices.  
Associations are made between reinforcing stimuli and 
positive physiological affective states.  Responses 
generated that lead to a negative “gut feeling” are filtered 
out. 
5. Moral judgement A more deliberate reasoning process is required in order to 
confirm reformulate or discard a moral judgement accessed 
or constructed at step 4.  This is influence by relevant 
moral schema - relevant rules and knowledge.  A cognitive 
evaluation of emotional expectations and memory of 
previous experiences also contributes to responsivity. 
6. Behavioural enactment The enactment of behaviour.  However, this can be 
overridden, e.g. due to a sudden conflicting emotion, or a 
realisation that the self-efficacy has been overestimated. 
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information is processed, and the content and way in which schemas are stored.  
Examples of regions implicated in this model include the amygdala, which is proposed 
to play a role in emotion (Davis & Whalen, 2001), and the pre-frontal cortex, which is 
involved in abstract thinking (Yurgelun-Todd, 2007), however the authors acknowledge 
a number of areas and connections are likely to be implicated in this process. 
The database component of the model places emphasis on morality within 
decision-making.  It comprises information stored in memory, rules and knowledge, and 
is influenced by brain development, such as memory capacity and executive functioning 
skills.  The model also considers the importance of emotion and experience (Hoffman, 
2000).  Empathy and emotion based processes emphasise the importance of 
temperament, the physiological state associated with emotions, and affect regulation, 
suggesting these influence the aspects of a situation that are captured by attention and 
will therefore influence the interpretation of the situation (Damasio, 1994; Lemerise & 
Arsenio, 2000).  In addition, social, cultural and economic variables will affect 
development and thereby affect processing and influence the information stored in 
schema.   
In typically developing individuals, a young child has limited cues and 
experiences on which to base moral decisions.  However, these skills become more 
efficient and elaborate with maturity and increasing experiences, as a result of 
developments in encoding, storage, and retrieval processes within the brain.  In atypical 
development, however, Garrigan and Langdon suggest that neural damage or 
impairment may impact upon the interrelated cognitive, social, moral emotional 
processes, as these functions are carried out in multiple regions and connections 
throughout the brain.  Consequently, damage, impairment, or delay will impair this 
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developmental trajectory.  For example, people with attention deficits will not encode as 
many features of a situation as someone with typically developing attention, or people 
with deficits in emotion recognition may have impaired abilities to encode emotional 
cues seen in by others, and may have difficulty interpreting these cues.  Consequently, 
such deficits can impact upon the way in which information is processed during the 
process of making a moral decision, and so this model offers a comprehensive 
consideration of where, and how, deficits may arise, and thus problematic behaviour 
may result. 
1.3.3.3.1 Application to IDO 
Garrigan and Langdon’s (In Press) model suggests that impairments in one or 
more components of this process can have significant implications for behaviour, and 
consequently, the model has application to IDO.  It can be hypothesised that, as a 
consequence of brain damage or delay, people with an ID will have impairments in 
social information processing, perspective taking, and/or empathy that may contribute to 
a delay in their moral development, and together with pertinent socio-economic factors, 
this can lead to antisocial behaviour.  For example, attentional deficits that impact on the 
ability to encode information, difficulties with perspective taking that bias the 
interpretation of interpersonally-based cues, or impaired abstract thinking skills that 
prevent people from working towards long term, moral-based goals, may develop or 
maintain offending behaviour. 
A review of the limited moral development studies in this area suggests that 
when comparing people with ID to chronologically age matched peers, moral reasoning 
is significantly related to cognitive ability (Langdon, Clare, et al., 2010).  However, only 
one study has explored how this might relate to empathy and cognitive processes in 
IDO.  In a four-group design comparing people with ID, IDO, non-ID offenders and 
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non-ID non-offenders, Langdon, Murphy, Clare, Steverson & Palmer (2011) reported 
that the ID groups had less developed moral reasoning and empathy than the non-ID 
groups, but that they had a greater level of cognitive distortions than the non-ID groups.  
Also, the IDO group had the highest levels of cognitive distortions, and significantly 
more developed moral reasoning than ID non-offenders.  The authors suggest these 
findings indicate that high levels of cognitive distortions are the first step in a 
relationship with empathy, that is mediated by moral reasoning, and culminates in 
offending behaviour (Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000).  Whilst further work is needed at all 
aspects of the model to confirm these interpretations, this preliminary investigation 
suggests that the relationship between cognitive, emotional and moral processes may 
offer a useful framework for understanding offending in this population. 
1.3.4 Section Summary 
This section has reviewed moral, empathy and information processing theories in 
some detail, and has considered how they can explain general offending behaviour 
within the population.  However, in isolation these are insufficient, and more 
comprehensive models, such as that by Palmer (2003) and by Arsenio and Lemerise 
(2004) gives consideration to how these factors interact, and are influenced by 
development, in order to produce behaviours.  The recent development of a model that 
considers all of these factors, and specifically relates this to development, may offer the 
most up to date understanding of offending in people with ID.  Garrigan and Langdon’s 
(In Press) model suggests that the way in which information is processed is directly 
related to emotional and social factors, and stored information from previous 
experiences, all of which is integrally linked to brain development and function.  With 
this as a backdrop, the final section in this chapter will explore a single aspect of this 
process in detail, in preparation for the current study.  
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1.4 Attentional Bias 
1.4.1 Section Overview 
At the core of the models discussed in section 1.3.3 is information processing, and 
social-cognitive theorists argue this is vital to how a person interacts with the world.  
The first step comprises the way in which attention is allocated, which is necessary for 
the cognitive load of a vast array of environmental information to be managed 
efficiently.  The concept of attentional bias will first be discussed, describing this 
cognitive phenomena and how it can be measured.  This will then be considered in 
relation to empathy, a key aspect of models of offending.  A literature review will then 
consider how attentional bias has been investigated in offenders, and studies looking at 
attentional bias in people with ID will be examined. 
1.4.2 Attentional Bias 
In all aspects of life, we use visual information to guide our behaviour.  However, 
given the vast array of information available to us, we need to select the information that 
is most relevant to our current goals, and the cognitive process of attention enables some 
information to be prioritised over others.  Attention can broadly be understood as the 
process by which external stimuli form internal representations that gain conscious 
awareness, and it comprises three processes: disengaging attentional focus from one 
location, shifting attention to a new location, and engaging attention in the new location 
(Posner, Inhoff, Friedrich, & Cohen, 1987; Posner, Snyder, & Davidson, 1980).  Where 
information is processed through a “top-down” approach, attention is under the 
intentional volition of the individual.  In “bottom-up” processing, attention is guided by 
the salient features of the stimulus in the environment, in a more passive, automatic way.  
These processes do not necessarily favour the same stimulus, and one can prevail over 
the other e.g. if attention is involuntarily drawn to salient stimuli, the selection of stimuli 
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that are in line with current goals can be delayed, or both processes can occur 
simultaneously. 
Attention is the mechanism by which salient stimuli are detected, appraised in 
terms of their significance, and then acted upon through cognitions and behaviours 
(Broadbent, 1958; Öhman, 1993).  Consequently, it is not uniformly biased towards 
certain types of stimuli (Fox, Ridgewell, & Ashwin, 2009); it has been suggested that 
highly salient or emotive information is most likely to influence attention.  One 
perspective on attention, the categorical negativity theory, suggests that only stimuli that 
is initially perceived as negative, attracts attention (Pratto & John, 1991).  Whilst there is 
some support for this idea (e.g. Sharma & McKenna, 2001), there is also evidence to 
suggest that positive information influences attention (Dalgleish, 1995; Koven, Heller, 
Banich, & Miller, 2003).  An alternative perspective, the cognitive resource allocation 
model (Kahneman, 1973) hypothesises that that the more interested a person is in a 
particular type of stimuli, the more cognitive resources they will devote to viewing that 
stimulus, and as such, the more attention it demands.   
The psychopathology literature offers the clearest demonstration of the importance 
of this single aspect of information processing.  A substantial body of evidence 
demonstrates that individuals with disorders of affect are prone to biased processing of 
stimuli which are emotionally salient to the key traits, or concerns, of their disorder 
(Mogg & Bradley, 1999; J. Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Matthew, 1997).  In people 
with anxiety, attentional processes are biased towards threat stimuli, whilst people with 
depression preferentially attend to negative information (Bar-Haim, Lamy, Pergamin, 
Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van, 2007; Dalgleish & Watts, 1990; MacLeod, Mathews, & 
Tata, 1986).  As such, the allocation of attention is central to cognitive explanations of 
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aetiology and maintenance of the mental health problems (Beck, Rush, Shaw, & Emery, 
1979; Mogg & Bradley, 1999). 
Research into attentional bias is stimulated by the prospect that improving 
understanding will lead to the development of new and more effective therapeutic 
interventions (Mobini & Grant, 2007).  Ideas regarding attentional bias have been 
applied to psychological therapy, where more adaptive, unbiased information processing 
is encouraged through increased awareness and implementation of cognitive 
restructuring (e.g. Beck et al., 1979; Wells, 1997).  This is of particular utility in 
cognitive-behavioural therapy, where emphasis is placed on aiding individuals to notice 
their attentional biases, and subsequently learn how to reallocate their attention (Wells, 
1997).  There is also interesting and promising research into cognitive and attentional 
bias modification interventions, which aim to modify cognitive biases through repeated 
practice on cognitive tasks (Bar-Heim, 2010). 
1.4.2.1 Assessment 
Assessment of attentional bias is based on the premise that attention can be 
measured by assessing the speed of responses made to visual probes, and a number of 
paradigms exist that capture the allocation of attention in different ways.  For example, 
the emotional Stroop task involves naming the colour ink that a variety of emotional 
words are written in.  The speed of the response or reaction times (RT) are used as 
evidence of an attentional bias; in this task, slow RT indicate that attention to the 
meaning of the word interferes with the task performance, whilst the presence of 
emotion words in a lexical decision task is thought to facilitate performance.  
Participants are asked to focus on the meaning of a string of letters, and to indicate 
whether these form a word or a non-word.  In this task, faster RT occur when the word is 
of emotional or motivational significance. 
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The dot-probe task is another established attentional bias assessment (Williams 
et al., 1997), and can be adapted to suit the population under investigation (Mogg & 
Bradley, 1999).  Using either lexical or pictorial stimuli, it typically involves the brief 
presentation of two images, one that is of interest or significance, and one that is neutral.  
A dot-probe then immediately follows this, appearing behind the location of either 
image, and participants are required to press a button to indicate the position of the 
probe.  The content of the stimuli and length of stimuli exposure can be varied 
considerably, depending on the hypotheses under investigation (e.g. Bradley, Mogg, 
White, Groom, & de Bono, 1999). 
In tasks such as the Stroop and dot-probe, fast response times have typically been 
interpreted to indicate hypervigilance or facilitated orientation of attention towards the 
stimuli in question.  However, an increasing body of literature suggests this may be 
equally due to the stimulus holding attention, or a difficulty with disengagement (Fox, 
Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2004; 
Yiend & Mathews, 2001).  In order to determine the nature of this bias in the dot-probe, 
RT to salient image trials can be compared to trials containing only neutral images, 
which do not elicit an attentional bias.  Interpretation of the data relies on the assumption 
that faster responses will occur when the trial is congruent (i.e. when the probe appears 
behind the salient image) than when trial is incongruent (i.e. when the probe appears 
behind the neutral image), as attention is already allocated to the visual field where the 
probe has appeared.  Faster responses to congruent salient image trials than neutral trials 
is thought to reflect vigilance for the stimuli, as content of the image is thought to have 
captured the individuals attention (Koster et al., 2004).  Conversely, difficulties with 
disengagement are thought to be indicated by slower responses to incongruent negative 
trials, in comparison to neutral trials, as this indicates the individual has difficulty 
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disengaging and shifting their attention from the image in order to respond to a probe in 
a different location. 
The characteristics of the attentional bias are also commonly investigated by 
converting RT data to an attentional bias index that indicates the attention capturing 
quality of the stimulus (Gotlib, Krasnoperova, Yue, & Joormann, 2004).  Using a 
standardised calculation that considers the position of the dot-probe in relation to the 
stimuli of interest (congruency), comparisons are made between RT to congruent and 
incongruent trial types using the same type of affective image, giving a proxy measure 
of whether the attention is drawn towards, or away from, the image. 
Despite their widespread use, some authors have questioned the reliability and 
validity of measures such as the dot-probe, and overall, there is a paucity of 
psychometric data on these measures (Cisler, Bacon, & Williams, 2009).  What little 
test-retest reliability and internal consistency evidence is available is inconsistent (Eide, 
Kemp, Silberstein, Nathan, & Stough, 2002; Schmukle, 2005; Siegrist, 1997), and this is 
compounded by the fact that the nature of the measure means it is not standardised.  In 
addition, studies have also shown that scores on different measures do not always 
correlate when used within the same sample (Egloff & Hock, 2003).  To further 
complicate the picture, there is also evidence that attentional bias alters with other 
factors, such as age (e.g. Carstensen, Pasupathi, Mayr, & Nesselroade, 2000; Mather & 
Knight, 2005), sex (Tan, Ma, Gao, Wu, & Fang, 2011; Vitale, 2011), and race (Lorenz 
& Newman, 2002b).  Despite this, these tasks are widely used as it is argued that 
meaningful conclusions can be drawn from the data (Cisler et al., 2009). 
Physiological measurements can also be used in order to determine how attention 
varies with different types of stimuli.  For example, event related potential modulation, a 
measure of neural response as a direct result of a specific cognitive event, is often used 
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to measure information processing (e.g. Anderson & Stanford, 2012).  In sex offenders, 
penile plethysmography can be used to measure arousal in response to stimuli (Reyes, 
Vollmer, & Sloman, 2006), and electrodermal skin conductance can be used with a 
wider range of participants (Fung et al., 2005).  Also, eye tracking studies offer a robust 
form of measuring the way in which attention is allocated, and can conclusively indicate 
whether certain stimuli types attract or maintain attention (Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & 
Calvo, 2006; Wadlinger & Isaacowitz, 2006). 
1.4.3 Attentional Bias and Empathy 
Empathy researchers have long sought to understand the mechanisms by which we 
come to feel the emotional states of others.  In section 1.3.2, it was discussed that the 
perception-action model of empathy posits that we attend to affect-laden information, 
we recognise and comprehend it quickly, this activates our own internal representations, 
and so this is felt as if it is our own (Preston, 2007).  This resonates with descriptions of 
cognitive empathy; the ability to place one’s own needs in the context of others’ enables 
a person to understand another’s perspective in a conflict situation, and stands in 
contrast to those who have a self-serving or egocentric (and therefore distorted) 
cognitive style (Feshbach, 1975).  Thus, recognising and attending to emotional 
information is central to this process.  Studies of social referencing suggest that an 
awareness of, search for, and use of affect-based information starts early in 
development.  Evidence suggests that infants access emotional information displayed in 
adult facial expressions, which they then use to guide their behaviour, such as their 
interactions with strangers (Feinman & Lewis, 1983).   
As the cognitive functions of attention and encoding develop, attention may be 
allocated to new and less obvious sources of information, certain stimuli become 
favoured or more salient, and a preference is typically developed for visual stimuli over 
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other sensory modalities (Blanck, Rosenthal, Snodgrass, DePaulo, & Zuckerman, 1982), 
particularly where multiple cues offer discrepant information.  This attention to affective 
stimuli in the environment, such as facial expressions or non-verbal cues, theoretically 
forms the basis upon which an assumption can be made about what another person is 
thinking or feeling, i.e. cognitive perspective taking or cognitive empathy. 
Up until recently, it has not been possible to go beyond theoretical explanations of 
the relationship between attention and encoding of affective information, and empathy.  
However, there is now a small amount of research in non-clinical populations that 
considers this process.  Using an “Emostroop” task (that measures RT to emotion words 
superimposed over task-irrelevant pictures – congruent or incongruent faces in relation 
to the word), Preston and Stansfield (2008) found that individuals who rated highest for 
emotional contagion (the mimicry and synchronisation of emotion with others) for anger 
and fear, were less distracted by happy faces.  They suggest that those who strongly 
relate to negative emotions may experience more negative affect, or are more likely to 
perceive it in others, offering evidence for the role of empathy in top-down processing, 
as they are less likely to experience interference by positive emotions.  They also found 
that RT data were consistently slower to angry words in comparison to happy words.  
They suggest this is because anger is associated with a set of inherent, conditioned social 
responses, and so may be affiliated a goal of avoiding exacerbation of a situation, thus 
having a suppressive effect on behaviour 
A recent follow up study sought to understand how individual differences in self-
reported empathy are related to differences in attention to affective stimuli.  Using the 
same task, Hofelich and Preston (2012) replicated Preston and Stansfield’s (2008) 
findings.  They also reported that trait empathy and facial mimicry, measured using 
facial electromyography, resulted from differences in attention.  Participants typically 
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mimicked the face they were attending to, and this mimicry was higher in people with 
high levels of empathy.  Furthermore, people with high empathy had significantly 
slower RT to positive and negative words than neutral words, suggesting increasing 
processing of this information.  For these individuals, the authors argue this could be 
particularly beneficial if they are in circumstances where correctly determining affect is 
difficult or complex.  The authors suggest that further research is needed in order to 
examine how people monitor their environment and allocate their attention, and to 
consider the role these processes play in a prosocial actions and responses. 
Neural studies of attention have also found a relationship between attention to 
affective information and empathy.  Choi and Watanuki (2014) measured participants’ 
event-related potentials whilst they completed a stimuli discrimination task, and found 
that those with highest self-rated empathy scores paid more attention to facial 
expressions than neutral stimuli, and that this correlated with a greater amplitude in ‘late 
positive potential’ neural signals, which are commonly seen in relation to arousing or 
motivationally significant stimuli.  They suggest this is because people with higher 
levels of empathy are more likely to work to gauge the emotional states and intentions of 
others.   
1.4.4 Attentional Bias and Offending 
As discussed in section 1.3.2, the activation of certain schema is associated with 
distortions, which in turn, are associated with changes in affect, motivation and 
behaviour.  Furthermore, drawing upon the theory and evidence from the general 
population, it appears that individual levels of empathic skills are related to the way in 
which people process external information.  Thus, although attentional bias has largely 
been investigated in clinical and non-clinical populations, it has the potential to explain a 
key cause and maintenance aspect of offending behaviour.  There is currently some 
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evidence for this type of investigation.  For example, using an emotional picture dot-
probe task with distressing and threatening stimuli, Kimonis, Frick, Fazekas, and Loney 
(2006) found that adolescents with callous-unemotional traits had reduced attention to 
distressing pictures, suggesting that cues that should typically inhibit aggressive 
behaviour (such as victim distress cues) are ineffective in this population.  They also 
conducted a similar study with a more ethnically diverse population (Kimonis, Frick, 
Munoz, & Aucoin, 2008), although processing of stimuli related to callous-unemotional 
traits was not observed. 
However, it is not immediately clear which types of information may be 
perceived as salient to offenders.  Similar to “disorder specific” stimuli seen in affective 
disorders (Mobini & Grant, 2007), information that is related to the type of crime the 
offender commits may be salient, because the individual holds offence-related schema or 
cognitive representations (Smith & Waterman, 2003).  Alternatively, given evidence 
suggesting impairments in empathy and affective processes (e.g. Hogan, 1969), this may 
suggest that emotional or affective stimuli are of particular relevance to offenders.   
1.4.4.1 Literature Review 
To better understand the phenomenon of attentional bias in this population – that 
is, whether a particular type of stimuli elicits an attentional bias, and whether offenders 
are particularly fast or slow to attend to this – a systematic literature review of non-ID 
offenders was conducted.  Full criteria for study inclusion is outlined in Appendix 3, but 
it should be noted that in order to see if offenders had an attentional bias for certain 
types of stimuli, methodologies in the included studies had to make use of salient stimuli 
(rather than generic stimuli e.g. colours) stimuli, defined as either affective or offence-
related stimuli.  
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Abstracts of relevant articles were initially searched in order to determine 
appropriate search terms; the terms used are detailed in Appendix 4.  The selection and 
exclusion criteria and processes are detailed in Appendix 5.  The primary searches were 
conducted using NHS Evidence and Web of Knowledge, and PubMed was used to find 
studies which had not yet been indexed through Medline.  Two searches were 
performed, covering the inception of each journal searched through to March 2014.  
Articles were retrieved if they were considered to be potentially relevant on the basis of 
the abstract, or if the abstract gave insufficient information for a judgement to be made.  
This process resulted in a total of 16 eligible papers.  In order to understand the nature of 
any attentional bias observed, the studies were grouped according to significant 
differences observed between groups.  Results from the review are shown in Table 7. 
1.4.4.1.1 Attentional Bias: Faster 
In two studies, offenders were found to have faster RT to stimuli than their 
control group.  Using both the dot-probe task and the Stroop task, violent offenders 
(VO) attended faster than non-offenders (NO) to aggression stimuli, relative to neutral 
stimuli (Smith & Waterman, 2003).  Lorenz and Newman (2002c) reported that 
antisocial personality disordered offenders attended significantly faster to affective 
stimuli (relative to neutral stimuli), than non-antisocial personality disordered offenders.  
When looking at results by gender, the same pattern of results was also found in females 
only, but not in males only. 
1.4.4.1.2 Attentional Bias: Slower 
In total, eight studies found offenders had a slowed attentional bias in 
comparison to their control group.  Two of these demonstrated slower RT in comparison 
to NO.  BothVO and sex offenders (SO) were slower to colour name sexual words when
58 
 
Table 7. Systematic Literature Review of Attentional Bias Studies in Offenders 
Study Sample Experimental paradigm Results 
Faster RT 
 
Smith and 
Waterman 
(2003) 
a
 38 VO, 12 NVO; 30 NO 
b
 Males and females 
c
 Prisons; university students (UK) 
d
 Caucasian 
 
f
 Dot-probe, 
Stroop 
g
 Affective words  
Dot-probe: VO had faster RT than NO (p < .05), when 
probes replaced aggression words relative to neutral 
words. 
Stroop: VO had faster RT than NO (p < .05), when 
colour-naming aggression words relative to neutral 
words. 
Lorenz and 
Newman 
(2002c) 
a 
197 APDO; 194 NAPDO
 
b 
Males and females 
c 
Prisons (USA)
 
d 
African American and Caucasian 
 
f
 Lexical decision  
g
 Affective words
 
APDO had faster RT to affective words, relative to 
neutral words, than NAPDO (p < .01). 
These findings were also observed in females only, but 
not males only. 
 
 
Slower RT 
 
Smith and 
Waterman 
(2004a)   
a
 38 VO, 12 NVO; 30 NO 
b
 Males and females 
c
 Prisons; university students (UK) 
d
 Caucasian 
f
 Primed dot-probe, 
Visual search  
g
 Affective words  
Dot-probe: VO had slower RT to probes after reading 
violent text, than after reading neutral text (p < .00), 
compared to NO. 
Visual search: VO had slower RT for detecting neutral 
words, when surrounded by aggression words (p < 
.01), compared to NO. 
 
Smith and 
Waterman  
(2004b)  
a
 10 SO, 10 VO, 10 NVO;  13 NO 
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons; university students (UK) 
d
 Caucasian 
f
 Stroop  
g
 Affective words 
 
SO and VO were slower to colour name sexual words 
than NO (p < .05). 
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Mokros, 
Dombert, 
Osterheider, 
Zappala, and 
Santtila 
(2010) 
 
a
 21 CMO, 21 NSO 
b
 Males 
c
 Forensic psychiatric hospital 
(Germany) 
d
 Unspecified 
f
 Choice reaction time 
g
 Offence-related pictures  
CMO were slower to respond to pictures of infants 
than adults, and NSO had slower RT to pictures of 
adults than children (p = .01). 
Williamson, 
Harpur, and 
Hare (1991)  
a
 8 PO, 8 NPO  
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons (Canada) 
d
 Unspecified 
e
 >33; <25 
 
f
 Lexical decision  
g
 Affective words 
PO had slower RT on lexical decisions that used 
affective words, compared to neutral words, than did 
NPO (statistical significance not reported). 
 
 
Lorenz and 
Newman 
(2002a) 
a
 11 LA and 17 HA PO, 26 LA and 20 
HA NPO 
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons (USA) 
d
 Caucasian 
e
 >30; <20 
 
f
 Lexical decision  
g
 Affective words 
LA PO had slower RT to affective stimuli, relative to 
neutral stimuli, than LA NPO, when indicating lexical 
decisions with their right hand (p < .001). 
 
 
Kosson, 
Lorenz and 
Newman 
(2006) 
a
 25APDO-PO; 26 APDO-NPO; 36 
NAPDO  
b
 Males 
c
 Prison (America) 
d
 Caucasian
 
f
 Lexical decision  
g
 Affective words 
 
APDO-PO had slower RT for affective stimuli, 
relative to neutral stimuli than APDO (p < .05).   
Domes, 
Mense, Vohs 
and 
Habermeyer 
(2013) 
a
 35 APDO; 34 NAPDO ; 24 NO 
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons and forensic psychiatric 
hospital; community  (Germany) 
d
 Caucasian 
f
 Stroop  
g
 Affective words 
 
APDO had significantly slower RT than NO when 
colour naming negative and violent words, relative to 
neutral words (p < .00). 
60 
 
 
  
 
Price, Beech, 
Mitchell and 
Humphreys 
(2013) 
a
 28 SO; 21 VO; 38 NO 
b
 Males 
c
 Prison and probation; university 
sample (UK) 
d
 Caucasian 
 
f
 Stroop  
g
 Affective words; Deviant 
sexual interest words 
 
SO had significantly slower RT to negative words than 
VO and NO (p < .05). 
SO had significantly slower RT to emotional-
personality, sexual action and physical descriptor 
words, than VO and NO (p < .05). 
No observed differences 
 
Ó Ciardha 
and Gormley 
(2012) 
a
 24 SO; 24 NO 
b
 Males 
c
 Community treatment/prisons; 
university students (UK) 
d
 Unspecified 
 
f
 Stroop  
g
 Offence-related pictures  
No significant differences in RT between SO and NO 
to stimuli (ns). 
 
Price and 
Hanson 
(2007) 
a
 15 RO,15 CMO, 15 VO, 15 NVNSO; 
15 NO 
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons; community sample (Canada) 
d
 Caucasian 
f
 Stroop  
g
 Offence-related words 
No significant difference in RT between all SO, and 
NSO, when colour-naming sexual words (ns). 
 
 
Muller et al. 
(2008) 
a
 10 PO; 12 NPNO 
b
 Males 
c
 Forensic hospital; unspecified 
(Germany) 
d
 Caucasian 
e
 >28; <10 
f
 Simon paradigm  
g
 Affective pictures 
No significant group differences in RT for spatial 
response, for different affective stimuli (ns). 
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Lorenz and 
Newman 
(2002b) 
a
 14 LA and 9 HA PO, 16 LA and 23 
HA NPO  
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons (USA) 
d
 Africa American 
e
 >30; <20 
 
f
 Lexical decision  
g
 Affective words 
No differences between psychopathy groups, or 
psychopathy-anxiety groups, for valence or hand used 
for response (ns). 
 
 
Vitale (2011) 
a
 10 LA and 15 HA PO, 20 LA and 16 
HA NPO 
b
 Females 
c
 Prisons (USA) 
d
 Caucasian 
e
 >24; <14 
 
f
 Lexical decision  
g
 Affective words 
No differences between psychopathy groups, or 
psychopathy-anxiety groups, for valence or hand used 
for response (ns). 
 
 
Cima, 
Tonnaer, and 
Lobbestael 
(2007) 
a
 55 offenders 
b
 Males 
c
 Prisons (Netherlands) 
d
 Caucasian 
f
 Implicit 
Association Task  
g
 Affective words 
 
No difference in RT to probes for neutral and moral 
stimuli (ns). 
 
 
  
Kosson, 
Lorenz and 
Newman 
(2006) 
Reported under “Slower RT” 
 
There were no differences between APDO and 
NAPDO (on a lexical decision task).  
    
Domes, 
Mense, Vohs 
and 
Habermeyer 
(2013) 
Reported under “Slower RT” 
 
There were no significant differences between APDO 
and NAPDO (on a Stroop task). 
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Note: 
a
 Demographics 
b
 Gender 
c
 Recruitment (Country) 
d
 Ethnicity 
e
  Cut-off scores on the PCL-R (Psychopathy Checklist Revised) 
   used to determine groups 
f
 Task 
g
 Stimulus 
RT = Reaction times 
VO = Violent offenders 
NVO = Non-violent offenders  
NO = Non-offenders 
SO = Sex offenders 
NSO = Non-sex offenders 
RO = Rapist offenders  
CMO = Child molesters offenders  
NVNSO = Non-violent non-sex offenders  
PO = Psychopathic offenders 
NPO = Non-psychopathic offenders  
NPNO = Non-psychopathic non-offenders  
LA = Low anxious  
HA = High anxious 
APDO = Antisocial personality disordered offenders 
NAPDO = Non-antisocial personality disordered offenders 
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surrounded by aggression words on the Stroop task (Smith & Waterman, 2004a)  VO 
had slower RT to dot-probes after reading violent text, than after reading neutral text, 
and slower RT for detecting neutral words, on a primed dot-probe and visual search 
tasks (Smith & Waterman, 2004b). 
Four studies found the offender group of interest had slower RT than a “control” 
offender group; that is, a group of offenders that were unlikely to have a bias for the 
stimuli under investigation.  Mokros, Dombert, Osterheider, Zappala, and Santtila 
(2010) used a Choice Reaction Time task with SO, and found that offence-related 
stimuli are salient to the attention offenders; child molesters had slower RT to infant 
stimuli than adults, whilst non-SO had slower RT for adult stimuli.  Williamson, Harpur 
and Hare (1991) investigated the processing of affective words by psychopathic 
offenders (PO), and reported PO had slower RT to affective words than non-PO (NPO).  
Similarly, Lorenz and Newman (2002a) reported that when participants gave right 
handed responses, low anxiety PO had slower RT to affective stimuli, relative to neutral 
stimuli, than low anxiety non-PO.  Finally, Kosson, Lorenz and Newman (2006) found 
that offenders with diagnoses of antisocial personality disorder and psychopathy, had 
slower RT (that is, less attentional facilitation for affective stimuli) than two other 
offender groups (those with a diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder and without 
psychopathy, and those neither antisocial personality disorder, nor psychopathy).  
Two studies compared their offender group of interest to control offenders and 
control non-offenders.  Using the Stroop task and sets of affective words, both Domes, 
Mense, Vohs and Habermeyer (2013) and Price, Beech, Mitchell and Humphrey (2013) 
found that both offenders with antisocial personality disorder and SO respectively were 
slow to colour name both affective and sexual lexical stimuli, both in comparison to 
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non-offender controls, and in comparison to offenders with no diagnosis of antisocial 
personality disorder, and VO. 
1.4.4.1.3 Attentional Bias: No Observed Differences 
Six studies reported no significant differences in attentional bias.  Price and 
Hanson (2007) and Ó Ciardha and Gormley (2012) found that SO had similar 
information processing of offence stimuli to non-SO on the Stroop task.  In three studies, 
no differences in attentional bias were observed between PO and non-psychotic NO 
(Muller et al., 2008); male non-PO (Lorenz & Newman, 2002b), or female non-PO.  In 
the only study to use a use a single group design, and to consider the broad category of 
“offenders”, Cima et al. (2007) found no differences in attentional bias when comparing 
attention to moral versus neutral stimuli.  In addition, the previous studies by Kosson et 
al. (2006) and Domes et al (2013) also reported no differences when comparing 
offenders with and without antisocial personality disorder on lexical and Stroop tasks, 
respectively. 
1.4.4.1.4 Summary of Findings and Methodological Considerations 
Overall, investigations of attentional bias in offenders revealed that over half of 
the published studies indicated an attentional bias for salient information, with the 
majority using affective rather than offence specific stimuli.  Eight studies found that 
offenders had slower RT to salient stimuli, whilst two studies found that RT were faster 
for salient stimuli.  However, six studies reported no significant differences in the way 
attention was allocated, and two of the studies that had reported slower RT also reported 
no differences between groups.  Broadly, there is therefore some evidence to suggest an 
attentional bias exists in offenders; it does not appear to be as robust a phenomenon in 
this population as it is in people with mental health problems such as anxiety.  
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Furthermore, no attentional bias trends were evident for different stimuli types, or within 
each offender sub-group; at best, both studies of VO found an attentional bias. 
However, the nature of the studies reported makes it difficult to draw conclusions 
from the data, which leads to a necessary consideration of the methodological 
differences between studies.  Firstly, the way in which data was reported varied 
considerably across studies; some authors reported their data in the form of an 
attentional bias index, which denotes the attention-mediated speed of response to images 
depending on whether or not the probe is congruent with affective image, whilst others 
directly compared RT between groups.  Without both types of data being reported, this 
makes it difficult to go beyond statements that describe the presence or absence of a 
general attentional bias. 
Secondly, across all of these studies, participants were relatively heterogeneous 
in terms of country of origin, gender and race, and it is likely that more reliable 
conclusions could be drawn from more homogenous populations.  Thirdly, a number of 
design problems occurred throughout the studies.  Sample characteristics were often 
inadequately reported or analysed, making it difficult to know whether confounding 
variables were adequately controlled, or if groups were appropriately matched (e.g. 
Muller et al, 2008).  Inclusion criteria were not always appropriate to the study; for 
example, several studies did not examine IQ or reading level, despite the fact that often 
both were intrinsic to completion of the experimental task (e.g. Smith and Waterman, 
2004b).  Furthermore, comparison groups were a mixture of offenders and non-
offenders, which makes drawing reliable conclusions across the data problematic.  
Fourthly, a mixture of tasks and stimuli were used; some of the stimuli were 
highly salient to the offender group, whilst others were more generic.  As none of the 
studies compared the two stimuli types within the same study, it is not possible to know 
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whether this had an effect on the findings.  There was also a mix of pictorial and lexical 
stimuli, which have influenced the findings.  It is also worth considering that a possible 
explanation for non-significant findings is that the stimuli used do not reflect differences 
in accessible schema specific to the offence type of each group (e.g. Cima et al, 2007).  
Furthermore, many studies drew their conclusions from using neutral stimuli and only 
one type of affective stimuli (e.g. Williamson, Harpur and Hare, 1991), which does not 
take into account the potential role that other factors may have, such as the level of 
arousal elicited by the affective stimulus (Kahneman, 1973). 
1.4.4.2 Attentional Bias in ID and IDO 
To date, attentional bias in people with ID, and IDO, has received extremely 
limited attention.  Only three published studies have specifically examined attentional 
bias in people with ID, two of which were in people with Williams Syndrome.  Using a 
dot-probe task and stimuli of different emotional valence facial expressions, it was found 
that people with Williams Syndrome had a greater attentional bias for happy faces, in 
comparison to chronological and mental age matched groups (Dodd & Porter, 2010), 
and had an attentional bias towards threatening images (Dodd & Porter, 2011).  The 
third considered people with alcohol related problems (van Duijvenbode, Didden, 
Voogd, Korzilius, & Engels, 2012).  Grouping participants according to three categories 
each of IQ, and alcohol consumption, no differences were observed between groups on 
severity of alcohol use or ID.  However, given the number of groups in the sample and 
the overall sample size (n = 57), this may have contributed to the null findings.  
Finally, one unpublished preliminary investigation of attentional bias has been 
conducted in offenders with ID using offence-related stimuli.  Watson (2006) compared 
ID child sex offenders, ID non-offenders and non-ID non-offenders on a dot-probe task 
using sexual stimuli.  This study demonstrated that people with ID were able to complete 
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a task of this nature, but found that child sex offenders had no attentional bias for these 
images.  Although the study used particularly salient stimuli, it was substantially 
underpowered, and as such, may have been unable to detect any significant differences 
between groups. 
1.4.5 Section Summary  
In light of the theoretical significance of attentional processes in theories of 
offending, this section considered the phenomenon of attentional bias.  Its key role in the 
development and maintenance of mental health problems was discussed, and its 
significance in therapeutic interventions was considered.  However, a literature review 
of attention bias in non-ID offenders revealed mixed evidence for attentional bias; over 
half of the studies conducted to date showed an attentional bias for salient related 
information, but the nature of this bias was mixed, and a significant proportion of the 
studies reported no attentional bias.  However, a number of methodological differences 
and issues across these studies were acknowledged to make it difficult to draw reliable 
conclusions from the data.  The attentional bias literature in people with ID was also 
considered, which equally revealed mixed findings.  Together, these results suggest that 
cognitive tasks are capable of measuring attentional bias in offenders, and the use of 
pictorial stimuli in some of the tasks opens up this avenue of work for exploration in ID 
populations, for whom language can be a barrier. 
1.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter opened with a description of people with ID, and people with ID 
who offend.  A number of offending theories were discussed, and these were drawn 
together into a developmental model that can be used to describe offending in IDO.  A 
central component to this model, attentional bias, was then considered in detail, followed 
by consideration of the way in which it relates to empathy, and how it has previously 
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been examined in non-ID offenders.  This provides the backdrop to the rationale and 
hypotheses for the current study, which will now be outlined. 
1.6 Rationale and Hypotheses 
1.6.1 Rationale and Outline of the Investigation 
Theoretical models of offending suggest that attentional bias is likely to be 
central to explaining the differences between offenders and non-offenders with ID 
(Garrigan & Langdon, In Press; Palmer, 2003).  Only one investigation of attentional 
bias has been conducted in IDO, but in non-ID offenders, there is some evidence to 
suggest that this population has an attentional bias towards stimuli that are salient or 
relevant, though methodological problems and differences make it difficult to draw any 
reliable conclusions from the data.  In addition, when considering the relationship 
between attentional bias and empathy, there is some evidence from the general 
population to suggest that the way in which attention is allocated varies with individual 
differences in empathy.  However, this has not been examined in offenders, with or 
without ID. 
Thus, current data is limited, inconclusive, and largely not applicable to IDO.  
Despite this, the concept of attentional bias has the potential to be a useful addition to 
the IDO literature; not only is it thought to be key to a number of explanations of 
offending, but it can be assessed objectively, does not rely heavily on expressive or 
receptive communication, and is not as susceptible to social desirability bias.  The 
present study therefore sought to offer novel examination of attentional bias and 
empathy in across different offenders with ID.  Firstly, a self-report measure of empathy, 
IDO and ID non-offenders (IDNO) will be compared to see if there are group 
differences in empathy.  Secondly, using dot-probe task with negative-affective, 
positive-affective and global-affective (both positive and negative) stimuli, each group 
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will then be examined to see whether they have a vigilance or difficulty disengaging 
their attention from these types of stimuli, and whether they have a bias towards, or 
away from, positive and negative images.  Finally, the data will be examined to see if 
there is a relationship between attentional bias and empathy. 
Although research to date has been equivocal, based on similar methods 
(Hockley & Langdon, In Press) it is predicted that IDO will have lower empathy than 
the IDNO group.  There are no comparable, within-group studies that consider how 
attention bias for affective information compares to neutral information.  However, in 
light of evidence that suggests people with poor affective and interpersonal features have 
reduced affective responses and emotional disengagement, and offenders have 
impairments in recognition of affective information and perspective taking (Gery et al., 
2009; Hanson, 2003; Seara-Cardoso et al., 2011), it can be predicted that IDO will 
attend to all types of stimuli in the same way, that is, will exhibit no vigilance or 
disengagement effects.  Previous studies using the dot-probe task to compare non-
offenders to offenders/adolescents with antisocial behaviour, have found an attentional 
bias for negative stimuli (Kimonis et al., 2006; Smith & Waterman, 2003), which may 
suggest that IDO will have an attentional bias for negative-affective information.  
Finally, based on studies in the general population (Hofelich & Preston, 2012; Preston & 
Stansfield, 2008), it is anticipated that attentional bias for affective information will be 
able to predict a significant percentage of the variance in empathy.   
1.6.2 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The follow research questions and hypotheses are proposed: 
1. Research Question 1: Do IDO have lower empathy than IDNO? 
a. Hypothesis 1: The IDO group will have significantly lower scores on the 
Empathy Quotient questionnaire than the IDNO group. 
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2. Research Question 2: Do IDO and IDNO groups have a bias for different types of 
image? 
a. Hypothesis 2a: There will be no differences in RT when comparing 
negative-affective, positive-affective and global-affective (both positive 
and negative) trials, to neutral only trials, in the IDO group. 
b. Hypothesis 2b: On the above trials, there will be significant differences in 
RT in the IDNO group. 
3. Research Question 3: Are there differences between groups in attentional bias for 
affective information? 
a. Hypothesis 3a: IDO will have a significant attentional bias for negative 
stimuli, in comparison to the IDNO group, controlling for relevant factors 
(age, IQ, anxiety and depression if appropriate). 
b. Hypothesis 3b: There will be no group differences in attentional bias for 
positive-affective stimuli, or global-affective stimuli. 
4. Research Question 4: Can attentional bias predict empathy? 
a. Hypothesis 4: Attentional bias for global-affective, negative-affective and 
positive-affective stimuli will be significant predictors of empathy, 
controlling for relevant factors (age and IQ) if appropriate.   
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2 Methods 
2.1 Chapter Overview 
This chapter outlines the methodology used in the study.  The design is 
described, followed by a description of the participants, and measures and materials.  
The data collection process is detailed, and ethical considerations pertinent to the 
research are discussed.  Finally, necessary data preparations are outlined. 
2.2 Design 
The study uses a quasi-experimental, non-equivalent mixed design (2 [Group: 
IDO, IDNO] x 2 [Trial Type: affective-stimuli congruent, affective-stimuli incongruent]) 
with group as the between-groups variable, and trial type as the within-groups variable.  
The trial type factor indicates whether the affective image in question (i.e. positive-
affective stimuli, or negative-affective stimuli) is presented in the same location as the 
dot-probe.  These factors are described in more detail in section 2.2.4.  Two non-
randomised groups were recruited, comprising people with ID who have offended (IDO 
group), and people with ID who have not offended (IDNO group).  The dot-probe task 
comprises the main experimental paradigm. The study used quantitative analysis of 
questionnaire scores and dot-probe paradigm responses to investigate whether there is a 
significant difference between the groups on measures of empathy and attentional bias.  
Participants in both groups also completed measures of IQ, anxiety and depression.  All 
measures were taken at a single time point.   
2.1 Participants 
2.1.1 Power Calculations 
  Power calculations represent the probability that effects or differences that exist 
within the population from which a sample is derived, have a chance of reaching 
statistical significance in research (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  In order to determine an 
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appropriate sample size, multiple a priori power analyses were undertaken, according to 
the proposed hypotheses, using G*power 3.1 (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009).  
Calculations were based on data from previous studies investigating similar hypotheses 
with people with ID (Dodd & Porter, 2010), and IDO (Hockley & Langdon, In Press; 
Watson, 2006).  Power and alpha (one tailed) were set at the conventional levels of 1-β = 
.80 and α = .05 (Kazdin, 2003).  
The power calculation for hypothesis 1 used directly comparable data from a 
previous study investigating empathy in a similar population, using the same assessment 
tool (Hockley & Langdon, In Press).   Using a t-test calculation (difference between two 
independent means, with two groups, effect size d = .97), a necessary total sample size 
of 28 was predicted.  For hypothesis 2b, the only comparable study in this population did 
not report RT data (Watson, 2006).  Comparable data points in people with ID, 
specifically, Williams syndrome, could be obtained from an investigation of attentional 
bias to threat stimuli and happy faces (Dodd & Porter, 2010, 2011), however these 
samples are not ideal as they include children and young people, and were specifically 
examining attentional bias in a group whose behavioural phenotype centres upon a 
preference for the stimuli under examination.  Without appropriate data on which to base 
the calculation, a medium effect size d of 0.5 was used for a t-test calculation, resulting 
in a total sample size of 102. 
For hypothesis 3a, firstly without considering covariates, data from a previous, 
comparable study is available (Watson, 2006), however the sample size of the ID groups 
was small (ID child sex offenders n = 17; ID non-offenders n = 18), and consequently 
the standard deviations are very large and unusual for studies using similar methods 
(Group 1: M  = .81, SD = 2.89; Group 2: M = -.63, SD = 3.11).  For example, in an ID 
population of people with Williams Syndrome, Dodd and Porter (2011) reported mean 
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RT of approximately .63 and SD of approximately .09.  Using the SD reported by 
Watson (2006) indicated that a sample of 110 participants would be needed.  However, 
using a smaller SD (SD = 1.5), but still large in comparison to other studies using similar 
methods, indicated that a sample of 30 participants was required (t-test calculation; 
effect size d = .96).  Considering the inclusion of up to four covariates, no suitable 
previous studies could be obtained on which calculations could be based.  Using an 
ANCOVA test (fixed effects, main effects and interaction) adopting a conservative 
approach (effect size f = .35), a sample size of 67 was estimated.  Finally, for hypothesis 
4, again due to the limited previous investigations, no appropriate studies were available 
from which data could be obtained.  However, assuming conservative correlations 
between predictors (age, IQ and attentional bias; .2, .2 and .3 respectively) and outcome 
(empathy) using a linear multiple regression test (effect size f
2
 = .20), a total sample of 
58 participants was estimated.  Power calculations are not given for hypothesis 2a and 
3b, as they are in effect null hypotheses. 
The difficulties in obtaining a reliable estimate of power, given the limited 
previous investigations in people with atypical development, are acknowledged.  Using 
best estimates, recruitment plans for the present study were based upon a sample size of 
67 participants, however it should be noted that as this study is part of a larger project 
(see section 2.1.5), and the total sample size for this project is 98 participants. 
2.1.2 Sample 
2.1.2.1 Attrition 
Thirty-seven participants were recruited each to the IDO group, and the IDNO 
group.  However eight participants who had completed the consent forms were unable to 
take part in the study.  One person was too fatigued to be able to concentrate during the 
assessment (IDNO n = 1), two people signed the consent form then declined to 
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participate, without giving a reason (IDO n = 1, IDNO n = 1), and three people 
completed a measure of IQ, and were above the study threshold (IDO n = 2, IDNO n = 
1).  The two final people found the questionnaires and computer task too difficult to 
complete (IDO n = 1, IDNO n =1).  Before deciding that the participants were unable to 
complete the assessment, additional support was given in order to see if this facilitated 
their participation, in the form of additional instructions for both the paper and computer 
based tasks, and encouragement to carry on, where appropriate.  When it was established 
that they would be unable to take part, it was collaboratively agreed between the 
participant and the researcher that the assessment wasn’t right for them, and they did not 
take part in the study, but were given financial reimbursement (shopping vouchers) to 
thank them for their time.  
2.1.2.2 Final Sample 
In total, 66 participants were able to complete the study in full.  Thirty-four men 
were recruited to the IDO group (Mage = 33.06, SD = 13.29, range 18-59 years), and 32 
men were recruited to the IDNO group (Mage = 43.47, SD = 14.71, range 19-65 years).  
The mean IQ of the IDO group was 63.42 (SD = 4.82, range 50-70) and the mean IQ of 
the IDNO group was 61.19 (SD = 4.82, range 55-69). 
2.1.3 Inclusion Criteria 
Any individual was considered eligible to take part if they met the following 
criteria: (a) aged between 18-65 years, (b) male, (c) an ID of “mild” severity (American 
Psychiatric Association, 1994); that is, a full scale IQ between 50 and 70 (Wechsler, 
1999), and (d) had the capacity to give, or withhold, informed consent.  Capacity for 
consent was determined in line with Mental Capacity Act (2005), and ascertained by the 
researcher at the time of meeting the participant, together with guidance from any 
individual who knew the person well.  Participants were recruited to the IDNO group if 
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they had no self-reported history of arrests, cautions or convictions, which was 
confirmed with staff members or carers as best as possible.  Participants were recruited 
to the IDO group if they had a documented history of at least one Crown Court 
conviction that led to a custodial sentence.   
2.1.4 Exclusion Criteria 
Participants were excluded if they had a diagnosis of dementia and/or acquired 
brain injury, as the presence of an additional cognitive impairment could bias the results.  
Women were also excluded, as evidence suggests that gender differences exist in 
attentional bias (Tan et al., 2011; Vitale, 2011) and empathy (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004), could significantly confound the findings.  Furthermore, the 
population of people with ID in forensic settings is predominantly male, and so the 
above criteria were set in order to most accurately reflect the clinical population.  
Similarly, IQ in the “mild” range was used to define inclusion criteria, as ID offenders 
typically have this level of functioning (Salekin et al., 2010).  
2.1.5 Recruitment Strategy 
Participants were recruited from services across the east of England.  IDO were 
recruited from NHS and independent sector secure forensic services, where they were 
currently detained under the Mental Health Act (2007).  IDNO were recruited from day 
services and NHS or social care community ID teams.  In order to identify potential 
participants, the researcher presented the study to staff at each site.  Staff were given 
both staff and participant information sheets (Appendix 6 and Appendix 7), and were 
then asked to identify individuals in their service who they thought might meet the 
research criteria.  They gave the participant information sheets and verbal explanations 
to these individuals.  Any person who was interested in taking part was advised to 
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express this to the staff, who then informed the researcher.  A flowchart of the 
recruitment procedure is shown in Appendix 8. 
In order to facilitate recruitment within appropriate timescales, this study was 
carried out as part of a larger study, and alongside another trainee research project.  The 
focus and content of the trainee project, aside from collection of demographic 
information was entirely independent.  A summary of the overlap between projects is 
outlined in Appendix 9. 
2.2 Materials 
2.2.1 Demographic Data 
Demographic data was obtained directly from participants, consisting of age, 
ethnicity, marital status, any dependents, education leaving age, known physical and 
mental health problems, and information about previous convictions.  This took between 
5 and 10 minutes to complete, and consent was obtained from participants in order 
reference relevant records, to verify this information.  Appendix 10 contains the full data 
collection pack. 
2.2.2 General Intellectual Functioning 
 Cognitive assessment was used to establish an individual’s IQ.  Where possible, 
an existing measure of participants’ Full Scale IQ (FSIQ) was obtained from their 
records.  These scores were considered acceptable for use in the study if they were 
obtained within the last three years, using either the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale, 
third or fourth editions (WAIS-III, WAIS-IV; Wechsler, 1997, 2008), or the Wechsler 
Abbreviated Scales of Intelligence, first or second editions (WASI, WASI-II; Wechsler, 
1999, 2011).  The Wechsler scales are a nationally standardised set of intelligence 
scales, which are administered by a trained professional, for use in individuals aged 6-
89. 
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Those participants who did not have an FSIQ on record were asked to complete 
the two subtest version of the WASI.  Assessment lasted a maximum of fifteen minutes, 
and could be scored immediately, making it possible to determine eligibility for the 
study straight away.  It comprised a Vocabulary Subtest, which assessed word 
knowledge and verbal concept formation, and Matrix Reasoning Subtest, which 
measured abstract reasoning skills and visual processing.  Information was presented 
visually, responses were given manually or verbally, and performance was converted to 
an age standardised score.  The two subtest version of the WASI yields a full-scale IQ 
(FSIQ-2) on the basis of only two subtests, but unlike the four subtest version, is unable 
to produce Performance and Verbal IQ estimate scores.  It has good reliability ( = .84- 
.98) and high test-retest reliability (0.92; Wechsler, 1999).  It is seen to be the most 
useful measure of IQ when time is constrained, but an accurate, overall summary of an 
individual’s general intellectual functioning, and is deemed to be acceptable for use in 
research (Axelrod, 2002). 
  In the IDO group, IQs were ascertained using from the file using the WAIS-IV 
(25%), the WAIS-III (25%), or as part of the research assessment using the WASI 
(50%).  In the IDNO group, all IQs were assessed during the research using the WASI.   
2.2.3 Empathy Quotient 
The Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2004) is a self-report 
measure.  It is described as a global measure of empathy (Lawrence, Shaw, Baker, 
Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004), comprising three main aspects: cognitive empathy, 
reflected in statements such as “I can’t always see why someone was offended by a 
remark”, emotional reactivity or affective empathy, e.g. “I get upset if I see people 
suffering on the news programmes”, and social skills, e.g. “Friends usually talk to me 
about their problems as they say I am very understanding”.  The authors did not separate 
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cognitive and affective empathy constructs due to their overlap (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2004).  The original measure contains 40 empathy statements and 20 
unscored filler statements; the filler items were removed from the questionnaire in the 
present study.  The measure requires participants to indicate their level of agreement to 
the empathy statements using a 4-point rating scale from ‘strongly agree’ to strongly 
disagree’, and approximately half of the items are reversed scored.  Higher scores on the 
EQ indicate higher levels of empathy.   
In the general population and people with developmental disabilities, the EQ has 
robust psychometric properties.  It has moderate concurrent validity with subscales of 
other measures of empathy, such as the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (Lawrence et al., 
2004), and high test–retest reliability (r = 0.83; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004).  
In men with ID, internal consistency of α = .64, which rates as “questionable” (George 
& Mallery, 2003) has been reported (Hockley & Langdon, In Press), but was based upon 
a sample comprising only 35 participants.  One reason for this may be because the 
wording of the EQ is complex, and so has the potential to be confusing for people with 
ID.  For example, a statement might contain a hypothetical scenario, or use double 
negatives.  In order to minimise the likelihood of this confounding the results, the 
researcher read each statement aloud, and presented participants with a visual analogue 
scale to aid response giving (Appendix 14).  The researcher also checked the participants 
understanding of the statements, to ensure this matched the response given. In the 
current study, the Cronbach alpha coefficient of the EQ was “good” (George & Mallery, 
2003), α = .88. 
2.2.4 Affective Pictures Dot-Probe Task 
The dot-probe task was used to assess attentional bias towards affective stimuli.  
This involves the sequential presentation of pairs of images on a computer screen, 
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followed by the brief appearance of a dot.  Participants make a timed response to 
indicate the location of the dot.  Three studies have described the reliability and validity 
of this measure.  In a task using anxiety related stimuli in a non-clinical group, 
Schmukle (2005) suggests a poor reliability estimate of internal consistency and test-
retest reliability (r = <.2 and r = <.3 respectively), using both picture and lexical stimuli.  
In the second study (Staugaard, 2009), again using anxiety related stimuli, but this time 
using images of faces, found similarly poor levels of internal consistency and test-retest 
reliability.  The length of time presentation of the stimuli was varied across two 
conditions, and results were consistently low (r = <.4).  However, their findings 
suggested that groups had stable and consistent engagement for emotional faces, and 
suggested that the task was appropriate when used within a between-group design, when 
investigating attention to affect-based stimuli.  In the third study investigating the 
psychometric properties of the task in a clinical population, Dear, Sharpe, Nicholas and 
Refshauge (2011) used pictorial and lexical stimuli in people with chronic pain, and 
again, reported poor internal consistency for both sets of stimuli (r = <.25). 
Necessarily, caution is required when generalising these findings, given that they 
have focused only on anxiety-related attention biases, and only one has used a clinical 
sample.  Whilst no reliability or validity data are available specifically within an ID or 
offending populations, it should be noted that the dot-probe is a widely used task across 
a wide range of clinical and non-clinical populations, and is an established assessment 
tool of attentional bias (Cisler et al., 2009).   
2.2.4.1 Stimuli  
Pictorial stimuli, rather than lexical stimuli, were selected for the task, as this 
was thought to be more appropriate for people with ID, and because images are more 
strongly related to affect (Glaser & Glaser, 1982; Loney, Frick, Clements, Ellis, & 
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Kerlin, 2003).  As the population under investigation involved a mixed sample of 
offenders, affective, rather than offence-related pictures were used.  Pictures were taken 
from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 
2008).  This is a standardised set of over 900 affect-inducing colour images validated for 
experimental use (Verschuere, Crombez, & Koster, 2001).  Using a nine point Likert 
scale, each image has previously been rated by men and women for the emotional 
response it elicits, and factor analysis data has revealed two key dimensions to the 
images (Lang, 1980); valence (ranging from pleasant to unpleasant) and arousal (from 
calm to excited).  A third, less significant dimension of dominance or control (from 
totally controlled to totally in control) has also been reported.  Together, these ratings 
enable researchers to select a group of stimuli which share similar, multidimensional 
affective properties (Scherer, Dan, & Flykt, 2010).   
All pictures used in the task were presented at a standardised height of 9.63cm 
and width of 13.54cm.  It was necessary to optimise homogeneity across the images, 
therefore all images were in landscape orientation.  Furthermore, given the sample under 
investigation, images were considered inappropriate for the task if they contained 
nude/erotic images, or children.  Twenty-four images were selected for use in the main 
task; eight positive, eight negative, and eight neutral.  Within each category, four images 
contained people, and four contained objects (images are shown in Appendix 11), in 
order to counterbalance for image types across conditions.  Guidance on selection of 
positive and negative images was not available from existing literature, and so criteria 
were set using the rating available from the standardised Likert scales to distinguish 
positive and negative images from neutral images, and to ensure positive and negative 
images had similar affective properties.  This was particularly important as previous 
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evidence suggests the extent to which valence or arousal interferes with information 
processing is unclear (Schimmack, 2005). 
Using the Likert score for valence, positive and negative images were selected 
from those images scored in the top or bottom (respectively) 1.5 points.  Neutral images 
were selected from those which scored +/- .35 points around the mean of the valence 
scale.  Positive and negative images were also matched on scores of arousal; images 
were only considered suitable if they were rated between 5 and 9 on the arousal scale.  
All neutral images rated below 4 on the arousal scale.  Similar to other studies e.g. 
(Scherer et al., 2010), dominance ratings were not utilised in the selection criteria, as this 
dimension only explain a limited proportion of the variance in evaluative judgments of 
these stimuli (Coan & Allen, 2007). 
2.2.4.2 Trials 
The format of a single trial is represented below (Figure 4).  A single trial could 
last for up to 11,000ms, and contained: (1) a central fixation cross (presented for 
1,000ms; first trial in the block only), (2) the fixation cross and two pictures, which are 
presented directly to the left and right of the cross (500ms), (3) the fixation cross, and a 
small circle (the dot-probe) located either to the left or the right of the cross, 
corresponding to the centre point of one of the presented pictures (500ms), followed by 
(4) the fixation cross alone.  This remains until a response is made by the participant, at 
which point, a new trial is automatically started.  A response can be made any time up to 
10,000ms, but is typically made in fewer than 1,000ms.  Pictures were presented side by 
side, rather than in parallel vertically in order that they were congruent with the 
orientation of buttons on the response box (described below). 
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Fixation cross, 
presented for 
1,000ms 
Picture pair 
(randomised), 
presented for 
500ms 
Dot-probe, 
presented 
either side for 
up to 500ms 
 
Fixation cross, 
presented for  
up to 
10,000ms 
 
Figure 4. Representation of a Trial on the Dot-Probe Task. 
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Duration of stimulus presentation (500ms) was based on previous research in 
people with ID and offenders (Dodd & Porter, 2010, 2011; Smith & Waterman, 2003).  
The main task contains 368 trials, of which 112 trials contain two neutral images 
(Neutral-Neutral Trial), 128 trials contain one positive-affective and one neutral image 
(Positive-Affective Trial), and 128 trials contain one negative-affective image and one 
neutral image (Negative-Affective Trial).  Within the positive and negative conditions, 
each trial could be classified as either congruent or incongruent.  A congruent trial is one 
where a dot-probe replaces an affective image (that is paired with a neutral image).  An 
incongruent trial is one where a dot-probe replaces a neutral image (that is paired with 
an affective image). In Neutral-Neutral trials, as neither image is affective, the position 
of the dot-probe is neither congruent nor incongruent. 
2.2.4.3 Practice Procedure 
A short computerised explanation of the task was provided, instructing 
participants to indicate whether a dot appears on either the left or the right side of the 
screen, using a response box (see Figure 5 and Figure 6).  All computerised explanations 
were supported by a verbal explanation of the task, given by the researcher.  Participants 
were asked to press a button with a black arrow located on the far left of the box if the 
dot is on the left side of the computer screen, and a button with a white arrow on the 
right if a dot appearing on the right.  Participants were instructed to respond as quickly 
as possible, avoiding making errors. 
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Figure 5. Practice Information for the Dot-Probe Task: Part 1. 
85 
 
 
  
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
15 
14 
13 
Repeat 10 times with 
different, 
randomised pictures 
If a correct response 
is given  on less than 
9 trials, task is 
repeated (maximum 
3 times) 
Figure 6. Practice Trials for the Dot-Probe Task: Part 2.  
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Three practice blocks are then presented, each comprising 10 practice trials.  If 
participants achieved nine or ten (out of ten) trials correct, in either the first, second or 
third practice blocks, they could move directly to the main task, where they were 
presented with computerised instructions indicating that the main task will begin.  
However, if they made two or more errors within a practice block, they were required to 
complete another practice block.  If they made two or more errors in each of three 
practice blocks, the task was discontinued.  Pictures used in the practice are different to 
the pictures used in the main task, and are all neutral in content (Appendix 12). 
2.2.4.4 Main Task Procedure 
Participants sat comfortably with their heads approximately one metre away 
from the laptop, with the screen angled to ensure optimum viewing of the images.  The 
368 trials in the main task are grouped into eight blocks containing 46 trials.  Within 
each block, the trials were presented continuously.  The end of each block is denoted by 
the following words on the screen: “When you are ready to start again, press any key on 
the button box”, giving participants a brief comfort break before they resumed the task.  
Participants could control the start of the next block by pressing the space bar. 
2.2.4.5 Counterbalancing and Randomisation 
The following factors were counterbalanced across the left and right visual 
fields, for all of the main task trials: dot-probe position, position of the affective image 
position within a picture pair, position of the object/person position within a picture pair, 
congruency of the dot-probe and affective image.  The order in which trials were 
presented was randomised, generated by the presentation software, and so differed for 
each participant in order to eliminate order effects.   
2.2.4.6 Software and Hardware 
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  The dot-probe task was programmed using PsychoPy v1.75.01 software (Peirce, 
2007), and presented using Psychopy v1.74.00.  This was presented on Toshiba Satellite 
Pro C850-1K4 laptops, Microsoft Windows 7 Enterprise Operating System (Intel Core 
i3-3120M CPU, 2.5GHz, 4GB installed RAM), 15” screen, 1366 x 768 resolution, set to 
60Hz screen refresh rate, True Colour (32bit) and maximum brightness.  Three 
computers were used for the study, all of which had the same specifications. 
A serial response box, DirectIN High Speed Button-Box v2012 manufactured by 
Empirisoft, was used to record participant responses.  It connected directly to the laptop 
via USB, and responses were delivered to the computer in less than 1ms.  The box was 
oblong shaped, containing nine key keys in landscape orientation, where the first and 
last keys are separated from the central keys (keys two to eight) so that they are at the 
extremities of the box.  Participants were asked to use the keys farthest to the left and 
right, to respond to the respective dot-probes on the screen.  The keys to press were 
denoted with black and white arrows. 
Response boxes were used as they provide a more accurate response time than a 
standard computer/laptop keyboard or mouse, which typically are not considered precise 
enough for experiments requiring accurate response times (Schneider, Eschman, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002).  Although a keyboard could have been used, it was felt that having 
the target key in amongst other keys would be confusing for participants, and would 
increase the likelihood that they would need to look down at the keyboard to ensure they 
were pressing the correct key, which could have significantly influenced overall RT.  
2.2.5 Anxiety and Depression Questionnaires 
Previous research has demonstrated that different levels of anxiety within the 
population can have influence attentional bias in the general population and in offenders 
(Lorenz & Newman, 2002a), therefore it was deemed necessary to measure and co-vary 
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for this where appropriate.  Depression is also known to exert differences in attentional 
bias (Gotlib et al., 2004).  In light of the negative content of some of the images being 
used, this was also measured, in order to include as covariates if appropriate. 
The measures selected to investigate anxiety and depression were self-report, and 
use a 3-point Likert response scale and visual analogues scale (Appendix 14), where 
higher scores on both measures indicate higher levels of anxiety and depression 
respectively. Each took between 10-15 minutes to complete.  They are considered to be 
the most promising of the available self-report screening measures for ID, based on a 
comparison of relevant psychometric properties (Hermans & Evenhuis, 2010; Hermans, 
van der Pas, & Evenhuis, 2011). 
2.2.5.1 Glasgow Anxiety Scale 
The Glasgow Anxiety Scale for people with an Intellectual Disability (GAS; 
Mindham & Espie, 2003) was used to measure anxiety.  It has good content and 
discriminant validity when comparing anxious ID, non-anxious ID and anxious non-ID 
groups, and good test-retest reliability (r = .95) and internal consistency (α = .96).  It 
also has acceptable criterion validity (ρ = .72) when compared to the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  In the current study, internal 
consistency was reported to be α = .86. 
2.2.5.2 Glasgow Depression Scale 
The Glasgow Depression Scale for people with a Learning Disability (GDS-LD; 
Cuthill, Espie, & Cooper, 2003) was used to measure depression.  Psychometric 
properties for this measure are also acceptable; it has good test-retest reliability (r = .97), 
internal consistency (α = .90), and it correlates positively with the Beck Depression 
Inventory – II (r = .88).  It has good discriminant validity for depressed ID and non-
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depressed ID groups.  Internal consistency in the current use of the measure was rated as 
α = .84. 
2.3 Procedure 
Following the recruitment procedures detailed in section 2.1.5, the researcher 
arranged to meet the potential participant; all potential participants could have someone 
else present during this and subsequent meetings.  The researcher gave further 
explanation of the study, ensured that information sheets had been read and understood, 
and answered questions pertaining to participation in the study.  If potential participants 
met the inclusion criteria, they had up to two weeks to decide if they wanted to take part, 
with the option of proceeding immediately if they wished.  Written consent to 
participation was taken from all participants (Appendix 13). 
All identified participants were tested individually in a quiet room.  The 
measures described in this study took approximately one hour to complete, however the 
completion of additional tasks for the second trainee study meant that assessments lasted 
approximately two hours in total.  The researcher sat with the participant for the duration 
of the session.  Participants had the option of taking breaks in between tasks if they 
wished. 
Demographic sheet was completed first, followed by IQ assessments for any 
participant who did not have an IQ score on file within the service where they were seen.  
The dot-probe task was completed as described above.  The remaining measures were 
completed in the following order: GAS, GDS, EQ.  These measures were read aloud to 
participants, presented in a written format, and participants had the option of using a 
visual analogue scale to assist in giving their response (Appendix 14).  The order of 
assessments was not counterbalanced, as previous studies have noted that the completion 
of emotion-based questionnaires immediately before an attentional bias task can prime 
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the participants emotion-cognition networks, and thus can influence the way in which 
their attention is allocated (Todorov & Bargh, 2002). 
Recruitment was shared between three researchers.  The current author collected 
half of the data (IDO n = 18, IDNO n = 17), with the remainder being collected by 
another trainee (IDO n = 15, IDNO n = 14), and the supervisor (IDO n = 4, IDNO n = 
6).  
2.4 Ethical Considerations 
2.4.1 Ethical Approval 
A favourable ethical opinion was gained from the South West National Research 
Ethics Committee Service (Reference No: 13/SW/0084; Appendix 15).  Applications to 
conduct research within five NHS trusts were requested and granted; Norfolk 
Community Health and Care NHS Trust, South Essex Partnership University NHS 
Foundation Trust, Cambridgeshire and Peterborough NHS Foundation Trust, 
Hertfordshire Partnership NHS Foundation Trust, and Leicester Partnership NHS Trust 
(Appendix 16).  Private forensic psychiatric units Partnerships in Care and St Andrew’s 
Healthcare also granted permission to act as recruitment sites. 
Ethical approval was contingent on the production of a satisfactory interim 
report; the Committee requested that after the first ten participants were recruited, 
recruitment should be temporarily halted, and a report should be provided detailing how 
the research was progressing.  Specifically, the Committee asked to hear whether any of 
the participants had experienced distress in response to the images.  The report produced 
was satisfactory (no adverse events were reported), and recruitment was allowed to 
proceed. 
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2.4.2 Decision Making 
Whilst the inclusion criteria ensured all participants would have capacity to give 
consent, people with ID experience a number of difficulties which can impact on their 
ability to make decisions, such as difficulty processing complex information, and a 
tendency towards acquiescence and suggestibility (Clements, 1987; Ellis, Deacon, & 
Wooldridge, 1985; Morris, Niederbuhl, & Mahr, 1993; Murphy & Clare, 1995).  
Furthermore, the implicit power balance that exists between researchers and participants 
has the potential to compound these difficulties.  A possible implication of potential 
participants experiencing these difficulties is therefore that they may consent to 
participation without understanding the full implications.  The following processes were 
put in place in order to reduce this risk, and to facilitate potential participants in making 
an informed, individual decision about participation. 
2.4.2.1 Reducing Coercion 
To reduce the possibility of coercion, potential participants were initially 
approached about the study by an individual whom they knew well, such as their key 
worker.  They then had the opportunity to discuss the study with staff, and time to 
consider whether they wished to participate.  At the time of taking consent, participants 
all had the option of having someone they knew present when the study was being 
explained and consent was being sought, such as a family member or carer.  They also 
had the option of having someone present with them throughout the full assessment, 
although it was made clear that the person providing support could not provide help to 
the participant in the completion of any of the tasks. 
2.4.2.2 Ensuring Capacity 
Managers were asked to only identify participants who they thought would be 
able to: (a) understand the purpose and nature of the research, (b) understand what their 
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involvement would entail, (c) understand benefits to taking part, (d) understand the risks, 
burdens and alternatives to taking part, (e) could retain the information long enough to 
make an effective decision, and (f) make a free choice.  However, it was still possible 
that researchers would come into contact with people who did not have capacity to 
consent.  Researchers therefore had ultimate responsibility for ensuring that potential 
participants had capacity to consent to participation, and followed guidelines provided 
by the Mental Capacity Act (2005). 
2.4.2.3 Taking Informed Consent 
Information sheets were designed using guidelines to promote ease of reading 
and understanding (Flesch, 1948), in order to make them accessible and transparent.  
Jargon and use of abstract concepts has been minimised, and words, sentences and 
paragraphs have been kept short and simple.  Following the initial opportunity to read 
the information sheet, this information was reviewed in detail with the researcher before 
consent was taken, as reinforcement of information is considered good practice with 
people with ID (Clare, 1993).  It was made clear that the decision to participate would 
not affect either current or future care, and that participants could withdraw from the 
study at any time, without giving a reason. 
2.4.3 Confidentiality 
Data acquisition and storage complied with the Data Protection Act (1998).  
Identifiable information was kept under a coding system, and separate to all research 
data, which was anonymised.  All paper records were kept in locked filing cabinets and 
stored securely in the office of the Chief Investigator.  Electronic files containing data 
were password protected, and stored on password protected computers, and any 
electronic transportation of data was encrypted.  No data which would enable the 
identification of the participant was transmitted electronically.  Confidentiality and data 
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protection was explained to participants.  Confidentiality applied to all aspects of data 
collection, however, participants were clearly advised at the start of the assessment to 
only discuss disclosed offences with the researcher.  It was made clear that should they 
disclose any previously unmentioned offences, the researcher would be obliged to share 
this information with the relevant authorities.  It should be noted that no participant 
disclosed an offence that had not previously been recorded. 
2.4.4 Distress 
The pictures used in the dot-probe task were selected as they were rated high on 
scales of emotional arousal.  It was acknowledged that some of these images had the 
potential to be perceived as distressing, and so it was necessary to consider the possible 
impact this may have on participants.  Firstly, the picture was presented to participants 
for only 500ms.  Thus, although participants were able to perceive the image, they 
would not be able to fixate upon the content for a prolonged period, which reduced the 
probability of experiencing distress.  Secondly, all of the images had been validated with 
research populations (Lang et al., 2008), and have been used in other clinical studies of 
attentional bias of affective stimuli (e.g. Kimonis et al., 2006). 
Thirdly, the following protocol was agreed and observed during data collection: 
(1) participants were informed that some of the images may be distressing before they 
took part; (2) they were reminded that they could terminate their participation at any 
point, even whilst taking part in the task; (3) researchers monitored participants for signs 
of distress throughout the assessment - if they appeared distressed or upset in any way, 
this task (or any other, if relevant) was to be stopped, participants were offered a break, 
and they were reminded that they may withdraw from the study if they wished; and (4) if 
a participant became distressed, a member of staff from the recruitment site was 
informed.  This information was also communicated to the Chief Investigator, who was 
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available to offer advice where necessary.  In accordance with good clinical practice 
(Medical Research Council, 1998), any observed distress was recorded and monitored 
throughout the study.  Only one record was made; one participant reported distress at 
seeing the positive-affective picture of puppies, as it reminded him of his dog that has 
passed away, but when asked, said he was willing and able to carry on with the task. 
2.4.5 Debriefing 
All participants were offered an opportunity to debrief following the assessment, 
where they could be given an explanation of the purpose and the findings of the study.  
Where this was requested, this was done idiosyncratically, in order to match the needs 
and abilities of the individual.  All professionals who expressed an interest in the results 
of the study were also offered the opportunity to receive the results of the study. 
2.4.6 Researcher Safety 
Unit policies, and local and national operating procedures regarding health, 
safety and risk, were adhered to at all times.  It was agreed that a member of staff from 
the service where the participant was recruited would be informed if any issues 
concerning the researcher arose.  
2.4.7 Participant Reimbursement 
Similar to previous studies in this population (Langdon, Murphy, Clare, & Palmer, 
2010), participants who completed 50% or more of the current study were given a £20 
shopping voucher to thank them for their participation.   
2.5 Data Preparation 
2.5.1 Data Analysis 
Descriptive data were generated and examined, and any identified errors were 
corrected as appropriate.  A comparison of the mean and 5% trimmed mean showed all 
values to be similar, so all data was retained.  Data were inspected for departures for 
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normality by visual inspection of histograms and the generation of Q-Q plots.  Overall, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests with Lilliefors Significance Correction revealed all except 
four variables (IQ, EQ, GDS and GAS scores) departed from normality in either one or 
both groups (see Appendix 17 for results of this test).  Difficulties meeting assumptions 
of parametric tests is common when using RT data, and the data are often skewed 
(Gress & Laws, 2009).  Where parametric statistics could not be applied, Field (2013) 
argues that bootstrapping, a nonparametric resampling procedure, is a more powerful 
alternative to parametric statistics.  It involves repeated sampling from the original 
data, estimating the indirect effect in each re-sampled data set, thus deriving an 
empirical approximation of the sampling distribution which is then used to create 
percentile confidence intervals.  Normality assumptions are not necessary and 
bootstrapping generates robust estimates. 
Where parametric statistics were not appropriate, bootstrapping was therefore 
used, and bias corrected and accelerated (BCa) confidence intervals were calculated and 
reported.  The recommended number of bootstrap samples has increased over time 
(Wagstaff, Elek, Kulis, & Marsiglia, 2009), and it is suggested that good estimates of 
confidence intervals often require 5,000 samples or more.  Statistics reported in the 
results were derived using the original data, and the significance level and the 95% BCa 
CI were derived using bootstrapping with 5,000 samples.  If the BCa confidence 
interval crosses zero, the data was considered not to be statistically significant.  All 
tests were two tailed, performed at the p ≤ .05 significance level, and equal variances 
are assumed unless stated. 
2.5.2 Errors and Outliers   
Output files from the dot-probe task were generated in Excel 2010, and data were 
transferred into SPSS-IBM, version 21 (IBM Corporation, 2012).  In line with previous 
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studies, any incorrect responses given by participants were excluded from the analysis.  
There were significant differences in terms of the numbers of errors made; IDO made 
fewer errors, M = 9.94, SD = 14.12, than IDNO, M = 24.91, SD = 37.72, t(56) = -2.12, p 
= 0.04, BCa 95% CI [-31.94, -2.16].   
Similar to protocols used in other studies, RT that were more than two standard 
deviations above each participant’s mean were removed (Koster et al., 2004; Mogg, 
Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004).  There were no significant differences between groups 
in terms of the numbers of outliers identified and removed: IDO M = 10.42, SD = 7.51, 
IDNO M = 11.31, SD = 6.00, t(63) = -.53, p = 0.60; BCa 95% CI [-4.04, 2.43].  As part 
of learning the task requirements, participants were able to practice the task up to three 
times.  In the IDO group, 94.1% (n=32) needed one practice trial, and 2.9% (n=1) 
needed two.  In the IDNO group, 84.4% (n=27) needed one practice, and 15.6% (n=5) 
needed two.  
2.5.3 Preparation for Analyses 
2.5.3.1 Vigilance and Disengagement (Hypothesis 2a and 2b) 
Mean RT on Congruent and Incongruent trials (described in section 2.4.1) were 
compared to RT on Neutral-Neutral trials, in order to determine whether any within 
group RT differences were a consequence of attentional vigilance, or attentional 
disengagement.  This was conducted separately for each trial type (Negative-Congruent 
Trials, Negative-Incongruent Trials, Positive-Congruent Trials, Positive-Congruent 
Trials, Global-Affective-Congruent Trials, and Global-Affective-Incongruent Trials). 
In order to understand whether participants were vigilant for affective stimuli, 
responses to congruent trials are observed.  When participants have faster responses on 
Congruent trials compared to Neutral-Neutral trials, this results in a negative (-) number, 
which suggests that individuals preferentially hold their attention at the affective 
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location.  When participants have slower RT on Incongruent trials in comparison to 
Neutral-Neutral trials, this results in a positive (+) number, which indicates that they 
have difficulty disengaging attention from affective stimuli, as time is needed to shift 
attention from the affective to the neutral location (Koster et al., 2004). 
2.5.3.2 Attentional Bias Index (Hypothesis 3a and 3b) 
These calculations are used to determine the “attention capturing” quality of the 
images (Gotlib et al., 2004).  Here, Attentional Bias Index is an indication of the 
attention-mediated speed of response to images, calculated depending on whether or not 
the dot-probe is congruent with affective image in question.  This score is therefore an 
index of the speed of attention moving from one type of stimuli to another (MacLeod & 
Mathews, 1988).  The subtraction of RT on congruent trials from incongruent trials is 
conducted as participants typically respond fastest to probes that appear in a region to 
which they are attending (i.e. congruent trials; Posner et al., 1980). 
A bias away from affective images is inferred when responses on incongruent 
trials are faster than responses on congruent trials.  In this instance, negative (-) values 
are interpreted as an indication of a shift of attention away from the spatial location of 
the affective picture, and the further the number is from 0, the greater the bias away 
from the affective image.  Conversely, a bias towards affective images in inferred when 
responses on incongruent trials are slower than responses on congruent trials.  Positive 
(+) values are interpreted as a shift in attention towards the spatial location of the 
affective picture relative to the paired (neutral) picture.  The further the number is from 
0, the greater the bias towards the affective image. 
Three attention bias indices can be calculated for each participant, for positive-
affective images (Positive-Affective Bias Index), for negative-affective images 
(Negative-Affective Bias Index), and for any affective image (both positive and negative 
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images; Global-Affective Bias Index).  The first two indices are calculated as follows: i) 
the mean RT to congruent trials is calculated, ii) the mean RT to congruent trials is 
calculated, and iii) the congruent value is subtracted from the incongruent value.  For the 
Global-Affective Bias Index (both positive and negative images), the RT data from the 
two (positive and negative) congruent trial types is summed, then subtracted from the 
sum of the RT on the two incongruent trial types, and divided by two (see Figure 7 for 
each calculation).  An index indicating attentional bias for each stimuli category is thus 
calculated for each person. 
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Figure 7. Attentional Bias Index Calculations 
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2.6 Chapter Summary 
The characteristics of the sample and measures used in the present study, in 
particular the dot-probe task, were described in detail.  The assessment and recruitment 
procedures were described, and management of necessary ethical considerations 
pertinent to this clinical population were discussed.  Of particular significance, the 
potential distress that could be caused by the images used was highlighted.  In 
preparation for the results in section 3, the necessary data preparation procedures were 
outlined. 
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3 Results 
3.1 Chapter Overview 
The research questions outlined in chapter one will be investigated.  The 
demographic characteristics of the sample and scores measures are presented initially.  
Groups will then be compared to explore differences in empathy, RT to different trial 
types, and overall attentional bias.  Finally, the extent to which empathy can be 
explained by attentional bias will be explored. 
3.2 Preliminary Data and Analyses 
3.2.1 Attrition 
As described in section 2.1.2, eight participants who had completed the consent 
forms were unable to take part in the study.  The final sample size used in the analysis 
was n = 66 (IDO n = 34; IDNO n = 32).  
3.2.2 Sample 
Recruitment and support data is shown in Table 8.  Of those who took part in the 
assessment in full, over half of the IDO group were recruited from independent forensic 
inpatient services (n = 21), and the majority of participants were in Medium Secure 
Units (n = 25).  One person was recruited from a community ID NHS team, having 
previously served a sentence in a Medium Secure Unit.  The majority of IDNO 
participants were recruited from day centres (n = 17), with roughly a third each of 
remaining participants being recruited from community ID teams (n = 6), residential 
housing (n = 4), and local council facilities (n = 4).  In the IDNO group, under half had 
someone present during the consent process (n = 13), and less than 10% requested this 
for the full assessment (n = 3).  Over half of the IDO group had someone present whilst 
consent was being taken (n = 21), and just under half had someone present throughout 
the duration of the assessment (n = 16). 
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Table 8. Recruitment and Support Data, by Group 
 IDO N (%) 
(n = 34) 
IDNO N (%) 
(n = 32) 
Recruitment Location   
      Community NHS LD Team 1 (2.9) 6 (18.8) 
      Forensic Inpatient Service - Independent 21 (61.8) 0 (0) 
      Forensic Inpatient Service – NHS 12 (35.3) 0 (0) 
      Residential Housing 0 (0) 4 (12.5) 
      Day Centre 0 (0) 17 (53.1) 
      County Council 0 (0) 4 (12.5) 
      College 0 (0) 1 (3.1) 
Type of Secure Unit   
      Low Secure 7 (20.6) - 
      Medium Secure 25 (76.5) - 
      N/A (Community) 1 (2.9) - 
Someone Present for Consent   
      No 13 (38.2) 19 (59.4) 
      Yes 21 (61.8) 13 (40.6) 
Someone Present for Assessment   
      No 18 (52.9) 29 (90.6) 
      Yes 16 (47.1) 3 (9.4) 
   
3.2.3 Descriptive Data 
Offence data for the IDO group are shown in Table 9, which includes both the 
index offence, and all offences recorded on file.  All offence data and physical and 
mental health data were elicited using open ended questions.  Categories for analysis 
were created after data collection based on the sample data, and UK government offence 
classifications (Department of Justice, 2010) were used to develop offence categories.   
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Table 9. Offence Details in the IDO Group 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Means and standard deviations for the demographic data (ethnicity, relationship 
status, school type and number of children) are shown in Table 10.  Health data 
(physical health, mental health, and neurodevelopmental disorders) are shown in Table 
11.  It should be noted that more than one problem was recorded for some participants, 
and that where sensory problems are reported (sight problems n = 2, hearing problems n 
= 1), it was ensured that these would not impact on participants ability to complete any 
aspect of the study.  IQ, age, school leaving age, depression, anxiety and empathy 
scores, are shown in Table 12.  
  
 N (%) 
Violent Offences  
      Manslaughter 1 (2.9) 
      Murder 2 (5.9) 
      Attempted murder 1 (2.9) 
      Wounding or other act endangering life 10 (29.4) 
Sexual offences  
      Sexual assault of a minor 8 (23.5) 
      Sexual assault of an adult 6 (17.6) 
      Sexual activity with a minor 6 (17.6) 
      Rape 1 (2.9) 
      Abuse of children through pornography 2 (5.9) 
Acquisition offences  
      Burglary 2 (5.9) 
      Armed robbery 1 (2.9) 
Criminal Damage  
      Arson 4 (11.8) 
Other  
      Other indictable offence 3 (8.8) 
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Table 10. Demographic Data, by Group 
 
IDO N (%) 
(n = 34) 
IDNO N (%) 
(n = 32) 
Fisher’s 
Exact Test Sig 
Ethnicity   4.28 .14 
      White 29 (85.3) 32 (100)   
      Asian/Asian British 1 (2.9) 0 (0)   
      Black/Black British 2 (5.9) 0 (0)   
      Not stated/Other 2 (2.9) 0 (0)   
Relationship status   13.24 *.00 
      Single 33 (97.1) 22 (68.8)   
      Divorced 1 (2.9) 0 (0)   
      Married 0 (0) 8 (25.0)   
      Living with someone/partner 0 (0) 0 (6.3)   
Children   8.26 *.01 
      None 26 (76.5) 32 (100)   
      One 6 (17.6) 0 (0)   
      Two or more 2 (5.9) 0 (0)   
School   6.82 .09 
      Special needs 22 (64.7) 27 (84.4)   
      Mainstream 7 (20.6) 2 (6.3)   
      Received extra help 2 (5.9) 1 (3.1)   
      Learning support unit 0 (0) 2 (6.3)   
      Didn’t go to school 2 (5.9) 0 (0)   
Note.  * Statistically significant (2 tailed). 
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Table 11. Physical and Mental Health Comorbidities, by Group 
 
IDO N (%) 
(n = 34) 
IDNO N (%) 
(n = 32) Value Phi Sig 
Physical Health Problems 20 (60.6) 12 (37.5) 2.61 -.23 .11 
      No 13 (38.2) 20 (62.5)    
      Yes 20 (58.8) 12 (37.5) 2.21 -.21 .08 
            Epilepsy 3 (8.8) 6 (18.8)    
            Blood pressure 0 (0) 5 (15.6)    
            Diabetes 3 (8.8) 5 (15.6)    
            Heart problems 3 (8.8) 3 (9.4)    
            Asthma 2 (5.9) 5 (15.6)    
            Thyroid problems 0 (0) 2 (6.3)    
            Sensory problems 2 (5.9) 1 (3.1) 3.01 -.25 *.04 
            Other 2 (5.9) 4 (12.5)    
      Missing 1 (2.9) 0 (0)    
Mental Health Problems 20 (58.8) 12 (37.5) 2.21 -.21 .08 
      No 14 (41.2) 20 (62.5)    
      Yes 20 (58.8) 12 (37.5)    
            Anxiety 10 (29.4) 10 (31.3)    
            Depression 9 (26.5) 6 (18.8)    
            Personality Disorder 3 (8.8) 0 (0)    
            Schizophrenia 5 (14.7) 0 (0)    
Neurodevelopmental Disorders 10 (29.4) 3 (9.4) 3.01 -.25 *.04 
      No 24 (70.6) 30 (85.7)    
      Yes 7 (20.6) 2 (9.4)    
            Attention Deficit 
Hyperactivity Disorder  
3 (8.8) 1 (3.1) 
   
            Autistic Spectrum Disorder  7 (20.6) 2 (6.3)    
Note.  * Statistically significant (2 tailed). 
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3.2.4 Preliminary Analyses 
A Chi-square test for independence with Yates Continuity Correction indicated 
no significant association between group and physical health problems, χ² (1, n = 66) = 
2.61, p = .11, phi = -.23), or mental health problems, χ² (1, n = 66) = 2.21, p = .08, phi = 
-.21).  Significant group differences were observed in terms of neurodevelopmental 
disorders, χ² (1, n = 66) = 3.01, p = .04, phi = -.25).  Results are reported in Table 11.  
Where more than 80% of the cells had an expected count of less than five, Fisher’s exact 
test was used.  Groups differed significantly in terms of relationship status; significantly 
more of the IDO group were single, whilst more of the IDNO group were married 
(Fisher’s exact test, p = .00), and significantly more of the IDO group had children 
(Fisher’s exact test, p = .01).  No group differences were noted in ethnicity or type of 
school attended.  Results are reported in Table 10 and 11. 
Independent samples t-tests were conducted to compare interval data (Table 12).  
There were no significant differences in scores between groups in terms of school 
leaving age, t(60) = -.88, p = .38; BCa 95% CI [-1.49, .52], IQ t(63) = 1.87, p = .07, or 
anxiety, t(64) = -.39, p = .70.  There were significant differences in scores between 
groups in terms of age and depression, as measured by the GDS.  The IDO group were 
significantly younger (M = 33.06, SD = 13.29) than the IDNO group (M = 43.47, SD = 
14.71), t(64) = -3.02, p = .00; BCa 95% CI [-16.98, -3.35], and had higher depression 
scores (M = 12.51, SD = 7.08) than the IDNO group (M = 8.87, SD = 5.68), t(63) = 2.28, 
p = .03.  Finally, there were significant differences between groups on overall RT in the 
dot-probe task.  IDNO were significantly slower (M = .41, SD = .21) than the IDO group 
(M = .55, SD = .22), t(63) = -2.81, p = .01; BCa 95% CI [-.26, -.05]. 
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Table 12. Demographic, Questionnaire and Dot-Probe Analyses, by Group 
 
Note.  FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, EQ = Empathy Quotient, GDS = Glasgow Depression Scale, GAS = Glasgow Anxiety Scale, * Statistically significant (2 tailed). a Bootstrapped data.  b Equal variances not assumed. 
 IDO (n = 34) IDNO (n = 32)     
 M (SD) Min and 
Max Value 
M (SD) Min and 
Max Value 
BCa 95% CI t df Sig 
Demographic data         
   Age (years)
a
 33.06 (13.29) 18–59 43.47 (14.71) 19–65 -16.98–-3.35 -3.02 64 *.00 
   School leaving age (years)
 a
 15.47(1.95) 10–18 15.90 (1.91) 11–19 -1.49–.52 -.88 60 .38 
   FSIQ 63.42 (4.82) 50–70 61.19 (4.82) 55–69 - 1.87 63 .07 
Questionnaire data         
   EQ 32.45 (10.74) 15–58 38.16 (9.41) 21–58 - -2.27 63 *.03 
   GDS 12.51 (7.08) 0–28 8.87 (5.68) 0–20 - 2.28 63 *.03 
   GAS 18.61 (8.98) 3–39 19.53 (10.00) 5–40 - -.39 64 .70 
Dot-probe Task (seconds)         
   All Trials 
a b
 .55 (.22) .34–1.2 .71 (.22) .40–1.35 -.26–-.05 -2.81 63 *.01 
   Positive-Affective Bias Index
 a b
 -.01 (.07) -.15–.30 -.05 (.15) -.38–.39 -.02–.09 1.35 63 .19 
   Negative-Affective Bias Index
 a b
 .01 (.08) -.16–.22 -.08 (.19) -.67–.33 .02–.16 2.41 63 *.02 
   Global-Affective Bias Index
 a
 .00 (.07) -.14–.26 -.06 (.16) -.40–.36 .00–.12 2.12 63 *.04 
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3.3 Main Analyses 
3.3.1 Research Question 1 
Do IDO have lower empathy than IDNO? 
Hypothesis 1: The IDO group will have significantly lower scores on the 
Empathy Quotient questionnaire than the IDNO group. 
Tests were carried out to investigate whether IDO have significantly lower 
empathy than IDNO, as measured by the EQ.  Independent samples t-tests revealed the 
IDO group had significantly lower EQ scores (M = 32, SD = 10.74) than the IDNO 
group (M = 38, SD = 9.41); t(64) = -.39, p = .03, supporting the hypothesis.  Results are 
shown in Table 12. 
3.3.2 Research Question 2 
Do IDO and IDNO groups have a bias for different types of image? 
Hypothesis 2a: There will be no differences in RT when comparing negative-
affective, positive-affective and global-affective (both positive and 
negative) trials, to neutral only trials, in the IDO group. 
Hypothesis 2b: On the above trials, there will be significant differences in RT in 
the IDNO group. 
In order to understand whether IDO, and IDNO, differed in their RT to affective 
images in comparison to neutral images, paired samples t-tests were used to compare 
affective and neutral times, for each group (i.e. trials where there were two neutral 
images presented were compared to trials where an affective and a neutral image was 
presented).  In the IDO group, results revealed that IDO had no significant differences 
on Neutral-Neutral trial RT times, in comparison to any of the trial types: Negative 
Congruent, t(32) = -.34, p = .73, BCa 95% CI [-.04, .02], Negative Incongruent, t(32) = 
.37, p = 71, BCa 95% CI [-.01, .01], Positive Congruent, t(32) = .33, p = .71, BCa 95% 
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CI [-.02, .02], Positive Incongruent, t(32) = -.39, p = .70, BCa 95% CI [-.01, .00], 
Global-Affective Congruent, t(32) = -.03, p = .98, BCa 95% CI [-.03, .03], or Global-
Affective Incongruent trials, t(32) = .04, p = .97, BCa 95% CI [-.00, -.01].  This suggests 
that irrespective of the content of the stimulus, IDO RT do not differ, and confirms 
hypothesis 2a (Table 13). 
Across the IDNO group, significant findings were observed between Neutral-
Neutral trials and all other trial types, confirming hypothesis 2b.  RT on congruent trials 
were all significantly slower than RT on Neutral-Neutral trials (M = .59, SD = .19): 
Negative Congruent (M = .72, SD = .28), t(31) = 3.29, p = .00, BCa 95% CI [.05, .20], 
Positive Congruent (M = .66, SD = .22), t(31) = 2.47, p = .02, BCa 95% CI [.01, .12] and 
Global-Affective Congruent (M = .69, SD = .24), t(31) = 3.11, p = .00, BCa 95% CI 
[.04, .16]. 
If the position of the dot-probe, relative to the affective stimuli (i.e. congruency) 
exerts no influence on the RT, the score is zero, therefore the greater the score is from 
zero, the more substantial the bias in attention.  Vigilance for affective stimuli threat is 
indicated by faster responses on Congruent trials compared to Neutral-Neutral trials, 
which suggests that individuals preferentially hold their attention at the affective 
location (Koster et al., 2004).  The current results do not indicate vigilance for affective 
stimuli; instead, IDNO took significantly longer to respond to Congruent trials than 
neutral trials.  RT on incongruent trials in the IDNO group were all significantly slower 
than RT on neutral trials: Negative Incongruent (M = .64, SD = .22), t(31) = 3.04, p = 
.01, BCa 95% CI [.02, .08], Positive Incongruent (M = .61, SD = .21), t(31) = 2.36, p = 
.03, BCa 95% CI [.00, .04] and Global-Affective Incongruent (M = .63, SD = .21), t(31) 
= 3.08, p = .00, BCa 95% CI [.01, .06].  These results suggest that IDNO had difficulty 
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disengaging attention from all affective stimuli, as mean RT are slower on incongruent 
trials (in comparison to Neutral-Neutral trials).   
 
Table 13. Affective/Neutral Trials Analyses, by Group 
Note.  Congruent = probe in same location as affective picture; incongruent = probe in different location than affective picture.  
* Statistically significant (2 tailed).  a Equal variances not assumed. 
 
To reduce the possibility of Type I errors as a consequence of multiple 
simultaneous comparisons, post-hoc comparisons were conducted on the results that 
reached statistical significance.  The Bonferroni method is commonly used (Tabachnick 
& Fidell, 2001), but has been argued to be overly conservative (Cabral, 2008).  Holm’s 
adjustment of the p value was selected, as this maintains the experimentwise error rate at 
α (Wright, 1992).  In Holm’s method (Holm, 1979), the p values (pi) are ordered 
smallest to largest and numbered (i).  A Holm adjusted p value (pHolm) can then be 
calculated using the following formula: α / (n – i + 1), and where pi values are the same, 
pHolm also remains the same.  Adjusted p values are then compared to the original p 
 IDO (n = 34) 
 M (SD) Min and 
Max 
Value 
BCa 
95% CI 
t df Sig 
Neutral-Neutral, compared to:       
    Negative Congruent .52 (.22) .30–1.14 -.04–.02 -.34 32 .73 
    Negative Incongruent
 
 .53 (.21) .33–1.20 -.01–.01 .37 32 .71 
    Positive Congruent
 a
 .53 (.20) .33–1.19 -.02–.02 .33 32 .75 
    Positive Incongruent
  a
 .52 (.22) .30–1.20 -.01–.00 -.39 32 .70 
    Global-Affective Congruent .52 (.21) .33–1.16 -.03–.03 -.03 32 .98 
    Global-Affective Incongruent .52 (.22) .32–1.20 -.01–.01 .05 32 .96 
Neutral – Neutral Only .52 (.23) .31–1.23 - - - - 
 IDNO (n = 32) 
Neutral-Neutral, compared to:  
    Negative Congruent .72 (.28) .30–1.44 .05–.20 3.29 31 *.00 
    Negative Incongruent
 
 .64 (.22) .30–1.26 .02–.08 3.04 31 *.01 
    Positive Congruent 
a
 .66 (.22) .26–1.33 .01–.12 2.47 31 *.02 
    Positive Incongruent
  a 
 .61 (.21) .23–1.22 .00–.04 2.36 31 *.03 
    Global-Affective Congruent
 
 .69 (.24) .28–1.36 .04–.16 3.11 31 *.00 
    Global-Affective Incongruent .63 (.21) .26–1.24 .01–.06 3.08 31 *.00 
Neutral-Neutral Only .59 (.19) .26–1.22 - - - - 
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value, and where pi is less than pHolm, the null hypothesis can be rejected and the 
experimental hypothesis can be accepted.  When comparing the inferential statistics 
found in Table 13 with the adjusted p-values, all results remained significant (see Table 
14). 
 
Table 14. Holm’s Adjusted p Values for Multiple Comparisons 
 i pi pHolm Null Hypothesis (H0) 
Negative Congruent 1 .00 .01 Rejected 
Global-Affective Congruent 2 .00 .01 Rejected 
Global-Affective 
Incongruent 
3 .00 .01 Rejected 
Negative Incongruent 4 .01 .02 Rejected 
Positive Congruent 5 .02 .03 Rejected 
Positive Incongruent
 
 6 .03 .05 Rejected 
Note. pi: Unadjusted p value; pHolm: Holm’s adjusted p-value. 
 
3.3.3 Research Question 3 
Are there differences between groups in attentional bias for affective 
information? 
Hypothesis 3a: IDO will have a significant attentional bias for negative stimuli, 
in comparison to the IDNO group, controlling for relevant factors (age, 
IQ, anxiety and depression if appropriate). 
Hypothesis 3b: There will be no group differences in attentional bias for 
positive-affective stimuli, or global-affective stimuli. 
Given previous literature (Demeyer & De Raedt, 2013; Gotlib et al., 2004; 
Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004; Lorenz & Newman, 2002a), age, IQ, anxiety and depression 
were considered appropriate for covariates in this analysis.  Assumptions for this 
analysis were met; in particular, Appendix 18 shows data demonstrating the assumption 
of homogeneity of regression slopes was not violated.  However, the assumption of 
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homogeneity of variance was violated for both age and IQ (Levene’s Test p = .01).  
Furthermore, correlational analysis suggested none of these variables significantly 
correlated with any of the attentional bias indices (see Appendix 19).  Independent 
samples t-tests were therefore conducted (Table 12), and age, IQ, anxiety and depression 
were not used as covariates in the analysis.  
Considering hypothesis 3a, results indicated that the IDO group had no 
attentional bias towards negative stimuli (M = .01, SD = .08), whereas the IDNO Group 
had an attentional bias away from negative stimuli (M = -.08, SD = .19), t(63) = 2.41, p 
= .02; BCa 95% CI [.02, .16], equal variances not assumed.  Although the findings 
indicate that IDO group do not have a bias towards negative stimuli, the fact that the 
IDNO group has a negative (-) Negative-Affective Bias Index, is consistent with the 
direction of the hypothesis.  Considering whether the IDNO Group had an attentional 
bias towards positive stimuli, there was no significant difference between the two groups 
on the Positive-Affective Bias Index, t(63) = 1.35, p = .19; BCa 95% CI [-.02, .09], equal 
variances not assumed).  This is consistent with hypothesis 3b, meaning that the two 
groups did not respond differently to positive stimuli.  However, contrary to the 
hypothesis, there were significant group differences on the Global-Affective Bias Index, 
t(63) = 2.12, p = .04; BCa 95% CI [.00, .12].  The IDO group had no attentional bias for 
global-affective, yet the IDNO group had a negative (-) Global-Affective Bias Index (M 
= -.06, SD = .16). 
3.3.4 Research Question 4 
Can attentional bias predict empathy? 
Hypothesis 4: Attentional bias for global-affective, negative-affective and positive-
affective stimuli will be significant predictors of empathy, controlling 
for relevant factors (age and IQ) if appropriate.   
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The final research question was to examine whether attentional bias for affective 
information was a significant predictor of empathy, after controlling for the influence of 
age and IQ.  Hierarchical multiple regression was used to assess whether Global-
Affective Bias Index (M = -.03, SD = .12), Negative-Affective Bias Index (M = -.04, SD 
= .15), and Positive-Affective Bias Index (M = -.03, SD = .12) could predict empathy.  It 
is recommended that hierarchical multiple regression analyses are performed with a 
minimum of fifteen participants per predictor, or more if the data is skewed (Stevens, 
1996).  Preliminary analyses were conducted, ensuring that additional assumptions of 
linearity and homoscedascity were met.  Regression analysis requires data to adhere to 
assumptions of multicollinearity and singularity, however correlational analysis 
revealed, as anticipated, a high degree of correlation between all attentional bias 
variables.  In addition, the nature of the Global-Affective Bias Index calculation is that it 
violates the singularity assumption.  Separate regression analyses were therefore run 
with each Attentional Bias Index. 
For the first regression, all three models were unable to explain a significant 
proportion of the variance in empathy (Table 15): Model 1 (age), F (3, 62) = .44, p = 
.51, Model 2 (age and FSIQ), F (3, 62) = 2.55, p = .09, and Model 3 (age, FSIQ and 
Global-Affective Bias Index), F (3, 62) = 1.71, p = .18.  In the second regression (Table 
16), Models 1 and 2 remained unchanged, and Model 3 (age, FSIQ, and Negative-
Affective Bias Index), was not significant, F (3, 62) = 1.67, p = .18.  Similarly, in the 
third regression (Table 17), none of the models were able to explain a significant 
proportion of the variance in empathy: Models 1 and 2 remained unchanged, and Model 
3 (age, FSIQ, and Positive-Affective Bias Index), was not significant, F (3, 62) = 1.83, p 
= .15.  Overall, there was no support for hypothesis 4. 
3.3.5 Chapter Summary 
113 
 
Descriptive data showed the groups to broadly be similar in terms of IQ, school 
leaving age, and physical and mental health problems, however there were significant 
differences in terms of diagnoses of neurodevelopmental disorders.  The main analyses 
revealed that IDO have significantly lower empathy scores than the IDNO group.  IDNO 
had difficulties in disengaging from all types of affective stimuli, and IDO showed no 
differences in the way they attended to information, exhibiting no vigilance or 
disengagement effects.  When comparing groups, IDO did not have an attentional bias 
towards negative stimuli or global-affective stimuli (both positive and negative stimuli), 
but the IDNO group had an attentional bias away from these images.  Across stimuli, 
attentional bias for affective information was unable to predict empathy. 
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Table 15. Hierarchical Regression One: Global-Affective Bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. FSIQ = Full Scale IQ. a Predictors: Age. b Predictors: Age, FSIQ. c Predictors: Age, FSIQ, Bias Index. * Statistically significant (2 tailed). 
 
  
  
  
B (St. Error) beta t Adjusted 
R square 
R Square 
Change 
F Sig BCa 95% CI 
   Model 1    -.01 .01 .44 
a 
.51
 
  
      Age  .06 (.09) .09 .67 - - - .49 -.11–.23 
   Model 2    .05 .07 3.55 
b 
.09  
      Age .06 (.09) .08 .67 - - - .50 -.11–.22 
      FSIQ -.56 (.26) -.26 -2.15 - - - *.05 -1.11–-.03 
   Model 3    .03 .00 1.71 
c 
.18  
      Age  .06 (.09) .09 .36 - - - .48 -.12–.23 
      FSIQ -.56 (.26) -.26 -2.09 - - - *.05 -1.11–-.01 
      Global-Affective Bias Index 3.46 (10.56) .04 .33 - - - .69 -19.04–18.44 
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Table 16. Hierarchical Regression Two: Negative-Affective Bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. FSIQ = Full Scale IQ. a Predictors: Age. b Predictors: Age, FSIQ. c Predictors: Age, FSIQ, Bias Index. * Statistically significant (2 tailed). 
 
  
  
B (St. Error) beta t Adjusted 
R square 
R Square 
Change 
F Sig BCa 95% CI 
   Model 1    -.01 .01 .44 
a 
.51  
      Age  .06 (.09) .09 .67 - - - .49 -.11–.23 
   Model 2    .05 .07 2.55 
b 
.09
 
  
      Age .06 (.09) .09 .67 - - - .50 -.11–.23 
      FSIQ -.56 (.26) -.27 -2.15 - - - *.05 -1.13–.03 
   Model 3    .03 .00 1.67 
c 
.18  
      Age  .06 (.09) .08 .67 - - - .47 -.10–.24 
      FSIQ -.54 (.26) -.27 -2.13 - - - .07 -1.12–.03 
      Negative-Affective Bias Index .11 (8.60) .00 .01 - - - .36 -10.02–24.69 
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Table 17. Hierarchical Regression Three: Positive-Affective Bias 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. FSIQ = Full Scale IQ. a Predictors: Age. b Predictors: Age, FSIQ. c Predictors: Age, FSIQ, Bias Index. * Statistically significant (2 tailed). 
 
 
 
  
B (St. Error) beta t Adjusted 
R square 
R Square 
Change 
F Sig BCa 95% CI 
   Model 1    -.01 .01 .44 
a 
.51  
      Age  .06 (.09) .09 .67    .49 -.11–.23 
   Model 2    .05 .07 2.55 
b 
.09
 
  
      Age .06 (.09) .09 .67    .50 -.11–.23 
      FSIQ -.56 (.26) -.26 -2.15    *.05 -1.12–.03 
   Model 3    .03 .01 1.83 
c 
.15
 
  
      Age  .06 (.09) .09 .67    .48 -.10–.23 
      FSIQ -.54 (.26) -.25 -2.02    .07 -1.10–.02 
      Positive-Affective Bias Index 7.44 (11.04) .09 .67    .34 -9.91–23.15 
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4 Discussion 
4.1 Chapter Overview 
The final chapter explores the results of this study.  It opens with a discussion of the 
research findings, in the context of the existing literature, explained in three parts; empathy, 
attentional bias, and the relationship between empathy and attentional bias.  A critique of 
the methodological issues pertinent to this study will then be considered, and the impact 
this has on the interpretation of the results is detailed.  This is followed by consideration of 
the theoretical and clinical implications of the study.  Bringing together these ideas, 
possible adaptations to the design and areas for future research will be discussed.  The 
chapter closes with a conclusion and summary of the thesis.  
4.2 Discussion of Findings 
4.2.1 Empathy 
Deficits in empathy are hypothesised to have an association with offending 
behaviour.  Previous research in IDO have reported different relationships between 
offenders and empathy; in studies of IDO, participants have variously been found to have 
higher scores (Proctor & Beail, 2007; Ralfs & Beail, 2012), lower scores (Hockley & 
Langdon, In Press) and similar scores (Langdon et al., 2011) to IDNO participants on 
measures of empathy.  In support of the theoretical relationship, and hypothesis one, it was 
observed that IDO had lower levels of empathy than IDNO, as measured by the EQ. 
Considering these studies together, it appears that, similar to the evidence base in 
non-ID offenders, the role of empathy in the IDO population is equivocal.  As discussed in 
chapter one, a large part of this is likely to be associated with methodological problems.  
For example, previous evidence has suggested that in addition to low IQ, socio-economic 
status has a significant mediating effect on the relationship between empathy and offending 
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(Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004), yet none of the studies, including the present investigation, 
controlled for this. 
There are also conceptual and methodological differences.  Assessment tools have 
either been specifically designed for people with ID (the Test of Emotional Perception; 
Negri-Shoultz & Donnellan, 1989), adapted from existing versions of measures that are 
used for children (the Bryant Empathy Index; Bryant, 1982), or adult measures with 
simplified concepts and wording (Interpersonal Reactivity Index; Davis, 1980), creating 
much inconsistency in the overall approach to measurement.  The internal consistency 
scores in these studies have either not been reported (Proctor and Beail, 2007; Ralfs and 
Beail, 2012), or were “questionable” ( = .64; Langdon et al., 2011).  It is interesting to 
note that internal consistency of the EQ in the current study is much higher than in a similar 
study by Hockley and Langdon (In Press), however this may be explained by the fact that 
present study made use of a visual analogue scale to aid responses, which could have 
helped to mitigate some of the problems associated with using a measure with complex 
wording. 
4.2.2 Attentional Bias 
Whilst there is a robust evidence base outlining the types of stimuli to which certain 
populations have an attentional bias (e.g. threat-based stimuli in people with anxiety, Bar-
Heim et al., 2007), the limited study of attentional bias in offenders has explored a number 
of different stimuli types – offence specific stimuli such as aggressive words or pictures of 
children, and more general stimuli such as affective words.  Given the preliminary nature of 
this investigation in this population, and the fact that IDO who had committed a range of 
offences were recruited to the study, research question two sought to explore whether IDO 
and IDNO had an attentional bias for different categories of affective stimuli: positive-
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affective images, negative-affective images, and global-affective (both positive and 
negative) images, in comparison to neutral images.  Results showed that irrespective of the 
type of image, IDO had virtually identical RT across the trials.  There were hence no 
observable vigilance or disengagement effects on any of the trial types, suggesting that IDO 
do not process negative affective information any differently to positive or neutral affective 
stimuli.  
Conversely, IDNO showed much more variation in their RT, related to the type of 
image to which they were responding.  The largest difference observed was that between 
Negative Incongruent trials and Neutral-Neutral trials.  Results showed that when the 
negative image was incongruent with the position of the probe, their RT were slowest, and 
this was significantly slower than their standard RT on Neutral-Neutral trials.  According to 
Koster et al. (2004), this indicates that they had difficulty disengaging their attention from 
the stimuli.  It is likely that on the negative trials, this was because the content of the image 
was perceived as shocking or distressing, and as such, captured their attention more than 
that of a neutral image, which by contrast, has no particular salience or interest. 
The same pattern of findings was observed with Positive Incongruent trials.  
Similarly, this shows that IDNO experienced difficulty disengaging their attention from 
these images, though in this case, it is more likely that these images captured attention 
because they were enjoyable or rewarding.  Overall, the same pattern of findings was 
therefore observed when the positive- and negative-affective trials were combined.  This 
shows that attention in IDNO is influenced by affective images; specifically that affective 
information interrupts information processing.  It can be hypothesised that in part, this 
contributes to a lack of offence behaviour in this group, as neutral, images are attended to 
differently than positive and negative images, and so this may be associated with different 
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types of behavioural response.  Furthermore, these findings refute the idea that the 
categorical negativity theory, which suggest that only negative stimuli initially influence 
attention (Pratto & John, 1991).   
Taken together, within-group differences can be seen in terms of how IDO and 
IDNO process affective, external information.  Attentional theories, such as that by 
Kahneman (1972), argue that our attention can then be guided or focused according to what 
is salient or important to us, particularly when the observed stimuli is arousing.  Results 
indicated the image content had varying influence on attentional allocation; they suggest 
that IDNO group find it harder to disengage their attention from affective images, whilst no 
attentional differences were seen in response to affective or neutral images in the IDO 
group.  If these results are taken to suggest that attention in the IDO group is comparatively 
unaffected by affective information (i.e. they are neither hypervigilant for this stimuli, not 
struggle to disengage from it), and that this is atypical in comparison to the observations 
noted in the IDNO group, it can be hypothesised that this may be associated with 
engagement in offence behaviour. 
The results of the current study are insufficient to elucidate the precise mechanisms 
by which this relationship might occur, but it can be hypothesised that if IDO do not attend 
to affective stimuli differently to neutral stimuli, they may not be able to perceive 
differences in the contents of the stimuli (affect recognition), and hence may not then 
experience subsequent differences in affective responses.  To date, two studies in IDO have 
examined this, and current data would not support this idea; sex offenders were found to 
have similar emotion recognition abilities to IDNO (Ralfs & Beail, 2012), and IDO (type 
not specified) had results in the opposite direction; that is, they had superior emotion 
recognition abilities when compared to (Proctor & Beail, 2007).  Whilst both studies used 
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the same measure of emotion perception that can be considered to be ecologically valid, it 
can be argued to be a very narrow assessment of emotion recognition based on only a few 
responses by the participant.  Thus, in order to confirm or refute this hypothesis, further 
work would be needed to examine emotion recognition in this population, and to consider 
how this relates to attentional differences to different types of stimuli.  An alternative 
hypothesis could be that IDO have differences in their autonomic responses to affective and 
non-affective information, for example, their arousal threshold may be lower when viewing 
affective information.   This pattern has been observed in non-IDO, using methods to 
measure autonomic nervous system response such as galvanic skin conductance (Guarino-
Ghezzi & Treviño, 2005), but as yet, has not been investigated in IDO populations.  Such 
information would provide important evidence in fleshing out the hypothesised differences 
between offenders and non-offenders. 
The vigilance/disengagement analysis used here has previously been cited as being 
able to distinguish vigilance for stimuli from disengagement, however other authors have 
offered alternative interpretations.  For example, increased RT on affective compared to 
neutral trials can be seen as a response slowing effect (Mogg, Holmes, Garner, & Bradley, 
2008), that is, novel or threatening images can activate a behavioural inhibition system, 
which serves to interrupt information processing and behavioural responses (Gray, 1982).  
Mogg et al. (2008) also suggests that slowed RT could reflect participant’s experience of 
task-related cognitions associated with the affective content of the images, which would be 
competing for limited cognitive resources.  More than likely, multiple, simultaneous 
explanations may be relevant in explaining these findings, but it is clear that the current 
findings are insufficient to offer firm conclusions.  Methods such as eye movement 
detection paradigms, would be needed to definitively determine whether results are 
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indicative of a vigilance for stimuli, difficulty with disengagement, or an alternative 
attentional process. 
Attentional bias as described in the literature in clinical populations is observed 
when incongruent and congruent trials are compared on particular trial types e.g. negative-
affective trials.  Using this methodology, research question three aimed to determine 
whether offenders have an attentional bias towards or away from affective stimuli.  Results 
revealed that there were significant differences on the Negative-Affective and Global-
Affective Bias Index between groups, which suggests that IDO and IDNO differ in the way 
in which they process negative-affective stimuli, and affective stimuli more generally.  On 
both indices, IDO did not have an attentional bias for these stimuli, but in contrast, IDNO 
had a negative (-) bias score on both indices, indicating that their attention was biased away 
from the affective image. 
Given that these findings were observed for the negative, but not for the positive 
index, this offers support for the categorical negativity hypothesis (Pratto & John, 1991); a 
substantial component of attentional allocation is guided by valence, and stimuli with 
undesirable content can elicit particular attention effects in comparison to other types of 
stimuli.   The current findings indicate that individuals who engage in offending behaviour 
are unaffected by the presence and processing of negative-affective material, but that 
negative information has an interference effect on the attentional processes of IDNO.  The 
effect of negative stimuli on attention has also been observed in other groups, but more 
commonly, the attentional bias has been seen in the clinical population.  For example, in 
people with anxiety disorders, a pronounced attentional bias (i.e. substantial deviance from 
zero) towards salient stimuli is observed, whilst controls have no attentional bias for these 
images, and in an offender versus a non-offender population (Smith & Waterman, 2003). 
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As these are the first findings of this kind in people with ID, results at this stage 
cannot elucidate the underlying the mechanism responsible for these effects.  However, it 
could be hypothesised that inattention to negative stimuli may serve a ‘homeostatic 
function’ in the IDO group, whereby the salience and interest in such stimuli remains 
relatively constant.  Alternatively, it may be that negative valence images distinguish IDNO 
from IDO as they are perceived by the IDNO group as more pertinent or threatening to 
survival (Öhman, 1993), and so need to be avoided.  Such attentional allocation would be 
congruent with the behavioural differences seen in these groups; IDO engage in 
externalised behaviours that are perceived as threatening, whereas IDNO may avoid 
confrontation or challenging interpersonal interactions. 
Contrary to the hypothesis, it is interesting to see a similar pattern of findings in 
terms of attentional bias to all types of affective stimuli (global-affective).  One explanation 
for this is that the negative attentional bias findings are responsible for driving this effect.  
However, the results may also indicate that IDO and IDNO have a quantitatively different 
way of processing affective information in general, but that positive images alone are 
insufficient to distinguish attentional differences.  Although this is a novel finding within 
offending populations broadly, it is not illogical; all humans are predisposed to selectively 
attend to emotional or affective stimuli (Lang, 2000; LeDoux, 1996), and affective 
information of all types influence behavioural responses (Hoffman, 2000).  Group 
differences may hence be due to alternate ways that general affective information activate 
schema, and/or differences in the neural systems of networks associated with affect (Bower, 
1981; Garrigan & Langdon, In Press).  Future investigation broadening the stimuli used in 
the tasks will be of considerable benefit. 
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It is interesting to consider these findings in the context of attentional bias studies in 
non-ID offenders.  The majority of the findings from the systematic literature review 
showed significant differences in attentional bias between groups.  Together with the 
current findings, this lends support to the idea that irrespective of the type of task used, the 
precise nature of the affective/salient stimulus, and whether or not the offender has an ID, 
there is evidence to suggest that the phenomenon of attentional bias for salient stimuli 
exists in offenders, and can be measured.  Furthermore, these studies have examined 
attentional bias across offender types, and it is positive to see that even with this degree of 
heterogeneity, significant findings can be observed.  In the only previous study examining 
attentional bias in offenders with ID who had committed sex offences (Watson, 2006), no 
differences in attentional bias were found when using sexual stimuli.  However, this study 
was likely underpowered (ID child sex offenders n = 17; IDNO n = 18), and so the current 
study suggests that with an adequate sample size, significant differences between IDO and 
IDNO can be detected. 
4.2.3 Attentional Bias and Empathy 
Previous research has established that age and IQ have a significant relationship 
with empathy (Carstensen et al., 2000; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004), and the final part of 
this investigation examined whether, controlling for these factors, attentional bias was able 
to predict any of the variance in empathy across ID and IDO.  Results indicated that none of 
the attentional bias indices were significantly related to empathy. 
Models of empathy that identify multiple, sequential components offer a process 
view of how an empathic response is generated, and a number of authors posit that 
encoding of affective information is the first in a number of stages of empathy (Garrigan & 
Langdon, In Press; Preston, 2007; Proctor & Beail, 2007).  However, the current findings 
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are contrary to the hypothesis and theoretical relationship between these constructs.  It may 
be that this finding is associated with the way in which these factors were measured, 
however given that significant findings were observed for the previous hypotheses, this is 
unlikely.  A more likely explanation is perhaps that attentional bias comprises a very small 
component of these constructs, and hence, the extent to which it can directly explain any 
variance in empathy is minimal.  Alternatively, it may be that the sample size was 
insufficient to detect group differences (discussed further in section 4.3.2). 
4.2.4 Section Summary 
The current findings suggest that IDO had significantly lower global empathy than 
the IDNO group.  IDO showed no differences in RT to different trial types, suggesting that, 
irrespective of the content of stimuli, their attention allocation to stimuli did not change, 
whilst IDNO were significantly slower on affect trials than on neutral trials, and appeared 
to have difficulties disengaging from the stimulus.  IDNO also had a significant attentional 
bias away from negative stimuli and global affective stimuli in comparison to IDO.  
Overall, attentional bias for affective stimuli was unable to explain any of the variance in 
empathy.  These findings must be considered in the context of a number of methodological 
considerations, which will now be discussed. 
4.3 Methodological Considerations 
4.3.1 Ethical Considerations 
The overseeing ethics committee had requested a report following the recruitment 
of the first ten participants, in order to ensure that the study caused no undue harm or 
distress as a result of the images presented in the dot-probe tasks.  Of the first 10, and total 
64 participants who completed the study, no distress was observed in any of the 
participants, or reported during the debriefing at the end of the study.  Furthermore, follow 
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up conversations with the staff that had identified the participants for the study revealed no 
longer term effects of participation.   
4.3.2 Sample 
4.3.2.1 Generalisability 
In order to ascertain the generalisability of the findings, it is necessary to consider 
how representative the study sample is of the population from which it is drawn.  The 
nature of research of this type is that a number of factors meant that sample selection was 
not random.  Participants were recruited primarily from services that were supportive of 
research, and were identified from their peers as being potentially suitable, both in terms of 
meeting inclusion criteria, and assumed willingness to participate.  Furthermore, in secure 
services, participants who were deemed too risky to complete the assessment were 
automatically excluded. 
Within both groups, informal discussions with staff that were responsible for 
identifying participants also highlighted that a number of people whom they believed met 
the inclusion criteria declined finding out more information about the study and taking part, 
when they were approached.  It is not possible to know whether the inclusion of these 
individuals would influence the findings in any way, although in the IDO group it may be 
that they had different perspectives or insight into their offending behaviour, and so may 
have exhibited differences in empathy or attention bias.  However, a key strength to the 
study design is that offenders of all types were included in the research.  This reflects the 
general forensic ID population, and prevents participants from being excluded because they 
have committed more than one type of offence, which would create an artificial, 
unrepresentative study sample. 
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4.3.2.2 Participation Criteria 
Inclusion criteria aimed to balance the need for a generalisable sample with the 
overall hypotheses and methodologies, and recruitment practicalities.  Only men were 
included in the sample as the population of people with ID in forensic settings is 
predominantly male.  In addition, there is evidence to suggest that there are sex differences 
in the way in which people respond to affective stimuli; both in terms of neural activity 
(Kemp, Silberstein, Armstrong, & Nathan, 2004) and behavioural responses (Bradley, 
Codispoti, Sabatinelli, & Lang, 2001).  It is of interest to note that in anxious populations, 
women and men differ in terms of vigilance and disengagement to threat stimuli, which 
suggests that sex studies in IDO may offer some useful insights into differences in 
information processing in the future (Tan et al., 2011). 
A limitation to this study is that only ID non-offenders were recruited as a control 
group.  In the ID literature, matching ID participants to non-ID participants is not ideal, 
given that differences in cognitive skills, by definition, significantly skews the groups.  
Some studies (e.g. Dodd & Porter, 2010) compensate for this by using age matched 
participants.  However, these are typically children, and the nature of this investigation 
means it would have been difficult to establish an appropriate offender control group.  
Other studies have used an “attentional control” comparison group; that is, participants 
matched on a measures of general measures of attention (Dodd & Porter, 2011), and this 
may be worth further consideration. 
4.3.2.3 Equivalence Between Groups 
Groups showed no statistical differences in terms of presence of physical health 
problems or mental health problems.  However, there were group differences in terms of 
depression, as measured by the GDS, which highlight that it can be helpful to triangulate 
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self-report and clinical records data with formal data collection measures.  There was also a 
significant difference between groups in terms of neurodevelopmental disorders; 
participants in the IDO group had more diagnoses of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder.  There may also have been undiagnosed neurodevelopmental disorders or mental 
health problems in the sample, though this could have been in either group.  The attention 
difficulties observed in people with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) are 
well established, and people with ADHD often have difficulty focusing their attention on 
salient information and filtering out distracting stimuli, and make responses more 
impulsively (Brown, 2013).  It is therefore possible that these findings may have 
confounded the results.  There is no evidence to suggest that this is specific to certain types 
of stimuli, and so it is likely this would have contributed to the overall difference in RT 
between groups, rather than to attentional bias scores for specific stimuli types. 
In people with Autistic Spectrum Disorder (ASD), the evidence for different 
attentional processes is equivocal; some research has found people with ASD to 
preferentially attend to social information (Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Findlay, & Behan, 
2008), whereas other studies have found social attention to be equivalent between groups 
(Speer, Cook, McMahon, & Clark, 2007).  Although the focus of this study was not on 
social stimuli, the social content of images was controlled for in the design, and so it is 
hoped this will have minimised any differences between the small number of participants 
with a diagnosis of ASD, and those without. 
However, group differences in ASD may have impacted upon group differences in 
empathy.  People with ASD are thought to have poorer empathic abilities than people 
without ASD (Hollander, Kolevzon, & Coyle, 2010).  On the EQ, people with ASD are 
reported to have lower empathy scores than age matched controls (Baron-Cohen and 
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Wheelwright, 2004), and on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index, people with an ASD score 
lower on measures of cognitive empathy and theory of mind (Rogers, Dziobek, Hassenstab, 
Wolf, & Convit, 2007).  However, in the same study they score higher on items related to 
“personal distress”, and were equivalent on empathic concern.  Furthermore, some research 
suggests that ASD traits are not associated with a reduced or enhanced ability to resonate 
with the emotions of another person (Lockwood, Bird, Bridge, & Viding, 2013), and that, 
although they may have difficulties with perspective taking, the ability to express concern 
and compassion is present.  Whilst the evidence is mixed, it is possible that differences in 
empathy may have contributed to the findings in hypothesis one, and future research would 
likely benefit from incorporating this factor as part of the exclusion criteria. 
A further important difference between the two groups in the present study is age; 
IDNO were significantly older than IDO.  In the literature, there is considerable evidence to 
suggest that goals become more affect-driven with age (e.g. Carstensen et al., 2000), and 
evidence suggests that a shift towards more emotion driven goals will lead to similar 
changes in information processing.  A number of studies of attentional bias suggest that 
older adults are slower to respond to probes congruent with the presentation of sad or angry 
faces (Mather & Carstensen, 2005; Steinmetz, Muscatell, & Kensinger, 2010).  Although 
this pattern is seen in the present study, it is observed irrespective of trial type, and 
correlational analyses revealed no relationships between age and attentional bias indices.  It 
therefore seems more appropriate to consider group differences in light of the fact that RT 
typically become slower and more variable with age (Fozard, Vercruyssen, Reynolds, 
Hancock, & Quilter, 1993), and emphasises the need for groups to be age matched as far as 
is practicable. 
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Finally, it is regrettable that other factors that may affect attentional bias and 
empathy could not be measured.  For example, attentional bias for abuse related stimuli has 
been observed in both forensic and non-forensic samples  (Blake & Weinberger, 2006; 
Domes et al., 2013).  Such a bias may resonate with some of the negative images used in 
the study, and is of particular significance as a considerable percentage of sex offenders 
report having been a victim of crime (Edgar & O'Donnell, 1997; McMackin, Leisen, 
Cusack, LaFratta, & Litwin, 2002).  It may therefore have been helpful to be aware of any 
personal experiences of sexual and non-sexual abuse or assault in the sample, however, 
there are clearly ethical issues surrounding obtaining such information in this context. 
Another variable that would have been beneficial to measure would have been 
socio-economic status, as previous evidence suggests this has an important role in 
understanding the differences between offenders and non-offenders (Jolliffe & Farrington, 
2004).  However, measures of socio-economic status are often complex, and rely on access 
to detailed information about the participants personal and parental circumstances e.g. job 
type, education etc.  In the current study, participants would have broadly been unable to 
provide this information, and most recruitment locations would not have access to 
information of this nature.   
4.3.2.4 Treatment 
Due to anticipated difficulties in obtaining insufficient and incomplete records, the 
profile of the IDO group in terms of their current or previous offence related treatment was 
not recorded.  However, it should be noted that engagement with offender treatment 
programmes may have influenced response on the dot-probe task, by altering the attentional 
bias for negative images (through attention increasingly being drawn away from the 
image).  The study inclusion criteria meant that IDO participants were all detained using 
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the Mental Health Act, and the one person recruited from the community had previously 
been detained (under s. 37), and so the majority of participants will have likely attended a 
minimum of one offender treatment programme.  It is therefore positive to note that 
significant differences in attentional bias for negative stimuli were observed even in the 
context and thus it is likely that a Type I error (incorrectly accepting that this experimental 
hypothesis is true) did not occur. 
A limitation of this study is that details regarding current medications were not 
obtained.  Although there were no differences between groups in terms of mental health 
problems, the range of mental health conditions in each group may have meant there were 
differences in prescribed medications, and there may also have been differences between 
groups in terms of pharmacological treatment of ADHD.  Future studies would benefit from 
recording this information, and controlling for this where appropriate. 
4.3.2.5 Sample Size 
Sample size is calculated based on previous research in the area, and requires 
estimates of the size of the anticipated effect and the expected variability in this assessment, 
in addition to an alpha level and desired power (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).  It is 
acknowledged that a lack of published studies using the dot-probe paradigm in people with 
ID and IDO meant that estimates for this study largely could not be based on previous data, 
and where previous data was available, it was not directly comparable to the current 
questions under investigation.  Largely, the findings suggest that the sample size was 
sufficient to detect differences between groups, and the current study provides a useful 
estimate of variance in attentional bias in this population, which will be helpful in 
determining sample sizes for future research.  However, the difficulties in determining a 
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reliable power calculation for the final research question may have resulted in an 
underpowered sample.  
4.3.3 Processes and Procedures 
4.3.3.1 Blinding 
Due to the design of the research and practicalities, the researchers could not be 
blind to the group or hypotheses being investigated, which may have resulted in some 
unintentional bias in the way that participants were treated.  In order to reduce researcher 
bias as much as possible, standardised instructions explaining how to answer or respond to 
all of the measures, including the IQ assessment, were given, and standardised visual 
analogue scales were used with all researchers in order to support participants equally.  
4.3.3.2 Support 
All participants could have a member of staff, advocate or care worker present with 
them throughout the information and consent process, or during the entire assessment, if 
they wished.  Substantially more participants from the IDNO group had someone present 
during the consent and assessment process, however this was typically due to requirements 
of the recruitment facility, rather than because it was requested by the participant.  If a 
support worker/carer was present throughout the assessment, it was made clear that they 
would not be able to answer for participant, or prompt the participant in their responses.  It 
is possible that the presence of another person may have altered the participant’s responses 
to the tasks, however this is outweighed by ethical considerations, health and safety 
requirements of the host location, and the need to ensure that felt comfortable and 
adequately supported when taking part in research.  
4.3.3.3 Contextual Factors 
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All rooms were quiet and largely free from distractions, with participants facing 
away from windows.  Although appropriate measures were taken to minimise noise, such 
as closing windows, the circumstances and type of room used to conduct the assessment 
varied between participants, and it was not possible to rule out the possible effects of 
variables outside of the researcher’s control, such as noise in corridors or adjoining rooms.  
Ideally, all participants would have been seen under the same conditions, however this was 
not practicable due to the nature of the participant samples. 
4.3.3.4 Assessment Order 
Unlike previous studies (e.g. Smith & Waterman, 2003) the order of assessments 
was fixed so that the questionnaires (which were all associated with affect) were 
administered after the dot-probe task.  This was done in order to eliminate the possibility of 
priming participants’ emotion-cognition networks, which could have resulted in the 
priming of their attention (Todorov & Bargh, 2002).  Whilst this may have meant that 
participants were more fatigued by the time they completed the EQ, all participants were 
offered regular breaks to minimise this.  In the dot-probe task, which was the longest task to 
complete, the presentation of the image pairs was randomised using the computer software, 
and so was different for each participant, thereby eliminating order effects.  This meant that 
there were no consistent practice or fatigue effects across the task that would have 
interacted with trial type. 
4.3.4 Measures 
4.3.4.1 IQ Assessment 
The two sub-test Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler 1999) was 
used to assess full scale IQ in participants who did not have a recent accessible IQ 
assessment.  It provided a validated measurement of intellectual functioning, and was 
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selected in order to ensure no undue burden was placed on participants.  However, it offers 
limited information regarding different aspects of cognitive ability.  It may have been 
useful to understand how attentional bias relates to some of the scales on the Wechsler 
Adult Intelligence Scales (Wechsler, 1997, 2008) that measure processing speed or 
perceptual organisation, which could have offered useful insights into any potential group 
differences in processes that can interact with attention. 
4.3.4.2 Demographic and Offence Information 
Demographic and offence information was collected using a proforma completed 
with the participant, and review of participant records from the service they were recruited.  
The information collected through the interview was variable; some participants were able 
to provide detailed demographic information, whereas others were uncertain or did not 
know the answers to the questions.  Similarly, use of collateral records was helpful in some 
cases and helped to reduce reliance on erroneous information, however many participants 
had clinical records that had were either incomplete or out of date.  In the IDO group, many 
participants’ files had not been transferred from the units where they had previously 
resided.  It is likely that diagnoses of mental and physical health problems, type of school 
and school leaving age are likely be unreliable, and therefore this data should be interpreted 
with caution.  Although measures are available that can offer on the spot assessments, such 
as checklists of mental health problems (Sturmey, Newton, Cowley, Bouras, & Holt, 2005), 
these were considered to be prohibitively time consuming in the context of this study. 
In the IDNO group, people recruited from care homes or day centres had almost no 
information on file.  Given the reliance on self-report data, it is therefore possible that some 
participants in this group may have committed an offence, and did not inform the 
researcher.  If this were the case, this may have confounded the empathy and attentional 
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bias score observed in this study.  Including other methods of collecting offence histories, 
such as use of the Offenders Index which collects criminal conviction data from the courts, 
may have helped to overcome self-report bias and incomplete file information. 
4.3.4.3 Empathy 
In assessing empathy, it may be been helpful to have a measure that specifically 
examined victim empathy.  However, as the IDNO group would have had no “victim”, this 
would then need to be assessed using a vignette or similar hypothetical assessment tool.  As 
such, this would rely heavily on theory of mind skills, and consequently, would not have 
been a useful measure of global empathy.  The Empathy Quotient was selected for use in 
this study as it is a global empathy assessment tool, has the benefit of being brief, and has 
previously been used in this population.  Although previous assessment of EQ reliability 
was average, Cronbach’s alpha is substantially more robust in the present study, supporting 
its utility in the present study. 
4.3.4.4 Dot-Probe Task 
The use of pictorial rather than lexical stimuli in the dot-probe has the benefit of 
making it accessible to the ID population, but is also more likely to mimic attentional 
biases observed in real life, as images are more strongly associated with affective responses 
(Loney et al., 2003).  Images had previously validated for experimental use (Lang et al., 
2008), and were selected to be matched between trial types as far as possible, in particular, 
in terms of valence and arousal.  However, it should be acknowledged that the negative 
images, on the whole, were darker than the positive and neutral images.  Given the speed at 
which the image was presented (500ms), this likely made their content more difficult to 
ascertain, and consequently, may have elicited increased attention from participants trying 
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to make out the contents of the images.  However, this would be unlikely to have been 
associated with between group differences. 
Perhaps the most important consideration with regards to images is that all studies 
of clinical populations, and many studies of offenders, have used stimuli which are 
specifically salient to the population in question (Mokros et al., 2010; Yiend & Mathews, 
2001).  Attentional bias is most likely to be observed when the image is salient, or matches 
the interests of the individual, as this is likely to be associated with certain, offence salient 
schema.  The current sample was selected to be representative of IDO without specifying 
an offence type, and this is a preliminary investigation to see whether an attentional bias 
can be observed in offenders with ID, so in line with other studies in offenders images were 
selected in terms of general affective type, rather than being matched to the offence.  
Having found significant differences in attentional bias using generic, affective stimuli, this 
paves the way for future research using new, and possibly more offence specific stimuli in 
the future. 
Although pictures were matched for arousal (Lang et al., 2008), the ratings used to 
establish this were taken from men and women in the general population.  It would have 
been beneficial to establish ratings using an ID sample, and additionally, to record level of 
arousal or perceived distress in response to the images presented.  It is possible negative 
pictures may have been perceived as threatening, or elicited emotions such as fear, which 
may have meant an attentional bias akin to that seen in anxiety disorders may have driven 
the findings.  No distress was reported during or following the experiment, reducing the 
likelihood of such effects, however future studies may benefit from a recording such 
information subsequent to the task, in order to examine whether this interacts with 
attentional bias.  
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It was noted in Chapter 1 that there is substantial variation in the presentation time 
of the stimulus of interest across the literature (e.g. 50ms – 1250ms).  Across many studies 
in different populations, the stimuli and probe have been presented for a standard 500ms 
(Bradley, Mogg, Falla, & Hamilton, 1998; Mogg et al, 2004).  As this time had also been 
used in previous studies of attentional bias in people with ID (Dodd & Porter, 2010, 2011), 
and similar study designs with offenders (e.g. Smith & Waterman, 2003), it was therefore 
used to inform the present study.  Studies have variously show that attentional bias is, and 
is not, affected by stimulus duration (Bradley et al, 1999; Cooper & Langton, 2006), so 
exploring several different stimuli durations in the future may help to enhance our 
understanding of the nature of attentional bias in this population. 
Finally, given the overall differences in RT across the task, it is worth considering 
that there may be differences in motor speed between groups, or differences between 
groups in terms of more general attentional abilities.  In future studies, the former could 
easily be measured using a computer task designed to measure RT to standardised, neutral 
stimuli, or using a pen and pencil measure, such as the digit symbol copy test from the 
WAIS.  In order to understand whether there were group differences across the attentional 
construct, for example, in visual scanning, and in particular, to see if this accounted for age 
differences, a test of attention, such as the Testing Battery for Attentional Performance 
(Zimmermann & Fimm, 1993) might have been useful, similar to previous studies (Mokros 
et al., 2010).  
4.3.4.5 Analyses 
The majority of the variables in this study were not normally distributed, however 
skewed data is expected when analysing RT, as the results necessarily dependent upon 
stimuli having different salience to different participant groups (Gress & Laws, 2009).  As 
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non-parametric tests are less powerful, and increase the chance of committing a Type II 
error (incorrectly accepting that the null hypothesis is true), bootstrapped parametric tests 
were used, which are robust to violations of assumptions and outliers (Field, 2013)  .  Lack 
of normality prevents knowing the shape of the sampling distribution, and bootstrapping 
fits a model to data, calculates a “functional” (i.e. tests to determine whether it works), then 
estimates a new sampling distribution by generating synthetic data from the model (Shalizi, 
2010).  Essentially, the actual data is treated as the population, and bootstrapping then 
draws smaller samples from this data, and the parameter of interest, such as the mean, is 
established in each bootstrap sample.  A 95% confidence interval is used in order to work 
out the limits within which 95% of the data fall.  This methodology is preferable to non-
parametric tests not only because it is more robust, but also because it does not negatively 
influence the power of the study. 
4.3.5 Section Summary  
There are a number of strengths and weakness to the sample used, the measures 
selected, and the assessment processes used in this study.  The use of a representative IDO 
sample and an adequate sample size are two important factors which facilitate 
generalisability of the findings, and the use of standardised assessment tools and 
instructions for the paper and computer tasks helped to reduce variability and researcher 
bias.  Conversely, limitations to this study include a lack of group equivalence in terms of 
neurodevelopmental disabilities, which may have confounded results, and difficulty 
accessing the relevant information meant it was not possible to understand whether there 
were group differences in socio-economic status, or whether treatment history influenced 
attentional bias in the offender group.  
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A strength, and a weakness to the dot-probe task is the nature of the stimuli 
selected, which means conclusions can be drawn only in relation to how people encode 
general affective information, rather than examining whether they have an attentional bias 
for specific types of information.  In terms of the data analysis, data were not normally 
distributed, however application of bootstrapping to the analysis meant that results from the 
current study are more robust than they otherwise would have been through using only non-
parametric data analysis.   
4.4 Theoretical Implications 
It has long been argued that information that is most readily perceived is that which 
supports or reinforces our prior perceptions and beliefs about the world, and thereby 
enables people to make the most efficient use of an attentional system which has limited 
capacity (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).  According to their model, Ingram and Kendall (1986) 
suggest that the operational level (the level at which management and encoding of 
information occurs), is influenced by emotion, motivation, heuristics and circumstances.  
The results of the current study suggest that IDO and IDNO have different biases in their 
attention, that is, different biases at the operational level of information processing.  
Together with a small number of previous investigations (van Duijvenbode et al., 2012; 
Watson, 2006), the data from the current study supports the idea that attentional bias can be 
measured in people with ID and IDO, and that it can be used to ascertain meaningful 
differences between groups (Dodd & Porter, 2010, 2011).  It also supports the seminal 
work of Crick and Dodge’s (1994) social information processing theory, which states that 
attention to, and encoding of, external information is vital if this information is going to be 
incorporated goals, and a behavioural or affective response is going to be formulated and 
actioned. 
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Theoretically, it is assumed that the initial stages of information processing form an 
integral part of moral development and empathy explanations of offending.  In moral 
theories of offending, Gibbs (2013) suggests that moral and immoral behaviours are 
integrally linked to cognitive distortions and biases, which necessarily stem from 
information processing deficits (Lemerise & Arsenio, 2000).  Although the current study 
found no direct relationship between empathy and attentional bias, previous research 
suggests that moral reasoning may be a mediating factor between attentional bias and 
empathy (Langdon et al., 2011).  This study is part of a broader investigation that will 
investigate these relationships, and a larger sample size is planned, such that the possibility 
of a Type II error will be overcome. 
Whilst the current findings have not been able to replicate observations in the 
general population that relate attentional bias to empathy (Hofelich & Preston, 2012), it is 
important to acknowledge that simply because theories argue attentional bias is an early 
stage process (Garrigan & Langdon, In Press), this does not mean that attentional bias is a 
causal factor in empathy.  Empathy theories argue both that the way in which a person 
attends to, and recognises affective information, is a precursor of their empathic (both 
affective and behavioural) response (Hoffman, 1977), but also that top-down processing 
(e.g. existing cognitions, previous experiences, or memories related to empathy and affect) 
can also influence how stimuli are attended to and encoded (Hofelich & Preston, 2012; 
Preston & Stansfield, 2008).  A cross-sectional examination cannot provide evidence of 
cause and effect, and should attentional bias and empathy be established to have a 
relationship, much more work will be needed to understand causality. 
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4.5 Clinical Implications 
In disorders such as anxiety and depression, cognitive models acknowledge that 
automatic and preconscious attentional bias plays a key role in the aetiology and 
maintenance of the presenting problem, forming a basis for the development of cognitive 
distortions (MacLeod & Mathews, 1988; J. Williams et al., 1997).  This cognitive approach 
is a firm foundation for cognitive-behavioural interventions, which are now some of the 
most common approaches for treatment of a wide variety of mental health problems 
(National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence, 2008). The aim of these 
interventions is to develop more adaptive cognitions, emotions and behaviour, by 
increasing an individuals’ awareness of empathic and information processing biases or 
deficits, and using a range of techniques to develop more adaptive processes.   
An increasing evidence base suggests that cognitive behavioural therapies (CBT) 
are effective with people with ID.  In IDO, research has demonstrated the application of 
CBT with men with anger and aggression (Willner, 2007), following arson convictions 
(Taylor, Thorne, Robertson, & Avery, 2002), in sex offenders (Sex Offender Treatment 
Services Collaborative – Intellectual Disabilities, 2010), and in female offenders (Allan, 
Lindsay, Macleod, & Smith, 2001).  The findings from the current study suggest that IDO 
have an information processing bias for affective information, which offers support for the 
use of CBT interventions in a similar way to CBT used in clinical populations – that is, 
seeking to reduce biases that are considered unhelpful.  Furthermore, in future studies using 
CBT in IDO, it may be that ascertaining whether or not an individual exhibits biases in 
information processing pre and post intervention could contribute to the understanding of 
treatment outcomes, and mechanisms of change.  Attentional bias tasks have already been 
applied as assessment tool in other areas (Mathews, Mogg, Kentish, & Eysenck, 1995), and 
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the benefits of the dot-probe being language free is particularly important in this 
population.   
Despite the increasing research into CBT, it is also important to note that some 
factors associated with ID are thought to pose an obstacle for engagement in talking 
therapy, such as reduced expressive and receptive language skills, memory impairments, or 
executive dysfunction problems (see Willner, 2009).  Whilst it is positive to see that the 
creation of idiosyncratic, formulation driven approaches to treatment can make it possible 
to support individuals with these deficits (Taylor, Novaco, & Johnson, 2009; Willner, 
Bailey, Parry, & Dymond, 2010), it may also be helpful to also look forward to alternative 
approaches that may also confer therapeutic benefits.  Attention Bias Modification (ABM), 
a sub-type of cognitive bias modification programmes are one such example (Bar-Heim, 
2010).  They are based on the idea that specifically altering the way in which an individual 
processes external information makes it possible to reduce levels of a clinical phenomenon 
of interest. 
Using an attention-training variant of an attentional bias task, whereby the location 
of the probe is systematically manipulated such that targets will more frequently appear at 
the location of the neutral stimulus, a new bias can be learnt that targets attention away 
from salient stimuli.  Evidence already shows this has positive outcomes in disorders such 
as generalised anxiety disorder (Amir, Beard, Burns, & Bomyea, 2009).  Given these 
preliminary findings and the aforementioned benefits of the dot-probe task in this 
population, the future consideration of ABM in IDO might be warranted, either as a sole or 
adjunctive treatment.  However, much more research would be needed in order to confirm 
the existence and nature of attentional bias in this population, and its role in offending 
behaviour, before such a line of enquiry could be pursued. 
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Finally, findings from this study may also suggest that the dot-probe task could be 
used to investigate other types of information processing bias in people with ID, and there 
is great scope for altering the task stimuli in a number of ways that reflect different clinical 
presentations.  Given the strength of anxiety and depression biases observed in the general 
population, it is highly possible that similar biases exist in people with ID with comparable 
mental health problems, and again, evidence of such a bias would offer support for the 
application of cognitive-behavioural interventions.   
4.6 Future Research 
Discussions of the findings in relation to the methodological considerations, 
theoretical and clinical implications have raised a number of issues that would benefit from 
consideration in future research.  In order for more definitive conclusions to be drawn in 
this field, studies with larger sample sizes and additional control groups could be used to 
investigate different interactions between variables of interest.  Also, examination of the 
impact of both psychological and pharmacological treatment on bias scores, and varied 
lengths of presentation of the stimulus, may be worthy of investigation.  Furthermore, the 
use of vignettes may be helpful in understanding the effects of priming on how information 
is processed, as this can increase the salience of the stimuli (Ward et al., 2006).   
It will also be beneficial to examine the role of offender type, and stimuli, in more 
detail.  One way of doing this could be to use the current study design, and to explore 
whether a different set of images elicits the same attentional bias.  A recent study by van 
Duijvenbode et al. (2012) described methods for identifying and standardising stimuli for 
use in an attentional bias task, specifically in IDO.  Use of such a methodology with the 
same sample completing the attentional bias task would give valuable information as to 
how the participants perceive the image (e.g. they could rate the images on valence, 
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pleasantness, attractiveness etc.), and this would provide useful information in interpreting 
the nature of any attentional bias observed. 
Alternatively, a more homogenous sample of IDO who have committed a specific 
type of offence could be examined, and stimuli could then be specifically matched to the 
offence group, in order to see whether salience has an influence over the findings.  For 
example, participants could be examined in terms of their index offence e.g. violent crime, 
arson, or sexual offence.  The use of a case series methodology involving the collation of 
more in depth demographic and offence information, and generation of idiographic stimuli, 
could also be used to investigate the degree to which the personal salience of the stimuli 
influences attentional bias.  In addition, female IDO are significantly unrepresented in the 
literature, and it would be interesting to see if the current findings are replicated across both 
genders.   
It would also helpful to consider a number of new avenues of investigation, building 
upon the evidence from the current study.  Current investigations examining attentional 
bias, empathy and moral reasoning are underway, but a necessary next step will be to 
explore how attentional bias specifically relates to cognitive distortions in this population.  
A number of measures exist that measure cognitive distortions expressed by IDO, 
particularly with sex offenders (Lindsay, Whitefield, Carson, Broxholme, & Steptoe, 2004), 
but there are also measures that can be applied across offender groups (Barriga, Gibbs, 
Potter, & Liau, 2001).  Such studies will help to make more direct links regarding how 
different biases in information processing interact with offence behaviour, and to 
understand how they can be better targeted through treatment. 
Attention has a number of physiological consequences, such as autonomic arousal 
and electro-cortical activity, and it would be interesting to see whether such measures can 
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also identify physiological differences between groups.  In particular, using a direct 
measurement of attentional deployment, such as eye gaze tracker, would help to disentangle 
whether attentional bias is associated with vigilance or disengagement.  Finally, although 
the aetiology of attentional bias in IDO is unknown, its presence suggests that it may be 
worthy of future investigation in terms of therapeutic interventions.  Existing cognitive-
behavioural interventions are increasingly being pursued in IDO, but there is also evidence 
from other clinical populations that this sort of cognitive responding can be modified 
through both holistic and more targeted approaches (Bar-Heim, 2010), and the present 
study paves the way for future investigations that may seek to explore such interventions. 
4.7 Chapter Summary and Conclusions 
A number of theories of offending in people with ID exist, however, models that 
draw together these ideas in order to create a more comprehensive understanding are likely 
to have the greatest explanatory potential.  The allocation of attentional resources is the first 
step in information processing, empathy and moral reasoning morals theories that describe 
offending, and the present investigation sought to examine attentional bias in IDO, and to 
consider how this relates to empathy.   
This thesis has demonstrated that there are significant differences in empathy and 
the way in which offenders and non-offenders with ID process affective information, but 
that attentional bias is not able to predict group differences in empathy.  Taking the present 
study together with previous investigations in non-ID offenders, it can be concluded that 
there is some support for the application of attentional theories of information processing 
within the IDO population, although a number of factors need to be explored in greater 
detail before more robust conclusions can be drawn about this phenomenon.  At present, it 
would be inappropriate to target information processing as a mechanism for change in 
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clinical interventions, however the results suggest that cognitive tasks are able to capture 
group differences.  If future research addressed some limitations of the present study and 
more precisely defined the nature of this bias, measures of attentional bias may have the 
potential to be used as an assessment or outcome tool in the future, and may even have 
application in therapeutic contexts.  
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Appendix 3. Systematic Literature Review Screening Criteria 
 
1. For search one, studies must have been published from the date of database 
inception through to date of search (except Pubmed, where the search was for the 
most recent year only).  For search two, studies must have been published since the 
date of the last search, to the date of the second search. 
2. Written in English. 
3. Contained at least one group of people who had been convicted of an offence. 
4. Investigates attentional bias using an experimental task that yields reaction times 
(e.g. not just physiological data). 
5. Used salient (rather than generic) stimuli, defined as either affective or offence-
related stimuli. 
6. Participants were aged 18 or over. 
7. Were published/peer reviewed. 
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175 
 
Appendix 5. Study Selection and Exclusion Process  
  
Papers reviewed and excluded n = 41; 7 
 
NHS Evidence n = 33; 1 
 Sample under 18 years of age n = 8; 1 
 No offender only group n = 2; 0 
 Did not use reaction times to stimuli for outcome 
data n = 3; 0 
 Not peer reviewed n = 12; 0 
 Tasks did not use offence salient/emotion valence 
stimuli n = 8; 0 
 
Web of Knowledge n = 8; 6 
 No offender only group n = 3; 3 
 Did not use reaction times to stimuli for outcome 
data n = 2; 3 
 No attention task n = 1; 0 
 Tasks did not use offence salient/emotion valence 
stimuli n = 2; 0 
 
Papers obtained via ancestry method n = 3; 1 
 
Studies excluded on basis of title and abstract 
n = 1069 (search 1); 292 (search 2) 
 
NHS Evidence n = 576; 142 
 Duplicates n = 229; 107 
 Language other than English n = 21; 0 
 Studies excluded on the basis of title n = 147; 32 
 Studies excluded on the basis of abstract n=179; 3 
 
Web of Knowledge n = 410; 76 
 Duplicates (within results, and with previous 
search) n = 151; 12 
 Language other than English n = 31; 0 
 Studies excluded on the basis of title n = 201; 60 
 Studies excluded on the basis of abstract n=27; 4 
 
PubMed n = 83; 74 
 Duplicates (within results, and with previous 
searches) n = 8; 0 
 Language other than English n = 0; 0 
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 NHS Evidence n = 43; 1 
 Web of Knowledge n = 8; 8 
 
Potentially relevant papers 
identified by electronic database 
search 
n = 1120 (search 1); 301 (search 2) 
 NHS Evidence n = 619; 143 
 Web of Knowledge n = 418; 84 
 PubMed n= 83; 74 
 
Suitable studies n = 10 
 NHS Evidence n = 10; 2 
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3. Who have the capacity to consent to taking part in research 
 
Participants are being recruited from NHS and independent sector secure forensic services, 
and day services and community intellectual disability teams.  
Who are the researchers? 
 
Dr Peter Langdon, Clinical Senior Lecturer, University of East Anglia 
P.Langdon@uea.ac.uk 
Susan Sadek, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East Anglia 
S.Sadek@uea.ac.uk 
Matthew Daniel, Trainee Clinical Psychologist, University of East Anglia 
Matthew.Daniel@uea.ac.uk 
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Principal Investigator: Dr Peter Langdon        Phone: 01603 593599 
Address: Department of Psychological Sciences, Norwich Medical School,     University of East Anglia, 
Norwich Research Park, Norwich, NR4 7TJ 
What happens in the study? 
 
Researchers get in contact with teams who may have eligible service users, to discuss the 
research with staff 
 
Staff can give service users an information sheet, and ask them if they would like to talk to 
the researchers 
 
If service users say they would be interested in taking part, staff can then inform the 
researcher 
 
The researcher will arrange a time to visit the service user.  They will explain the study 
further, answer questions, and ensure that information sheets have been read and 
understood.  The full research assessment will take approximately 2 hours. 
 
The researcher will meet the service user again, two weeks later for a follow up 
appointment.  This will take 15 minutes. 
 
Participants will be reimbursed with a £20 shopping voucher for their time 
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Appendix 7. Participant Information Sheet 
 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
 
 
                          University of East Anglia                                  
                                       Norwich NR4 7TJ England                                      
                                                  Telephone:  01603 593599 
                                Fax: 01603 593604 
                                                    Email: 
P.Langdon@uea.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
                                              
 
Norwich Medical School 
 
 
INFORMATION SHEET 
 
 
 
Study Title: How do people with learning disabilities understand what is right 
or wrong? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
You are being asked to take part in research. 
 
IF YOU WOULD LIKE SOMEONE ELSE TO BE PRESENT WHILE WE TALK 
ABOUT THIS, PLEASE TELL ME.  YOU CAN HAVE AN ADVOCATE, FRIEND, 
KEYWORKER, OR SOMEONE ELSE COME IN AND TALK WITH US. 
 
You can talk to others about this research study if you want to.  This can be 
anyone you like.    
 
Please ask if there is anything that you do not understand.   
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Who are the Researchers? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dr Peter Langdon Clinical  
Clinical Psychologist 
University of East Anglia 
Susan Sadek 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist, 
University of East Anglia 
Matthew Daniel 
Trainee Clinical Psychologist, 
University of East Anglia 
 
 
 
 
We want to find out: 
 how people with a learning disability understand why some 
things are right or wrong. 
 how people with a learning disability pay attention to different 
types of pictures 
 
Do I have to take part in this research? 
 NO, you do not have to take part in this research. 
 If you say YES, you can change it to NO later on. 
 
 
IMPORTANT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 If you say YES, Peter, Susan or Matthew will contact you to 
arrange a time to meet. 
 We will ask you to do a task on the computer which involves 
looking at pictures and pressing special keys on a box. 
 We will ask you some questions about how you feel about 
different things like obeying the law.  We will come back in about 
two weeks and ask you some questions a second time. 
 You may have to do some puzzles and some tasks in order to 
help us understand what sorts of things you are good at doing.  If 
you have done these puzzles and tasks before, you do not have 
to do them again.  We can get this information from your notes. 
 We will ask you if you have ever been in trouble with the police.  
 YOU SHOULD NOT TELL PETER, SUSAN OR MATTHEW 
ABOUT THINGS YOU MAY HAVE DONE THAT ARE AGAINST 
THE LAW THAT OTHER PEOPLE DO NOT KNOW ABOUT. 
 IF YOU DO, PETER, SUSAN OR MATTHEW MAY TELL 
SOMEONE ELSE, AND YOU MAY GET INTO TROUBLE. 
 THIS MEANS THAT YOU SHOULD ONLY TELL PETER, SUSAN 
OR MATTHEW ABOUT THINGS YOU HAVE DONE WHICH YOU 
HAVE ALREADY BEEN IN TROUBLE FOR. 
 You will be asked for permission to look at the information the 
NHS and Social Services has about you.  
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Payment 
 We will give you a shopping voucher for £20.00 
 
 
How long will it take? 
 About two hours.  You can take a break half way through if you 
like. 
 We will come back in about two weeks and ask you some 
questions again.  This will take about 30 minutes.  
 
 
Could bad things happen if I do the research? 
 Some of the pictures we will show you on the computer are not 
very nice.   
 Some will show people in pain, and will contain blood.  Not all of 
the pictures are like this.  They will only appear on the computer 
very quickly - for less than one second at a time.  
 If you do not like the pictures and decide you want to stop, that is 
ok. 
 You may think some of the questions are silly, but we would like 
you to try to answer them as best as you can.  
 If anything upsets you, we can stop, and you can talk to Peter, 
Susan or Matthew, or you can talk to someone else.  
 
 
Could good things happen if I do the research n? 
 By saying YES you might help us to understand how people with 
learning disabilities understand why some things are right and 
some things are wrong.  You might also help us to understand why 
some people look at pictures in different ways. 
 
 
Will information about me be kept private?  
 Yes, but: 
o We will tell your care team if you tell us things that mean 
you or someone else is at risk.  This is to protect you and 
other people.   
o We may look at your records.  We will ask you if this is okay. 
o People who are in charge of making sure that the 
researchers are following the rules may also look at your 
records and the information they collect about you.  
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What happens at the end? 
 The results will be written about. No names will be given. 
 
 
 
Who is organising and giving money for the research? 
 The National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) is paying for the 
research.  
 
Has the research been checked? 
 People have looked at the study to check it is safe.  
 People have also checked to make sure that everyone gets good 
information before they start. 
 
What if you are unhappy about the research? 
 You can talk to the researchers first if you like.  
 You can make a complaint to the University of East Anglia or the 
NHS. 
 We will give you information about how to complain. 
 You may want a key worker to help you make a complaint. 
 If you are harmed, you may be able to take legal action against 
the University of East Anglia or the NHS, but you may have to pay 
for this.  
 
Contacts: 
 
 If you want any extra information, or you wish to complain, you or 
your key worker can call (Monday to Friday) or write to: 
 
Dr. Peter Langdon, Clinical Senior Lecturer/Honorary 
Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
 
His phone number is: 01603 593599  
 
or:  
 
Ms Susan Sadek or Mr Matthew Daniel.  
 
Their telephone number is 01603 593177 
 
Their address is: 
 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Norwich Medical School 
University of East Anglia 
Norwich Research Park 
Norwich           NR4 7TJ 
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Appendix 8. Flow Chart to Show Recruitment Procedure 
Ethical and R&D approval granted.
Three researchers (Trainee 1 and 2, and Chief Investigator) obtain contact details 
for managers for appropriate research sites within the East of England.
Send letters to all service managers, asking if they  would like to   
hear about the research.
Manager agrees for the researcher to meet the team
Yes
Manager declines invitation to   
research involvement.
No further involvement.
Researcher presents study to teams.  Team asked to share study 
information (including information sheets) with potential 
participants.
Potential participants who are interested in the study inform their 
key worker/a member of staff.
Yes
Staff member contacts the researcher, and a time is arranged for     
the researcher to meet the participant, to check eligibility and take 
consent.
Potential participant meets inclusion criteria.
Yes
Written consent to participation is sought.
Time 1:  Each researcher collects data - approximately 31 
participants each. Measures are for both Trainee 1 and Trainee 2 
studies, lasting approximately two hours.
Time 2 (two weeks later):  Each researcher collects data for the  
same participants seen at Time 1.  Measures used are for Trainee 2 
study only, lasting approximately 20 minutes
If >50% of the research is completed, participant is reimbursed.
No further involvement.
No potential participants identified.
No further involvement.
Participant does not meet inclusion 
criteria.
No further involvement.
No
IDO: forensic hospitals
IDNO: day service/
community teams
No
No
Yes
Consent is given to take part in the research.
No
No No
No
No
Participant does not give consent         
to participation/consent is withdrawn    
at any time.
No further involvement.
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Appendix 9. Flow Chart to Show Two Trainees Involvement in the Research 
  
 
Key 
                                 = Trainees together 
                                 = Trainees independently 
Trainee 1 and 2 submit joint ethics and R&D applications with the CI:
“Attentional Bias and Moral Reasoning in People with Intellectual Disabilities”.
All data is collated.  Paper data is stored at UEA with the CI.  All electronic data is 
stored on one database, held by the CI.  
Trainee 1 and Trainee 2 develop and submit independent  
research proposals.
Data analysis and write up for Trainee 1 and 2 is completed 
independently.
“Attentional Bias Towards Positive and 
Negative Imagery Amongst Offenders and 
Non-Offenders with Intellectual Disabilities”
“Intellectual Disabilities, Moral Reasoning, 
and Problem Solving”
A secure copy of the data relevant to each trainee is held on 
their computers.
Participants are identified and recruited according to the process outlined in Appendix 7.
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Appendix 10. Data Collection Pack 
 
Doctoral Programme in Clinical Psychology 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
 
 
                     University of East Anglia 
                                     
                                       Norwich NR4 7TJ 
England 
                                       
                                                   
 
 
 
                                              
 
Norwich Medical School 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
STUDY TITLE:   Developing measures and exploring relationships between 
empathy, reasoning and problem solving with men with intellectual 
disabilities who have forensic mental health problems 
 
Data Collection Pack 
 
TIME 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Date of Assessment: ________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Name of Researcher: ________________________________________ 
  
PARTICIPANT 
IDENTIFICATION 
NUMBER 
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1. INITIAL SCREENING AND DEMOGRAPHIC QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
“I just need to collect some background information about you by asking your some 
simple questions” 
 
1. “What is your date of birth?”  
 
_________________________________________________ 
 
2. “What is your ethnic group?  
 
Choose ONE section from A to E, then tick the appropriate box to indicate your 
ethnic group. 
 
A : White 
� British 
� Irish 
� Any other White background (please state) 
 
B : Mixed 
� White and Black Caribbean 
� White and Black African 
� White and Asian 
� Any other mixed background (please state) 
 
C : Asian or Asian British 
� Indian 
� Pakistani 
� Bangladeshi 
� Any other Asian background (please state) 
 
D : Black or Black British 
� Caribbean 
� African 
� Any other Black background (please state) 
 
E : Chinese or other ethnic group 
� Chinese 
� Any other (please state) 
 
F. Not stated 
� Not stated 
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3. “Are you married, single, living with someone, widowed or divorced? 
 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
4. “Do you have any children?   
 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
5. “What sort of school did you go to?  Was it a special school or a mainstream 
school, or a learning support unit, or did you receive any extra help?” 
 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
6. “What’s the highest level of education you have finished?” 
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
7. “Do you have any serious problems with your physical health?” 
 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
8. “Do you have any problems with your mental health?” 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
187 
 
“I would like to ask you if you have ever committed a crime that someone else, like 
a police officer, social worker, or doctor already knows about.  Do not tell me about 
crimes that are still secret to you.  If you do, I will have to tell somebody else about 
them.  This could be the police.”   
 
“Have you ever been charged, cautioned or convicted of a criminal offence 
before? I do not mean minor traffic offences.” 
 
“Have you ever been in trouble because you did something you should not 
have which the police talked to you about?” 
 
 
YES      NO 
 
If yes, “What have you been in trouble for?” 
 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
 
 
If yes, “Are you happy for me to see you again in the future?” 
 
YES        NO 
 
9. “Do you receive any help or support from the Learning Difficulties Team?” 
 
 
8.1. “Is there anyone who helps you to do things through-out the day? 
Like a support worker or a carer?” 
 
YES        NO 
 
8.2. “What sorts of things do they help with?” 
 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________
_______________________________________________ 
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PART A: 
1. DOT–PROBE TASK 
 
Data recorded through computer task. 
 
2. GLASGOW ANXIETY SCALE FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES 
 
I would like to talk to you about how you have been feeling just recently. First, it 
would help if you could tell me something you did last . . . state a day of the 
week/about a week ago.’ (Provide prompts as necessary or ask a carer) 
 
I am going to ask you some questions about how you have been feeling since [the 
anchor event] over the past week. There is no right or wrong answer; it is just 
about how you feel. If I have not explained something clearly, please ask me to tell 
you what I mean. For each question, I will ask you if you have ‘never felt like this’, 
‘sometimes felt like this’ or ‘always felt like this’. Demonstrate these responses 
using cue cards.  Check that the participant understands the concepts using 
everyday examples (e.g. ‘Do you like to go to the cinema?’). 
 
Each question should be asked in two parts. First, the participant is asked to 
choose between a ‘yes’ and ‘no ’answer. Use the symbols, if necessary. If their 
answer is ‘no’, the score in that column (‘0’ or ‘2’) should be recorded. If their 
answer is ‘yes’, they should be asked if that is ‘sometimes’ or ‘always’, and the 
score recorded as appropriate. Some respondents will be able to use the three-
point scale from the start, others might learn the ‘rules’ as you proceed. 
Supplementary questions (italics) may be used if the primary question is not 
understood completely.  If a response is unclear, ask for specific examples of what 
the participant means, or talk with them about their answer until you feel able to 
allocate it to a response category. 
 
 
In the last week...? Never/ 
No 
Some- 
times 
Always/ a 
lot 
Worries 
1 Do you worry a lot? (…feel worked up/wound 
up/uptight) 
0 1 2 
2 Do you have lots of thoughts that go round in your 
head? (…thoughts that you can’t stop/come from 
nowhere) 
0 1 2 
3 Do you worry about your parents/family? 0 1 2 
4 Do you worry about what will happen in the future? 
(tailored to the individual; e.g. what will happen if 
you can’t live with your mum anymore?) 
0 1 2 
5 Do you worry that something awful might happen? 0 1 2 
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6 Do you worry if you do not feel well? (…if you feel 
sick) 
0 1 2 
7 Do you worry when you are doing something new? 
(…for the first time) 
0 1 2 
8 Do you worry about what you are doing tomorrow? 0 1 2 
9 Can you stop worrying? (reverse score) 0 1 2 
10 Do you worry about death/dying? 0 1 2 
Specific fears 
11 Do you get scared in the dark? (…think of being in 
bed with the lights out: would you be scared?) 
0 1 2 
12 Do you feel scared if you are high up? (…think of 
being up a high building…) 
0 1 2 
13 Do you feel scared in lifts or escalators? (Would 
you go in?) 
0 1 2 
14 Are you scared of dogs? (Would you stroke/clap?) 0 1 2 
15 Are you scared of spiders? (Would you go near?) 0 1 2 
16 Do you feel scared going to see the doctor or 
dentist? 
0 1 2 
17 Do you feel scared meeting new people? 0 1 2 
18 Do you feel scared in busy places? (…like crowds, 
shopping centre) 
0 1 2 
19 Do you feel scared in wide open spaces? 
(…nothing round you) 
0 1 2 
Physiological symptoms 
20 Do you ever feel very hot or sweaty? (…all hot and 
bothered) 
0 1 2 
21 Does your heart beat faster? 0 1 2 
22 Do your hands and legs shake? 0 1 2 
23 Does your stomach ever feel funny, like butterflies? 0 1 2 
24 Do you ever feel breathless? (…hard to 
breathe/out of breath) 
0 1 2 
25 Do you feel like you need to go to the toilet more 
than usual? (…for a ‘pee’) 
0 1 2 
26 Is it difficult to sit still? (…feel you can’t sit at 
peace) 
0 1 2 
27 Do you feel panicky? (…get into a panic/a ‘state’) 0 1 2 
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3. GLASGOW DEPRESSION SCALE FOR PEOPLE WITH INTELLECTUAL 
DISABILITIES 
 
‘I am going to ask you about how you have been feeling since [anchor event last 
week]. Just between . . . and now, OK. There is no right or wrong answer - I just 
want to know how you have been feeling. If I don’t explain things well enough, just 
ask me to tell you what I mean. 
 
 
In the last week . . . Never/ 
No 
Some- 
times 
Always/ a 
lot 
1 Have you felt sad? 
        Have you felt upset? 
        Have you felt miserable? 
        Have you felt depressed? 
0 1 2 
2 Have you felt as if you are in a bad mood? 
        Have you felt bad-tempered? 
        Have you felt as if you want to shout at 
people? 
0 1 2 
3 Have you enjoyed the things you have done? 
        Have you had fun? 
        Have you enjoyed yourself? 
0 1 2 
4 Have you enjoyed talking to people and being 
with other people? 
        Have you liked having people around 
you? 
        Have you enjoyed other people’s 
company? 
0 1 2 
5 Have you made sure you have washed 
yourself, worn clean clothes, brushed 
you teeth and combed your hair? 
        Have you taken care of the way you 
look? 
        Have you looked after your appearance? 
0 1 2 
6 Have you felt tired during the day? 
        Have you gone to sleep during the day? 
        Have you found it hard to stay awake 
during the day? 
0 1 2 
7 Have you cried? 
 
0 1 2 
8 Have you felt you are a horrible person? 
        Have you felt others don’t like you? 
0 1 2 
9 Have you been able to pay attention to things 
(such as watching TV)? 
        Have you been able to concentrate on 
things (like  
        television programmes)? 
        What is your favourite [television 
0 1 2 
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programme]? Are you 
        able to watch it from start to finish? 
10 Have you found it hard to make decisions? 
        Have you found it hard to decide what to 
wear, or what  
        you would like to eat, or do? 
        Have you found it hard to choose 
between two things?  
       [Give concrete example if required.] 
0 1 2 
11 Have you found it hard to sit still? 
        Have you fidgeted when you are sitting 
down? 
        Have you been moving about a lot, like 
you can’t help it? 
0 1 2 
12 Have you been eating too little? 
        Have you been eating too much? 
        Do people say you should eat more/less? 
[Positive response for eating too much 
OR too little is scored.] 
0 1 2 
13 Have you found it hard to get a good night’s 
sleep? 
         [Ask questions to clarify information. If a 
positive response is given to one of 
the following, score positively.] 
        Have you found it hard to fall asleep at 
night? 
        Have you woken up in the middle of the 
night and found it hard to get back to 
sleep? 
        Have you woken up too early in the 
morning? [Clarify time.] 
0 1 2 
14 Have you felt that life is not worth living? 
        Have you wished you could die? 
        Have you felt you do not want to go on 
living? 
0 1 2 
15 Have you felt as if everything is your fault? 
        Have you felt as if people blame you for 
things? 
        Have you felt that things happen because 
of you? 
0 1 2 
16 Have you felt that other people are looking at 
you, talking about you, or laughing at 
you? 
        Have you worried about what other 
people think of you? 
0 1 2 
17 Have you become very upset if someone says 
you have done something wrong or 
you have made a mistake? 
0 1 2 
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        Do you feel sad if someone tells you . . 
./gives you a row? 
        Do you feel like crying if someone tells 
you . . ./gives you a row? 
18 Have you felt worried? 
        Have you felt nervous? 
        Have you felt tense/wound up/on edge? 
0 1 2 
19 Have you thought that bad things keep 
happening to you? 
        Have you felt that nothing nice ever 
happens to you anymore? 
0 1 2 
20 Have you felt happy when something good 
happened? 
[If nothing good has happened in the past 
week] 
If someone gave you a nice present, 
would that make you happy? 
0 1 2 
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4. EMPATHY QUOTIENT (EQ) 
This version has 40 items (the 20 filler items have been removed). 
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1 I can easily tell if someone else wants to enter 
a conversation. 
2 1 0 0 
2 I find it difficult to explain to others things that I 
understand easily, when they don’t understand 
it first time. 
0 0 1 2 
3 I really enjoy caring for other people. 2 1 0 0 
4 I find it hard to know what to do in a social 
situation. 
0 0 1 2 
5 People often tell me that I went too far in 
driving my point home in a discussion. 
0 0 1 2 
6 It doesn’t bother me too much if I am late 
meeting a friend. 
0 0 1 2 
7 Friendships and relationships are just too 
difficult, so I tend not to bother with them. 
0 0 1 2 
8 I often find it difficult to judge if something is 
rude or polite. 
0 0 1 2 
9 In a conversation, I tend to focus on my own 
thoughts rather than on what my listener might 
be thinking. 
0 0 1 2 
10 When I was a child, I enjoyed cutting up worms 
to see what would happen. 
0 0 1 2 
11 I can pick up quickly if someone says one thing 
but means another. 
2 1 0 0 
12 It is hard for me to see why some things upset 
people so much. 
0 0 1 2 
13 I find it easy to put myself in somebody else’s 
shoes. 
2 1 0 0 
14 I am good at predicting how someone will feel. 2 1 0 0 
15 I am quick to spot when someone in a group is 
feeling awkward or uncomfortable. 
2 1 0 0 
16 If I say something that someone else is 
offended by, I think that that’s their problem, 
not mine. 
0 0 1 2 
17 If anyone asked me if I like their haircut, I 
would reply truthfully, even if I didn’t like it. 
0 0 1 2 
18 I can’t always see why someone should have 
felt offended by a remark. 
0 0 1 2 
19 Seeing people cry doesn’t really upset me. 0 0 1 2 
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20 I am very blunt, which some people take to be 
rudeness, even though this is unintentional. 
   
1 
 
2 
21 I don’t tend to find social situations confusing. 2 1 0 0 
22 Other people tell me I am good at 
understanding how they are feeling and what 
they are thinking. 
2 1 0 0 
23 When I talk to people, I tend to talk about their 
experiences rather than my own. 
2 1 0 0 
24 It upsets me to see animals in pain. 2 1 0 0 
25 I am able to make decisions without being 
influenced by people’s feelings. 
0 0 1 2 
26 I can easily tell if someone else is interested or 
bored with what I am saying. 
2 1 0 0 
27 I get upset if I see people suffering on news 
programmes. 
2 1 0 0 
28 Friends usually talk to me about their problems 
as they say I am very understanding. 
2 1 0 0 
29 I can sense if I am intruding, even if the other 
person doesn’t tell me. 
 
2 
 
1 
0 0 
30 People sometimes tell me that I have gone too 
far with teasing. 
0 0 1 2 
31 Other people often say that I am insensitive, 
though I don’t always see why. 
0 0 1 2 
32 If I see a stranger in a group, I think that it is up 
to them to make an effort to join in. 
0 0 1 2 
33 I usually stay emotionally detached when 
watching a film. 
0 0 1 2 
34 I can tune into how someone else feels rapidly 
and intuitively. 
2 1 0 0 
35 I can easily work out what another person 
might want to talk about. 
2 1 0 0 
36 I can tell if someone is masking their true 
emotion. 
2 1 0 0 
37 I don’t consciously work out the rules of social 
situations. 
2 1 0 0 
38 I am good at predicting what someone will do. 2 1 0 0 
39 I tend to get emotionally involved with a friend’s 
problems. 
2 1 0 0 
40 I can usually appreciate the other person’s 
viewpoint, even if I don’t agree with it. 
2 1 0 0 
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Appendix 11. Images for the Dot-Probe Task 
 
Negative-affective images (1) 
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Negative-affective images (2) 
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Neutral-affective images (1) 
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Neutral-affective images (2) 
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Positive-affective images (1) 
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Positive-affective images (2) 
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Appendix 12. Practice Images for the Dot-Probe Task 
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Appendix 13. Consent Form 
 
 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
 
University of East Anglia 
                                     
Norwich NR4 7TJ England 
 
Telephone 01603 593599 
Fax 01603 593604 
 
Email P.Langdon@uea.ac.uk 
 
Norwich Medical School 
 
 
CONSENT FORM FOR RESEARCH 
          
Participant identification number: 
 
 
 
 
Study title: 
 
How do people with learning disabilities understand what is right and wrong? 
 
 
Name of researchers 
 
Susan Sadek, Trainee Clinical Psychologist 
Matthew Daniel, Trainee Clinical Psychologist  
Dr Peter Langdon, Clinical Senior Lecturer & Honorary Consultant Clinical Psychologist 
 
Please initial or tick  the box if you agree with the sentence.  
 
I confirm an advocate/key-worker was actually present when the study was 
explained to me. 
 
 
I understand the information sheet dated 18 October 2012 (Version 2.0) for this 
study, explained to me by ________________________ 
 
 
I have asked any questions I wanted.   
 
I understand that I can leave the research at any time (even while doing the 
questionnaires) without giving a reason. 
 
 
I agree for the research team to look at my clinical notes 
 
 
203 
 
 
I agree for my key worker to know I am taking part 
 
 
 
I understand that if I tell the researchers about offences which no one else knows 
about then they may tell other people about them (e.g. the police, my doctor, or my 
social worker).  
 
 
I understand that people from the NHS may check the information collected by the 
researchers to make sure they are following the rules.  I agree to this. 
 
 
I agree to take part in the research.  
 
I would like to be contacted in the future to take part in other studies. 
If you tick this box, we will keep your name and address, but this will remain secret.  We 
may get in touch and ask you if you would like to do a new study.  However, you can say 
no at any point.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Name of Participant  Date  Signature 
 
 
 
My address is: 
 
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________ 
 
My telephone number is: 
 
________________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
 
      
Name of Witness (If Present)  Date  Signature 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
Name of Researcher     Date      Signature 
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Appendix 14. Visual Analogue Scale 
(For use with the GDS-ID and GAS-ID) 
 
 
 
 
Never/No 
 
 
 
 
 
Sometimes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Always/A lot 
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 (For use with the EQ) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Strongly agree Slightly agree 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slightly disagree 
 
 
Strongly disagree 
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Appendix 15. Favourable Ethical Opinion 
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Appendix 16. Local NHS Permissions 
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Appendix 17. Results: Kolmogorov-Smirnov Tests 
 
  
  
IDO IDNO 
Statistic df Sig Statistic df Sig 
Age .24 34 *.00 .15 32 .08 
School leaving age .31 32 *.00 .21 30 *.00 
FSIQ
 a
 .11 33 .20
 
 .15 32 .06 
GAS
 a
 .10 34 .20
 
 .09 32 .20 
GDS
 a
 .09 33 .20
 
 .11 32 .20 
EQ
 a
 .12 33 .20
 
 .14 32 .10 
Mean Dot-Probe Scores (ms)       
     All Trials .24 33 *.00 .17 32 .02 
     Negative Congruent Trials .25 33 *.00 .19 32 *.01 
     Positive Congruent Trials .29 33 *.00 .16 32 *.05 
     Negative Incongruent Trials .25 33 *.00 .13 32 .20 
     Positive Incongruent Trials .23 33 *.00 .18 32 *.01 
     Neutral Trials .25 33 *.00 .16 32 *.03 
     Negative-Affective Bias Index  .12 33 .20 .21 32 *.00 
     Positive-Affective Bias Index .19 33 *.00 .21 32 *.00 
     Global-Affective Bias Index .18 33 *.01 .22 32 *.00 
     Errors .26 33 *.00 .32 32 *.00 
Note: * Statistically significant (2 tailed). a Normally distributed 
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Appendix 18. Results: Homogeneity of the Regression Slopes 
 
 Age 
(Sig) 
FSIQ 
(Sig) 
GAS
 
(Sig) 
GDS
 
(
Sig) 
Negative-Affective Bias Index .77 .20 .71 .74 
Positive-Affective Bias Index .85 .73 .71 .74 
Global-Affective Bias Index .40 .78 .68 .49 
Note.  FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, EQ = Empathy Quotient, GDS = Glasgow Depression Scale, GAS = Glasgow 
Anxiety Scale. 
 
Analyses conducted separately. 
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Appendix 19. Results: Correlation Analyses of Study Variables with Attentional 
Bias Indices 
 
 
Note.  FSIQ = Full Scale IQ, EQ = Empathy Quotient, GDS = Glasgow Depression Scale, GAS = Glasgow 
Anxiety Scale. a Pearson Correlation. b Statistically significant (2 tailed). c BCa 95% Confidence Interval. 
*Sig (2 tailed). 
 
 
 
 
 Negative-Affective 
Bias Index 
Positive-Affective 
Bias Index 
Global-Affective 
Bias Index 
Age -.19
 a
 
.13
 b
 
-.41-.01
 c
 
-.07
 a
 
.62
 b
 
-.27-.16
 c
 
-.15
 a
 
.24
 b
 
-.37-.06
 c
 
FSIQ -.02
 a
 
.86
 b
 
-.25-.25
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-.15
 a
 
.25
 b
 
-.37-.17
 c
 
-.08
 a
 
.51
 b
 
-.32-.22
 c
 
EQ -.01
 a
 
.95
 b
 
-.31-.23
 c
 
.12
 a
 
.37
 b
 
-.11-.30
 c
 
.05
a
 
.70
 b*
 
-.21-.27
 c
 
GAS -.04
 a
 
.76
 b
 
-.26-.16
 c
 
-.14
 a
 
.28
 b
 
-.33-.09
 c
 
-.09
 a
 
.48
 b
 
-.30-.12
 c
 
GDS .20
 a
 
.13
 b
 
.01-.36
 c
 
.08
 a
 
.53
 b
 
-.09-.278
 c
 
.16
 a
 
.21
 b
 
-.02-.35
 c
 
